Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 1 of 407

EXHIBIT B

1 2	BRIAN L. WILLIAMS, State Bar No. 227948 **BWilliams@GGTrialLaw.com** JEMMA E. DUNN, State Bar No. 258454	Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles	
3	JDunn@GGTrialLaw.com MATTHEW T. HALE, State Bar No. 303826 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com	6/26/2025 9:59 AM David W. Slayton, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, By Y. Tarasyuk, Deputy Clerk	
4	GREENBERG GROSS LLP 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor	by T. Tarasyuk, Deputy Clerk	
5	Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 334-7000		
6	Facsimile: (213) 334-7001		
7	Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson		
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
	FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES		
10	ASTA JONASSON, an individual,	Case No. 23STCV31143	
11 12	Plaintiff,	Assigned for All Purposes to: Hon. Daniel M. Crowley, Dept. 71	
13	V.	PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S NOTICE	
14	VIN DIESEL (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), an	OF APPLICATION AND APPLICATION TO (1) COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF	
15	individual; SAMANTHA VINCENT, an individual; ONE RACE PRODUCTIONS, INC., a California corporation; ONE RACE	DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL AND SANCTIONS OR (2) ALTERNATIVELY SHORTEN TIME REGARDING A	
16 17	FILMS, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive,	NOTICED MOTION FOR THE SAME RELIEF; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT	
18	Defendants.	THEREOF	
19	Defendants.	Date: June 26, 2025 Time: 8:30 a.m.	
20		Dept.: 71	
21		Action Filed: December 21, 2023 Trial Date: August 18, 2025	
22		[Filed Concurrently with Declaration of	
23		Matthew T. Hale; [Proposed] Order]	
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PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPLICATION AND APPLICATION TO COMPEL TO COMPEL

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on June 26, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 71 of Stanley Mosk Courthouse at 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, plaintiff Asta Jonasson will and hereby does apply to the Court for an order compelling Defendant Vin Diesel to appear for his deposition and for Defendant Vin Diesel and his counsel, Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley to pay sanctions in the amount of \$5,330.07, which is the amount reasonably incurred in connection with these proceedings. In the alternative, Plaintiff seeks an Order Shortening Time Regarding the Notice of a Motion for the Same Relief Pursuant to *Code of Civ. Proc.*, § 1005(b). A copy of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the Deposition, set for hearing on August 11, 2025, to be filed contemporaneously with this application, is attached as Exhibit 13 to the Declaration of Matthew T. Hale. (Hale Decl., ¶ 23, Exh. 13.)

Good cause exists for the above relief for the following reasons:

- 1. Defendant Vin Diesel has failed to appear for his properly noticed deposition scheduled for June 24-25, 2025, despite previously confirming his availability and the parties' agreement on the date and time, constituting a failure to submit to an authorized method of discovery in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(a).
- 2. With fact discovery closing on July 18, 2025, and trial set for August 18, 2025, Defendant's continued evasion through meritless objections and last-minute unavailability claims threatens irreparable prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to obtain essential testimony from the primary defendant needed to prosecute her sexual assault and wrongful termination claims at trial.
- 3. Defendant and his counsel have engaged in willful misuse of the discovery process through unmeritorious objections, obstructionist tactics, and unprofessional conduct, warranting the imposition of monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030(a), 2023.010(d), and 2023.010(e).

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This application will be based on Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.450(a), 2017.010, 2023.030(a), 2023.010(d), and 2023.010(e), the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declaration of Matthew T. Hale, and exhibits filed along with these papers, and other evidence to be presented at the hearing on this motion. DATED: June 25, 2025 **GREENBERG GROSS LLP** By: /s/ Matthew T. Hale Brian L. Williams Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

This case arises from Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's allegations that Defendant Vin Diesel sexually assaulted her in September 2010 while she was working as his assistant during the production of "Fast Five," and that she was terminated the following day in retaliation for resisting the assault. Empowered by recent legislative changes, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 21, 2023, seeking legal relief for the alleged sexual assault and wrongful termination under Code of Civil Procedure, § 340.16.

Defendant Vin Diesel has systematically evaded deposition for over a year through meritless objections and last-minute unavailability claims, despite previously confirming his availability for June 24-25, 2025. With fact discovery closing on July 18, 2025, and trial set for August 18, 2025, Defendant's obstructionist tactics—including his counsel's unprofessional conduct involving profanity and physical threats during counsels' meet and confer session—threaten to deny Plaintiff the essential testimony of the primary defendant needed to prosecute her claims at trial.

Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant this *ex parte* application to compel Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition before the discovery cutoff, impose monetary sanctions in the amount of \$5,330.07 against Defendant and his counsel for their willful abuse of the discovery process, and provide such other relief as the Court deems just and proper to prevent irreparable prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to present her case at trial.

II. <u>FACTUAL BACKGROUND</u>

A. <u>Defendant Vin Diesel's Testimony is Essential to the Prosecution of Plaintiff's</u> <u>Matter</u>

In September 2010, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson was hired by Defendants as an assistant working directly for Defendant Vin Diesel during the production of "Fast Five." (Compl., p. 2, ¶ 1.) Shortly after beginning her employment, on or about September 10, 2010, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Diesel sexually assaulted her in his hotel suite at the St. Regis Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia. (Compl., p. 10, ¶¶ 29-30.) The following day, on or about September 11, 2010, Plaintiff was terminated from her position when Samantha Vincent, President of One Race and Defendant Diesel's sister, called

Plaintiff and stated that One Race no longer needed "any extra help." (Compl., p. 11, ¶ 32.)

For years following the alleged incident, Plaintiff remained silent about the sexual assault. She was afraid to speak out against a high-profile actor, concerned about being ostracized from the industry, and worried that as a green card holder, speaking out could jeopardize her potential future citizenship. (Compl., p. 3, ¶ 7.) Additionally, One Race required all employees to sign non-disclosure agreements, further limiting Plaintiff's ability to discuss matters related to her employment and Defendant Diesel. (Compl., p. 3, ¶ 7.)

Recently empowered by the #MeToo and Time's Up movements, and with the protection of the Speak Out Act and the revival of her claims under California Assembly Bill 2777 (AB 2777), Plaintiff is now seeking legal relief for the alleged sexual assault and subsequent termination of her employment. (Compl., p. 4, \P 7.)

This lawsuit was filed on December 21, 2023, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.16, as amended by Assembly Bill 2777. Trial in this matter is scheduled for August 18, 2025.

B. <u>Defendant Vin Diesel Has Repeatedly Evaded Deposition Despite Multiple</u> Notices and Good Faith Efforts To Accommodate His Schedule.

Plaintiff Asta Jonasson first noticed Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition for May 7, 2024. (See Declaration of Matthew T. Hale ("Hale Decl."), ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) On May 1, 2024, Defendant served his objection to the notice of deposition, indicating in part that neither he nor his counsel were available on that date. (Hale Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. 2.)

On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff again noticed Mr. Diesel's deposition, this time for April 29, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 3.) Plaintiff accompanied the notice of deposition with a letter requesting alternative dates if April 29, 2025 did not work for Mr. Diesel or his attorneys. (Hale Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. 4.) No response was received to that letter until Mr. Diesel's objections to the deposition notice were served via overnight mail on April 24, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. 5.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. Diesel's counsel to meet and confer regarding the objections to Mr. Diesel's deposition notice. (Hale Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. 6.) This letter addressed Mr. Diesel's objections in detail, each of which was unmeritorious. Following discussion on this letter, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel confirmed that he would appear for his deposition in person on

for Defendant confirming that the deposition would be held at Plaintiff's office in downtown Los Angeles and to inform Plaintiff's counsel immediately if this was an issue. (Hale Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. 8.) That same date, May 13, 2025, Plaintiff served the notice of deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel to be conducted at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office for June 24 and June 25. (Hale Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. 9.)

June 24 and June 25. (Hale Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. 7.) On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel emailed counsel

C. <u>Defendant Vin Diesel Served Nearly Identical Objections Just Four Days Before</u> <u>His Scheduled Deposition Despite Previously Confirming His Availability.</u>

On June 20, 2025, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel served via personal service its objections to Plaintiff's deposition notice, served on May 13, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10.) This objection document closely resembled the prior objection document from April 2025, including five of the same eight objections. (See Hale Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 5.) The unique objections related to Vin Diesel's unavailability, the scope of the deposition, and alleged inadequacies of Plaintiff counsel's office to "protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy." (*Ibid.*) Plaintiff's counsel had previously conducted in-person depositions in this matter at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office on May 28, 2025 and June 19, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 12.)

That same day, June 20, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel responded via email, meeting and conferring regarding each objection and requesting alternative dates before the fact discovery cutoff (July 18, 2025), given Vin Diesel's asserted unavailability. (Hale Decl., ¶ 13, Exh. 11.)

D. <u>Defendant's Counsel Engaged In Obstructionist Tactics, Including Physical</u> <u>Threats And Profanity, While Refusing To Provide Any Legitimate Reason For Vin Diesel's Last-Minute Unavailability.</u>

Plaintiff's counsel was scheduled to take the in-person deposition of third party witness Valentino Morales on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 14.) The morning of this deposition, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel asserted that they disagreed with Plaintiff counsel's position regarding Vin Diesel's objections to his duly noticed deposition and would meet and confer in person, later that day, on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 15, Exh. 12.)

Counsel for Defendants, Sean Hardy and Bryan Freedman, appeared with the third party

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27 28 deponent on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 16.) Prior to the deposition, Plaintiff's counsel Matthew Hale requested to meet and confer about the objections to the deposition of Vin Diesel in a separate room. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy began to discuss the assertion that Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable for his deposition. (Ibid.) Mr. Hale requested to know why Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable, and Mr. Hardy refused to provide a reason. (*Ibid.*)

During this back and forth, Mr. Freedman entered the room. (Hale Decl., ¶ 17.) Mr. Hale again requested to know why Mr. Diesel was unavailable to determine if this was a true emergency or a simple failure to appear for his deposition, for which availability had been cleared over a month prior, as it would be important for the purposes of any motion to compel that may need to be filed. (*Ibid.*) Counsel for Defendant continued to refuse to provide any explanation. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Freedman interjected and told Mr. Hale to just file his motion and called Mr. Hale, a "moron" and cursed while doing so. (*Ibid*.) Mr. Hale began to write down the language on note paper, specifically stating that he would be including these insults in his declaration to any Motion and requesting to have a professional and substantive meet and confer. (Ibid.) Mr. Freedman then threatened Mr. Hale with malicious prosecution and called him a "piece of shit." (Ibid.) At no time did Mr. Hale exchange any insult with Mr. Freedman, raise his voice, or provoke any physical contact. (*Ibid.*) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman got up from his chair, rushed to stand directly in front of Mr. Hale, mere inches away from him, causing Mr. Freedman's face to be directly in front of that of Mr. Hale. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Freedman then called Mr. Hale a "pussy" and swung his fist at Mr. Hale's face, stopping directly in front of his face, without making contact. (*Ibid.*) Shocked, Mr. Hale nonetheless remained composed and attempted to address Mr. Hardy behind Mr. Freedman, in hopes that counsel could get the meet and confer discussion back on track. (*Ibid.*) At some point shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman left the room, and Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy conducted the meet and confer session, both then and after the deposition concluded later that day. (*Ibid.*)

Given Mr. Diesel's asserted objection regarding the lack of security and privacy at Plaintiff's counsel's office, Mr. Hale requested to know what was deficient about their security and/or privacy. (Hale Decl., ¶ 18.) Mr. Hardy indicated that Mr. Diesel had a medical condition and that he needed to be able to quickly leave the deposition for his security, including in relation to death threats,

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without having to go down thirty floors and obtain his vehicle from an underground parking lot. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hardy also asserted that Mr. Diesel would need his personal security with him. (*Ibid.*)

Mr. Hale then offered to conduct the next day's deposition at defense counsel's office. (Hale Decl., ¶ 19.) Mr. Hardy again asserted that Mr. Diesel was not in the city. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale asked when Mr. Diesel left the city and where he was, but Mr. Hardy would not provide that information. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hardy laid out several conditions for a rescheduled deposition of Vin Diesel: (1) that the deposition be conducted for no more than seven hours; (2) that a protective order be in place to protect Defendant's financial, medical, and sexual privacy; (3) that the deposition take place at defense counsel's office or remotely; and (4) that the deposition only occur following the hearing on Defendant's just-filed Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication, set for October 7, 2025, nearly two months after the current trial date of August 18, 2025. (*Ibid.*)

At no time did Mr. Hale agree to forego filing a Motion to Compel while the parties further met and conferred, at an Informal Discovery Conference, or in any other venue. (Hale Decl., ¶ 20.)

Ε. **Defendant's Filing of a Motion for Protective Order**

On the same date, June 23, 2025, Defendant Vin Diesel filed a Motion for Protective Order on the same subset of four (4) grounds listed immediately above. As will be argued below, these grounds are unmeritorious.

III. **LEGAL STANDARD**

Ex Parte Application Standard Α.

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1202 governs ex parte applications and establishes the requirements that must be satisfied before a court may grant relief without notice to opposing parties. Under rule 3.1202(c), an ex parte application may only be granted upon an affirmative factual showing that there is immediate danger, irreparable harm, or immediate loss or damage to property. The rule specifically provides that "[a] showing of irreparable harm or immediate danger must be made by affidavit based on admissible evidence."

В. **Standard for Motions to Compel Deposition**

Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(a) provides as follows:

If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director,

managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an

organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid

objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed

with it, or to produce for inspection any document or tangible thing described in

the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order

compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for

inspection of any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

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IV. <u>ARGUMENT</u>

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A. Defendant Vin Diesel's Objections to his Notice of Deposition are Invalid and Unmeritorious.

1. Defendant Vin Diesel's Asserted Unavailability

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel, for the first time since his counsel provided his availability for an in-person deposition on May 9, 2025, asserted that he was not available for his deposition. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1) Neither in writing nor verbally through his counsel did Defendant communicate any true emergency to explain his availability. In fact, Mr. Diesel's counsel indicated that he was not even "in the city." Mr. Diesel's counsel declined to provide any further detail. When Plaintiff's counsel offered to conduct the deposition at defense counsel's office, as requested by Mr. Diesel, defense counsel again asserted Mr. Diesel was not "in the city."

Furthermore, "unavailability" is not an adequate objection to a duly-served deposition notice. A deposition subpoena is valid if it complies with the timing and service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 *et seq*. With fact discovery closing on July 18, 2025, and trial set for August 18, 2025, Defendant's last-minute unavailability represents a deliberate attempt to run out the clock on discovery. Every day of delay brings Plaintiff closer to being forced to trial without the critical testimony of the key defendant, resulting in irreparable prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to prosecute her claims. Defendant's continued reliance on this meritless objection as discovery closes threatens to deny Plaintiff essential testimony needed for trial preparation.

2. In-Person Attendance

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that he cannot be required to attend his deposition in-person, pursuant to *Code of Civ. Proc.*, § 2025.310(a). (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) However, as pointed out to counsel in previous meet and confer discussions regarding an identical objection to a prior notice of deposition of Mr. Diesel, this is a misreading of that code section.

CCP § 2025.310(a) states as follows: "At the election of the deponent or the deposing party, the deposition officer may attend the deposition at a different location than the deponent via remote means. A deponent is not required to be physically present with the deposition officer when being sworn in at the time of the deposition." Thus, the code section permits the deposition officer, i.e., the court reporter, to attend the deposition via remote means. No reference is made to the deponent's ability to elect a remote appearance.

CCP § 2025.310(b), which Mr. Diesel did not cite in his objection, states as follows: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent. If a party or attorney of record elects to be physically present at the location of the deponent, all physically present participants in the deposition shall comply with local health and safety ordinances, rules, and orders." This code section similarly does not permit Mr. Diesel to elect a remote appearance; it merely allows Mr. Diesel, or his attorney of record, to be physically present at the location of another deponent. Of course, this supports Plaintiff's position, as Plaintiff and her attorney of record may be physically present at the deposition of the deponent in this scenario: Vin Diesel. With less than one month remaining before the discovery cutoff, Defendant's frivolous location objection threatens to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining critical testimony altogether.

3. Location of Deposition

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that he should not have to attend a deposition "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) Mr. Diesel failed to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from Plaintiff's counsel's office in

downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection.

Furthermore, Samantha Vincent – Mr. Diesel's sister – and Valentino Morales – Mr. Diesel's security and close friend – already confirmed at their depositions that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles, California. (Hale Decl., ¶21.) Defendant's suggestion to hold the deposition at defense counsel's office in Century City also confirms the convenience of Los Angeles as a location for Mr. Diesel's deposition.

Finally, Plaintiff's counsel repeatedly requested confirmation on this topic from defense counsel but was not provided with any. As recently as May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel requested to confirm that the in-person location of Vin Diesel's June 24 and 25 deposition was to be Los Angeles, specifically Plaintiff's counsel's Los Angeles office. (Hale Decl., ¶ 9, Exh 8.) Of course, this is Plaintiff's choice to begin with, but Plaintiff extended this question as a courtesy, which received no response from defense counsel.

With less than one month remaining before the discovery cutoff, Defendant's frivolous location objection threatens to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining critical testimony altogether.

4. Time Limit

Defendant Diesel also objected that his deposition should be limited to seven-hours under CCP § 2025.290. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) Pursuant to CCP § 2025.290(b)(4), depositions in employment matters are excepted from the default seven-hour limit. While Plaintiff's FEHA claims have indeed been dismissed, multiple employment claims still remain, including Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code, §§ 98.6, 1102.5 and Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

Further, the notice of deposition does not assume any particular total time to be on the record.

A full day of deposition rarely equates to seven hours on the record.

Given the compressed timeframe before the discovery cutoff and trial, artificial time limitations would further prejudice Plaintiff's ability to obtain complete testimony on the complex issues underlying this sexual assault case.

5. Questions Implicating Privacy

"[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (*Code Civ. Proc.*, § 2017.010.) "Relevant' evidence is evidence 'having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (*D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.* (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 229.) "The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious." (*Williams v. Sup. Ct.* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) If the court finds a privacy interest, the court must balance the privacy concerns against the need for the information. (*Id.* at p. 552.)

Defendant Vin Diesel asserts that he should not have to attend his deposition because questions *may* be asked that implicate his privacy, including his sexual history and financial condition. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.)

First, as to Defendant's financial condition, Plaintiff is already not permitted to seek pretrial discovery on this subject. (Civ. Code, § 3295(a)(2).) As such, a protective order is altogether unnecessary. On the contrary, Plaintiff must request an order permitting such discovery to obtain it pretrial. Plaintiff has not and does not plan on doing so. Defendant cannot be permitted to delay his deposition by simply listing subjects to which Plaintiff never had the intention or ability to inquire about.

Second, as to Mr. Diesel's "sexual history," it is unclear as to what Defendant is referring, given the ambiguity of the phrase. As asserted in Mr. Diesel's summary judgment motion, set to be heard after trial, Plaintiff relies on *Code of Civ. Proc.*, § 340.16 to revive her claims based on wrongful conduct in 2010. With regard to claims revived by *Code of Civ. Proc.*, § 340.16(e), Plaintiff must allege the following:

- (A) The plaintiff was sexually assaulted.
- (B) One or more entities are legally responsible for damages arising out of the

sexual assault.

(C) The entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.

As such, questions regarding previous instances of sexual assault by Mr. Diesel are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Now, Mr. Diesel seeks to prevent Plaintiff from even *seeking* essential discovery, while at the same time attempting to dismiss her claims for lack of that same sought-for evidence. That said, Plaintiff is not interested in Mr. Diesel's "sexual history" wholesale. An order preventing all investigation into anything sexual with regard to Vin Diesel would necessarily prevent Plaintiff from asking questions directed toward Mr. Diesel about accusations of sexual assault or abuse previously committed by him. A stipulated protective order ("SPO") in this matter has been in place since July 25, 2024. Any particular questions that Defendant or his counsel believe run afield are better addressed on a question-by-question basis, at which time counsel may simply instruct their client not to answer. All testimony will have the protection of the parties' protective order, so long as Defendant labels it as confidential, subject to the procedure in the parties' SPO to de-designate as confidential any testimony. In this scenario, a specialized protective order is a blunt tool that would prevent Plaintiff from seeking essential discovery.

In his recently filed Motion for Protective Order, Mr. Diesel adds multiple other types of privacy to the list, including medical and psychotherapeutic. Plaintiff has no interest in discovery on these topics, and Defendant has provided no examples of what it may be concerned about Plaintiff inquiring into. Again, Defendant cannot be permitted to delay his deposition by simply listing subjects to which Plaintiff never had the intention to inquire about and asking the Court to hear that Motion months after the parties' August 2025 trial date.

Finally, Defendant also adds "employment history" to the list of private topics that may not be inquired about. Defendant fails to define precisely what is meant by the ambiguous phrase.

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and his entities, so to the extent "employment history" refers

to Vin Diesel's employment with Defendants One Race Films, Inc. or One Race Productions, Inc., such topics are squarely discoverable. Other than this, Plaintiff has little interest in probing into Mr. Diesel's career path, which is already publicly known.

6. Safety

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that Plaintiff's office is "inadequate to protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy." (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) As is known by Defendants' counsel, Plaintiff's counsel's office is located in the PwC building on 7th and Figueroa, which is home to Seyfarth Shaw and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. (Hale Decl. ¶ 22.) Like many buildings downtown, it has multiple 24/7 dedicated security personnel. (*Ibid.*) Entrance is restricted per floor, and visitors may only access a particular floor if they have been added to a security list and been ushered to an appropriate elevator by security. (*Ibid.*) During a meet and confer session with Defense counsel, Sean Hardy explained that the concern was more about the quickness with which Mr. Diesel could descend from the 30th floor and retrieve his vehicle from the building's underground parking. (Hale Decl. ¶ 18.) This is not a reasonable or rational basis for failing to attend a deposition. Further, no explanation was provided with relation to the building's inability to protect Defendant's privacy, so this is still a mystery.

During the in-person meet and confer, Plaintiff's counsel offered as a compromise to conduct the deposition at the office of defense counsel. (Hale Decl. ¶ 19.) Defense counsel stated that nonetheless, Mr. Diesel was "not in the city" and so would not be attending. (*Ibid.*)

These shifting and contradictory excuses demonstrate Defendant's bad faith attempts to avoid deposition entirely as the discovery deadline approaches, threatening irreparable harm to Plaintiff's trial preparation.

7. Vague Procedural Deficiencies

Mr. Diesel also objected "to the extent [the deposition notice] fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, *et seq*." (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) This objection lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with, and no additional detail has been provided by counsel. This objection should be disregarded due to its vagueness and ambiguity. Such procedural gamesmanship with less than one month before the

discovery cutoff constitutes bad faith designed to prevent Plaintiff from obtaining critical testimony.

8. Pending Dispositive Motion

Defendant's final objection asserts good cause exists to stay the deposition pending Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication ("MSJ"), which is scheduled to be heard on October 7, 2025, nearly two months past the parties' August 18, 2025 trial date. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) The cases cited, *Silver v. City of Los Angeles* (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673 and *Terminal Equip. Co. v. City* (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 234 do not stand for this proposition. *Terminal* and *Silver* are both cases where a plaintiff had yet to get past the pleadings stage, and each court stated that the plaintiff had to state at least one cause of action before discovery or depositions would be permitted. Of course, this matter is past the pleadings stage, is deep into fact discovery, and testimony sought at the deposition of Vin Diesel is squarely relevant to Plaintiff's preparation for Trial. Further, the MSJ should never be heard because it was filed late, and so should not be used as a sword to delay discovery and trial itself. Allowing Defendant to use his untimely motion to prevent discovery would result in immediate and irreparable harm to Plaintiff, who will be forced to proceed to trial on August 18, 2025, without the essential testimony of the primary defendant.

B. Plaintiff's Counsel Adequately Notified Defense Counsel Prior to Filing this Application.

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1203(a) requires that no *ex parte* application will be considered unless the applicant has notified all other parties no later than 10:00 a.m. the court day before the *ex parte* appearance. Rule 3.1204(b) requires that an *ex parte* application must be accompanied by a declaration regarding notice stating the notice given, including the date, time, manner, and name of the party informed, the relief sought, any response, and whether opposition is expected.

Plaintiff has satisfied the notice requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1204. Mr. Hale gave notice of this *ex parte* application to defense counsel Sean Hardy via email on Thursday, June 26, 2025. (Hale Decl. ¶ 31, Exh. 14.) Mr. Hale specifically stated that the hearing would take place at 8:30 a.m. on Friday, June 27, 2025 in Department 71 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012 and described the date, time, place

for the presentation of the application, the relief sought, and inquired whether opposition is expected, thereby complying with the requirements of rule 3.1204. Defendant's counsel indicated it would oppose the instant application. (*Ibid.*)

C. <u>Monetary Sanctions Are Appropriate Due to Defendant's Misuse of the Discovery Process.</u>

California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a) provides that "[t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process." California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(d) provides that "[f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery" constitutes misuse of the discovery process. California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(e) provides that "making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery" also constitutes misuse of the discovery process.

Here, sanctions against Mr. Diesel and his counsel, Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley, are warranted pursuant to the aforementioned code sections because Defendant has failed to appear for his properly noticed deposition. Further, Defendant's unmeritorious objections and counsel's improper conduct constitute a misuse of the discovery process and failure to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(g)(1) provides:

If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Emphasis added.)

Defendants' conduct is a willful abuse of the discovery process for which Defendant and his counsel should be sanctioned. Defendant has failed to appear at his duly noticed deposition, at a date and location agreed to by the parties. Under the statutes enumerated above, plaintiff requests sanctions in the amount of \$5,330.07 for costs and attorneys' fees. (Hale Decl. ¶ 29.)

V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court grant this *ex parte* application to compel Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition before the July 18, 2025 discovery cutoff, impose monetary sanctions against Defendant and his counsel for their willful abuse of the discovery process, and provide such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED: June 26, 2025 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

9 By: /s/ Matthew T. Hale

Brian L. Williams Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. 3 **Case No. 23STCV31143** 4 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 5 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa 6 Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 7 On June 26, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S NOTICE OF APPLICATION AND APPLICATION TO 8 (1) COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL AND SANCTIONS OR (2) ALTERNATIVELY SHORTEN TIME REGARDING A NOTICED MOTION FOR THE 9 SAME RELIEF; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT **THEREOF** on the interested parties in this action as follows: 10 Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Attorneys for Defendants One Race Films, Inc., 11 Sean M. Hardy, Esq. One Race Productions, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Mark Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent 12 LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP 13 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 14 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 15 Emails: bfreedman@ftllp.com smhardy@ftllp.com 16 jsunshine@ftllp.com vbirtha@ftllp.com 17 cpuello@ftllp.com 18 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses 19 listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 20 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing 21 is true and correct. 22 Executed on June 26, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 23 24 Hazelle Nunez 25 26 27 28

1 2 3 4 5 6	BRIAN L. WILLIAMS, State Bar No. 227948 BWilliams@GGTrialLaw.com JEMMA E. DUNN, State Bar No. 258454 JDunn@GGTrialLaw.com MATTHEW T. HALE, State Bar No. 303826 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com GREENBERG GROSS LLP 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 334-7000 Facsimile: (213) 334-7001	Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles 6/26/2025 9:59 AM David W. Slayton, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, By Y. Tarasyuk, Deputy Clerk
7	Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson	
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF TH	E STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9	FOR THE COUNTY	OF LOS ANGELES
10	ASTA JONASSON, an individual,	Case No. 23STCV31143
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Plaintiff, v. VIN DIESEL (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), an individual; SAMANTHA VINCENT, an individual; ONE RACE PRODUCTIONS, INC., a California corporation; ONE RACE FILMS, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, Defendants.	Assigned for All Purposes to: Hon. Daniel M. Crowley, Dept. 71 DECLARATION OF MATTHEW T. HALE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE APPLICATION Date: June 26, 2025 Time: 8:30 a.m. Dept.: 71 Action Filed: December 21, 2023 Trial Date: August 18, 2025 [Filed Concurrently with Ex Parte Application;
19		[Proposed] Order]
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DECLARATION OF MATTHEW T. HALE

I, Matthew T. Hale, declare as follows:

- 1. I am an attorney at law, duly authorized to practice law in the State of California. I am an attorney with the law firm of Greenberg Gross LLP, counsel of record for plaintiff Asta Jonasson ("Plaintiff" or "Jonasson") in this case. The facts stated herein are within my personal knowledge and if called upon to testify, I can truthfully and competently do so as to all matters herein. I make this declaration in support of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's *Ex Parte* Application to compel the deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel and for sanctions, or in the alternative, for an order shortening time on Plaintiff's Motion for the same relief.
- 2. Plaintiff Asta Jonasson first noticed Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition for May 7, 2024. A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.
- 3. On May 1, 2024, Defendant Vin Diesel served his objection to the notice of deposition, indicating in part that neither he nor his counsel were available on that date. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as **Exhibit 2.**
- 4. On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff again noticed Mr. Diesel's deposition, this time for April 29, 2025. A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 3.**
- 5. Plaintiff accompanied the notice of deposition with a letter requesting alternative dates if April 29, 2025 did not work for Mr. Diesel or his attorneys. A true and correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as **Exhibit 4.**
- 6. No response was received to that letter until Mr. Diesel's objections to the deposition notice were served via overnight mail on April 24, 2025. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as **Exhibit 5**.
- 7. Thereafter, Plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. Diesel's counsel to meet and confer regarding the objections to Mr. Diesel's deposition notice. A true and correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as **Exhibit 6.**
- 8. Following discussion on this letter, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel confirmed that he would appear for his deposition in person on June 24 and June 25. A true and correct copy of the confirming email from Jason Sunshine is attached hereto as **Exhibit 7.**

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- 9. On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel emailed counsel for Defendant confirming that the deposition would be held at Plaintiff's office downtown Los Angeles and to inform Plaintiff's counsel immediately if this was an issue. A true and correct copy of the confirming email from Matthew Hale is attached hereto as **Exhibit 8**.
- 10. That same date, May 13, 2025, Plaintiff served the notice of deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel to be conducted at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office for June 24 and June 25., 2025 A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 9**.
- 11. On June 20, 2025, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel served via personal service its objections to Plaintiff's deposition notice, served on May 13, 2025. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as **Exhibit 10**.
- 12. Plaintiff's counsel had previously conducted in-person depositions in this matter at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office on May 28, 2025 and June 19, 2025.
- 13. That same day, June 20, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel responded via email, meeting and conferring regarding each objection and requesting alternative dates before the fact discovery cutoff (July 18, 2025), given Vin Diesel's asserted unavailability. A true and correct copy of that email is attached hereto as Exhibit 11.
- 14. Plaintiff's counsel was scheduled to take the in-person deposition of third party witness Valentino Morales on June 23, 2025.
- 15. The morning of this deposition, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel asserted that they disagreed with Plaintiff counsel's position regarding Vin Diesel's objections to his duly noticed deposition and would meet and confer in person later that day, on June 23, 2025. A true and correct copy of that email from Sean Hardy is attached hereto as **Exhibit 12**.
- 16. Counsel for Defendants, Sean Hardy and Bryan Freedman, appeared with the third party deponent on June 23, 2025. Prior to the deposition, Plaintiff's counsel Matthew Hale requested to meet and confer about the objections to the deposition of Vin Diesel in a separate room. Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy began to discuss the assertion that Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable for his deposition. Mr. Hale requested to know why Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable, and Mr. Hardy refused to provide a reason.

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- 17. During this back and forth, Mr. Freedman entered the room. Mr. Hale again requested to know why Mr. Diesel was unavailable to determine if this was a true emergency or a simple failure to appear for his deposition, for which availability had been cleared over a month prior, as it would be important for the purposes of any Motion to compel that may need to be filed. Counsel for Defendant continued to refuse to provide any explanation. Mr. Freedman interjected and told Mr. Hale to just file his motion and called Mr. Hale, a "moron" and cursed while doing so. Mr. Hale began to write down the language on note paper, specifically stating that he would be including these insults in his declaration to any motion and requesting to have a professional and substantive meet and confer. Mr. Freedman then threatened Mr. Hale with malicious prosecution and called him a "piece of shit." At no time did Mr. Hale exchange any insult with Mr. Freedman, raise his voice, or provoke any physical contact. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman got up from his chair, rushed to stand directly in front of Mr. Hale, mere inches away from him, causing Mr. Freedman's face to be directly in front of that of Mr. Hale. Mr. Freedman then called Mr. Hale a "pussy" and swung his fist at Mr. Hale's face, stopping directly in front of his face, without making contact. Shocked, Mr. Hale nonetheless remained composed and attempted to address Mr. Hardy behind Mr. Freedman, in hopes that counsel could get the meet and confer discussion back on track. At some point shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman left the room, and Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy conducted the meet and confer session, both then and after the deposition concluded later that day.
- 18. Given Mr. Diesel's asserted objection regarding the lack of security and privacy at Plaintiff's counsel's office, Mr. Hale requested to know what was deficient about their security and/or privacy. Mr. Hardy indicated that Mr. Diesel had a medical condition and that he needed to be able to quickly leave the deposition for his security, including in relation to death threats, without having to go down thirty floors and obtain his vehicle from an underground parking lot. Mr. Hardy also asserted that Mr. Diesel would need his personal security with him.
- 19. Mr. Hale then offered to conduct the next day's deposition at defense counsel's office. Mr. Hardy again asserted that Mr. Diesel was not in the city. Mr. Hale asked when Mr. Diesel left the city and where he was, but Mr. Hardy would not provide that information. Mr. Hardy laid out several conditions for a rescheduled deposition of Vin Diesel: (1) that the deposition be

current trial date of August 18, 2025.

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- 20. At no time did Mr. Hale agree to forego filing a Motion to Compel while the parties further met and conferred, at an Informal Discovery Conference, or in any other venue.
- 21. Samantha Vincent Mr. Diesel's sister and Valentino Morales Mr. Diesel's security and close friend already confirmed at their depositions that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles, California.
- 22. Plaintiff's counsel's office is located in the PwC building on 7th and Figueroa, which is home to Seyfarth Shaw and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. Like many buildings downtown, it has multiple 24/7 dedicated security personnel. Entrance is restricted per floor, and visitors may only access a particular floor if they have been added to a security list and been ushered to an appropriate elevator by security.
- 23. I have been practicing law since 2015. I primarily litigate wrongful termination of employment and discrimination cases in both state and federal court on behalf of plaintiffs, including cases based upon violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act and the California Labor Code.
- 24. I am a graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law and of Harvard University.
- 25. In January of 2023, my colleagues and I tried Galvan v. United Parcel Service, et al. (LASC Case No. BC703891), which resulted in a \$5.4 million verdict.
- 26. I have been confirmed legal fees at an hourly rate of \$850.00 by Judge Lipner of Department 72.
- 27. Throughout my practice as an attorney on plaintiff's side, I have become familiar with customary billing rates for attorneys of my experience level and title. I understand that my hourly rate as an associate attorney of a plaintiff's law firm is at least comparable, if not below, the

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hourly rates of other attorneys in similar situations.

- 28. I am familiar with the proper procedure for calculating hourly bills. I understand which tasks are billable and which are not. All of the time that I spent on this motion was necessary to prepare it properly and diligently.
- 29. I have primarily handled the discovery issues in this action. I have spent approximately one hour meeting and conferring with Defendant's counsel regarding the motion, including drafting and revising correspondence and participating in conferences regarding the same. I also spent more than 5 hours preparing and revising all briefing in connection with the instant Motion to Compel, including in preparing this declaration and preparing and revising the brief, notice, and proposed order (6 hours X \$850.00 = \$5,100.00). I anticipate that it will take me an additional 2.5 hours to review Defendant's opposition, prepare a reply brief in support of the motion, and prepare for and attend oral argument on this motion (2.5 hours X \$850.00 = \$2,125.00). I was also required to cancel my hotel reservation due to the cancellation of Defendant's deposition, with a fee in the amount of \$230.07. As such, Plaintiff has incurred fees and costs in the amount of \$5,330.07 and is likely to incur costs in the amount of \$2,125.00, for a total of \$7,455.07.
- 30. I gave notice of this ex parte application to defense counsel Sean Hardy via telephone around TIME a.m. on Wednesday, June 25, 2025. I then sent a confirming email soon afterward. Attached as Exhibit 14 is a true and correct copy of my June 25, 2025 email to Mr. Hardy. In the phone call and the email, I specifically stated that the hearing would take place at 8:30 a.m. on Thursday, June 26, 2025 in Department 71 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012.

I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: June 25, 2025.

/s/ Matthew T. Hale

Matthew T. Hale

EXHIBIT 1

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on May 7, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

By:

DATED: February 26, 2024 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

Brian L. Williams

Claire-Lise Y. Kutlay

Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

EXHIBIT 2

VINCENT)

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's notice of the May 7, 2024 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

I.

OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- 1. The deposition was unilaterally set without any consideration for either the deponent or counsel's availability, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(1). Consideration has not been given in scheduling this deposition because Plaintiff did not clear the dates and time with counsel, and neither the deponent nor his counsel of record are available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310, that any deposition proceed via remote video, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally <u>Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court</u> (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.
- 4. Defendant objects to the notice of deposition in that it is reasonably calculated to result in the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets without the entry of a mutually-acceptable protective order.
- 5. The deposition was unilaterally set prior to the initially-noticed deposition of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson, without the agreement of counsel, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(3).
- 6. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed.

7. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, et seq. DATED: May 1, 2024 FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant VIN DIÉSEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

SS.

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

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I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18, and not a party to the within action. My business address is FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP, 1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067.

On May 1, 2024, I served the following document(s) entitled OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) on the interested parties in this action as follows:

8 Brian L. Williams Claire-Lise Y. Kutlay 9 Matthew T. Hale GREENBERG GROSS LLP 10 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor 11 Los Angeles, California 90017 Tel. (213) 334-7000 12 Fax. (213) 334-7001 BWilliams@GGTrialLaw.com 13 CKutlay@GGTrialLaw.com MHale@GGTrialLaw.com 14 PHorlacher@GGTrialLaw.com 15 DVultaggio@GGTrialLaw.com CRose@GGTrialLaw.com 16 MSance@GGTrialLaw.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

By Overnight Delivery. I deposited a sealed envelope containing a true and correct copy of the documents listed above for overnight delivery via Federal Express.
By E-Mail or Electronic Transmission. I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the email address listed below in a PDF file, and the transmission appeared to be successful.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed on May 1, 2024, at Los Angeles, California.

/s/ Vaneta D. Birtha
Vaneta D. Birtha

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EXHIBIT 3

tase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on April 29, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034.415, the Deponent is directed to produce the documents and things set forth below no later than three business days before the deposition.

DEFINITIONS

Words in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS in these definitions, instructions, and Requests are defined as follows:

- 1. The term "DOCUMENT(S)" means all documents and electronically stored information—including but not limited to all emails, text messages, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, video and sound recordings, images, worksheets, and other data and data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation into a reasonably usable form, and includes COMMUNICATIONS.
- 2. The term "COMMUNICATION(S)" means and refers to all correspondence, discussions, conversations, interviews, telephone calls, emails, instant messages, voice mail messages, negotiations, notices, agreements, understandings, meetings, recordings, audiotapes, videotapes, transcripts, facsimiles, telegrams, charts, spreadsheets, visual images, presentations, and all other transmissions of information, thoughts, documents, electronically stored information, or ideas between two or more PERSONS.
 - 3. The terms "YOU" and "YOUR" means and refers to defendant Vin Diesel.
- 4. The terms "any" and "all" are interchangeable and shall be construed disjunctively, conjunctively, or both, as necessary to bring within the scope of this discovery request all matters

which might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

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5. The term "each" means "each and every."

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7. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

The term "including" means "including, but not limited to."

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YOUR possession, custody, or control) shall be identified and produced at the above-stated date,

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INSTRUCTIONS 1. The original of each responsive item (or a legible copy if the original is not within

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time, and place unless complete and legible copies of each responsive item are received at the above-referenced address on or before the specified production date. Any such production of

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copies is without prejudice to Propounding Party's right to inspect and/or copy the original of each

12 13 DOCUMENT or tangible thing at a future date. 2. These Requests seek the production of DOCUMENTS, and electronically stored

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information ("ESI"), in their native format, unless some other format is agreed to in writing by Propounding Party's counsel of record.

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3. ESI must be produced with all "metadata" intact. ("Metadata" means the data embedded in electronic versions of a document that show how, when and by whom the document was created, accessed or modified.)

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4. Any request for a DOCUMENT shall be construed to include any and all drafts, versions, or revisions of such DOCUMENT.

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5. These Requests seek the production of all responsive DOCUMENTS within YOUR possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such DOCUMENTS are possessed directly by YOU.

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6. In the event any DOCUMENTS responsive to these Requests are withheld from production based upon a claim of attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product doctrine, or any other privilege or protection from discovery, YOU are requested to provide a privilege log in which YOU explain the basis of the privilege or other protection you are claiming, and provide a description of the DOCUMENTS YOU are withholding sufficient to support the basis for withholding the DOCUMENTS.

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All emails referring to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

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1 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:** 2 All emails sent between YOU and plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 3 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5**: 4 All voicemail messages YOU received from plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 5 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:** 6 All text messages YOU received from or sent to plaintiff Asta Jonasson. **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:** 7 8 All audio recordings of plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 9 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:** 10 All video recordings of plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 11 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:** 12 All photographs of plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:** 14 All statements, declarations, and/or affidavits signed by YOU regarding the instant lawsuit. 15 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:** 16 All unsigned drafts of statements, declarations, and/or affidavits reflecting YOUR name, 17 regarding the instant lawsuit. 18 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:** 19 All notes or records relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 20 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:** 21 All text messages YOU received relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 ///

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

All text messages YOU sent relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

By:

4 DATED: April 7, 2025

GREENBERG GROSS LLP

Brian L. Williams
Jemma E. Dunn
Matthew T. Hale
Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

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EXHIBIT 4



Matthew T. Hale Direct Dial: (213) 334-7060 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com

April 7, 2025

VIA EMAIL ONLY

Bryan J. Freedman
Sean M. Hardy
Jason Sunshine
FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angles, CA 90067
bfreedman@ftllp.com
smhardy@ftllp.com
jsunshine@ftllp.com

Re: Asta Jonasson v. One Race Films, Inc., et al.

Counsel:

Enclosed please find notices of deposition for defendants Vin Diesel and Samantha Vincent and witnesses Valentino Morales and Thyrale Thai. If any of the noticed dates are not workable for the deponents' schedules, please let us know as soon as possible, and propose alternative dates that fall before the end of May 2025. Furthermore, counsel has previously objected that defendants Vin Diesel and Samantha Vincent *may* not reside within 150 miles of downtown Los Angeles. If these defendants do not reside within 150 miles of downtown Los Angeles, please notify our office of these defendants' city of residence, and we will coordinate a convenient location.

We are happy to accommodate reasonable scheduling conflicts, but considering the upcoming trial date, we will be completing these depositions by the end of May 2025.

Very truly yours,

Matthew T. Hale

Encls.

EXHIBIT 5

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's notice of the April 29, 2025 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

I.

OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- 1. The deposition was unilaterally set without any consideration for either the deponent or counsel's availability, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(1). Consideration has not been given in scheduling this deposition because Plaintiff did not clear the dates and time with counsel, and neither the deponent nor his counsel of record are available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel in the presence of a deposition officer. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310(a), that any deposition proceed via remote means, that the deposition officer not be physically present at the time of the deposition, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally <u>Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court</u> (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.
- 4. The deposition was unilaterally set prior to the initially-noticed deposition of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson, without the agreement of counsel, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(3).
- 5. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed.
- 6. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, *et seq*.

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7. Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents in connection with the Notice. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the California Code of Civil Procedure, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.260; 1013(e).

Defendant objects that the deposition was noticed for a period in which a dispositive motion is pending. Good cause exists to stay any deposition until after a ruling on such motion. Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673; Terminals Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 234, 247.

II.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

The following responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Any document or thing supplied in response to any request is subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and admissibility, and to any and all other objections on any ground that would require the exclusion of any document or thing, or portion thereof, if such document or thing were offered in evidence, all of which objections and grounds are expressly reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial.

No incidental or implied admissions are intended by the responses herein. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agree to supply, a document or thing in response to any request should not be taken as an admission that the Defendant accepts or admits the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such request or in said document, or that such document or thing constitutes admissible evidence. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agrees to supply any document or thing in response to any request is not intended to be and shall not be construed to be a waiver of any part of any objection to any such request, or any part of any General Objection.

The responses herein only apply to those documents or things currently in Defendant's possession. Defendant has not completed investigation of the facts relating to this matter, completed discovery in this matter, or completed preparation for trial in this matter. Accordingly,

Defendant reserve all rights with respect to documents or things which may be subsequently located or discovered, including, without limitation, the right to use such documents at trial, and further reserves any and all rights and any and all objections to any responsive documents or things which may hereafter come into Defendant's possession, or which hereafter may be determined to be within the scope of any such request. Defendant disclaims any legal obligation to supplement the responses herein.

III.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

- 1. Objection: Defendant objects to the production and inspection of documents at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel at their own expense. Defendant may be unable to locate all requested documents by the date specified for production and, therefore, a mutually convenient time and date can be ascertained by contacting the undersigned to make appropriate arrangement. Should Defendant in the future locate any relevant requested documents now in existence but not yet located, Defendant will so advise counsel for Plaintiff, subject to the objections and comments set forth in these responses.
- 2. Objection: Defendant objects to the instructions to the extent that they conflict with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq., or seek to impose additional obligations upon Defendant beyond those set forth under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. Defendant will respond within the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq.
- 3. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent that it requires the production of documents or things, which have previously been made available to the Plaintiff, are equally available to the Plaintiff, or are public records.
- 4. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks original documents, except where there is a legitimate dispute as to the legibility or authenticity of a copy.
- 5. Objection: to each and every request to the extent it seeks the production of documents or things not in the possession, custody or control of Defendant. Defendant would

produce only those documents or things, if any, in the possession of Defendant, and would produce documents, if any, in the manner kept by Defendant the usual course of business.

- 6. Objection: Defendant objects to the definitions contained in the requests in that they are incomplete, vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, overbroad and oppressive, and seek to impose obligations on Defendant beyond those imposed by the California Code of Civil Procedure.
- 7. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. Nothing herein is intended to be, nor shall in any way be construed as, a waiver of any attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. To the extent any request may be construed as calling for disclosure of information protected by such privilege or doctrine, a continuing objection to such Request is hereby interposed. No such privileged information will be provided. In the event any privileged information is provided in connection with these responses, such disclosure is inadvertent and is not intended to be, and shall not be deemed, a waiver of such privilege.
- 8. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information that is confidential, proprietary, a trade secret or private, or otherwise calls for information protected by the right of privacy contained in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of California, in the United States Constitution or any other applicable privilege or protection recognized under statute or applicable case law.
- 9. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks information that may violate the financial privacy rights of Defendant, third parties and individuals who are protected under the California Constitution.
- 10. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information not relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and would subject Defendant to oppression, harassment, and undue burden

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and expense not commensurate with any legitimate discovery need.

- 11. Objection: Defendant further objects to each request to the extent that it seeks a legal conclusion and/or an expert opinion.
- 12. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information already in the possession, custody, or control of Plaintiff.
- 13. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it is argumentative and without any foundation.
- 14. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information for periods of time other than periods relevant to the claims in the Complaint, or other than periods of time properly subject to discovery.
- 15. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets.
- 16. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information that are not limited in time or scope.
- 17. Objection: Defendant objects to each request on the grounds it requests

 Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is
 reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and
 produced the ESI.
- 18. Objection: Because Defendant have not concluded their discovery and investigation in this action, they specifically reserve the right to amend and/or supplement their responses to the requests.
- 19. Objection: Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents, and each of them. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the *California Code of Civil Procedure*, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. *See* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.260; 1013(e).

- 20. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of "DOCUMENTS" to the extent that it conflicts with the provisions of *Evidence Code* section 250 and/or the *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.010. *et seq.*, or seek to impose additional obligation upon Defendant beyond those set forth under *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.010.
- 21. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "DOCUMENT(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 22. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "COMMUNICATION(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 23. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOU" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 25. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOUR" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.

Defendant incorporates by reference these general objections to each response below.

IV.

OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search

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electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain 10

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confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating

to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be

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(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant. Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search

electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav—On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably

Defendant.

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Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.) Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the

particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030.

(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

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Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114

1 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav–On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also

Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav—On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030.

(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

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Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

DATED: April 24, 2025

LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP

Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant

IN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25

Page 73 of 407

EXHIBIT 6



Matthew T. Hale Direct Dial: (213) 334-7060 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com

May 1, 2025

VIA EMAIL ONLY

Bryan J. Freedman
Sean M. Hardy
Jason Sunshine
FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angles, CA 90067
bfreedman@ftllp.com
smhardy@ftllp.com
jsunshine@ftllp.com

Re: Asta Jonasson v. One Race Films, Inc., et al.

Counsel:

I write to meet and confer regarding Vin Diesel's general objections to Plaintiff's deposition subpoena.

First, Mr. Diesel's objection based on scheduling is not well-taken. Plaintiff is not required to "clear dates" before noticing a deposition. A deposition subpoena is valid if it complies with the timing and service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.210 and 2020.220. Plaintiff already initiated a good faith effort to coordinate the deposition, and your office failed to respond in any way until making the instant objection.

Second, Mr. Diesel's objection regarding in-person attendance misinterprets the CCP § 2025.310. The deponent cannot simply elect to be separate from the attorney taking the deposition. It is the attorney or party's election to physically present at the location of the deponent: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent."

Third, Mr. Diesel again fails to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from our office in Downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Instead, Mr. Diesel again uses the qualifying language, "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection. My April 7, 2025 letter even inquired about this previously stated objection, but Mr. Diesel chose to reuse this equivocal objection nonetheless.

Greenberg Gross LLP

May 1, 2025 Page 2

Fourth, Ms. Jonasson's deposition has not been noticed for any future date, no less in the "reasonably near future," as required by the related LASC Local Rule. Defendant has chosen to not re-notice Plaintiff's deposition since early 2024.

Fifth, there is no seven hour limit applicable to employment cases, like this one. (CCP § 2025.290(b)(4)). Further, the notice does not assume any such time period.

Sixth, the objection regarding a failure to comply with requirements of a deposition notice lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with. This objection should be disregarded due to its ambiguity.

Seventh, this objection does not relate to Mr. Diesel sitting for his deposition but rather to the documents demanded in the notice. This dispute will be addressed elsewhere.

Eighth, the objection merely asserts good cause exists to stay the deposition pending the MJOP. The cases cited, *Silver v. City of Los Angeles* (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673 and *Terminal Equip. Co. v. City* (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 234 do not stand for this proposition. *Terminal* and *Silver* are both cases where a plaintiff has yet to get past the pleadings stage and the court stated that the plaintiff had to state at least one cause of action before discovery or deposition would be permitted. Of course, this matter is past the pleadings stage, and the MJOP does not even relate to each and every cause of action. Furthermore, the Defendants would need to file a Motion to Stay Discovery in order to stay fact discovery, and they have not done so.

Please let us know when you are available for a call on these topics tomorrow or early next week. Thereafter, we will need to seek relief from the Court.

Very truly yours,

Matthew T. Hale

EXHIBIT 7

From: Jason Sunshine <jsunshine@lftcllp.com>

Sent: Friday, May 9, 2025 5:18 PM

To: Matthew T. Hale

Cc: Sean M. Hardy; Bryan Freedman; Joanna Rivera; Miles Cooley; Vaneta Birtha; Jemma E.

Dunn; Brian Williams

Subject: [EXT] RE: Jonasson v. Diesel, et al.

Matt:

Further to our meet and confer discussion on Monday, we can confirm that Samantha Vincent is available for deposition on May 29. Non-party Valentino Morales is available for deposition on June 3. Vin Diesel is available in-person on June 24 and June 25. Please confirm those dates, so we can lock them in. We are in the process of obtaining availability from non-party Thyrale Thai and should be in a position to offer the same to you next week. Additionally, per our prior request and discussion, please provide Ms. Jonasson's availability for deposition during this period. Finally, per our prior proposal and discussion on Monday, we reiterate that we have confirmed that Department 71 accepts stipulations and proposed orders to continue trial dates, and that we are amenable to doing so given your protestations regarding timing constraints.

Thanks, Jason

Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP 1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor Los Angeles, California 90067

Direct: (310) 201-4285 Cell: (917) 841-8716 Fax: (310) 201-0045 Web: www.lftcllp.com

Tel: (310) 201-0005

Please note that LFTC's domain name has changed from ftllp.com to lftcllp.com. Emails sent from this domain are not spam.

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EXHIBIT 8

From: Matthew T. Hale

Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2025 10:12 AM

To: Jason Sunshine

Cc: Sean M. Hardy; Bryan Freedman; Joanna Rivera; Miles Cooley; Vaneta Birtha; Jemma E.

Dunn; Brian Williams

Subject: RE: Jonasson v. Diesel, et al.

Hi Jason,

Yes, I'll presume the in-person location is Los Angeles, but please let us know immediately if this is not correct. In the interim, we'll notice them for our LA office. I can confirm the dates for Valentino Morales (6/3) and Vin Diesel (6/24-25). We will notice these depositions shortly.

We will need additional dates for Samantha Vincent's deposition as 5/29 does not work for us. Please provide those and dates for Ms. Thai as soon as possible. Thank you.

We are not amenable to continuing the trial.

Matthew T. Hale

Counsel - Assistant Director of Litigation | Greenberg Gross LLP

One Summerlin | 1980 Festival Plaza Drive | Suite 730 | Las Vegas, NV 89135 Direct 702.777.0891 | Main 702.777.0888 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com



Los Angeles | Orange County | Las Vegas | New York

EXHIBIT 9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	BRIAN L. WILLIAMS, State Bar No. 227948 BWilliams@GGTrialLaw.com JEMMA E. DUNN, State Bar No. 258454 JDunn@GGTrialLaw.com MATTHEW T. HALE, State Bar No. 303826 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com GREENBERG GROSS LLP 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30 th Floor Los Angeles, California 90017 Telephone: (213) 334-7000 Facsimile: (213) 334-7001 Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson			
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
9	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT			
10		,		
11	ASTA JONASSON, an individual,	Case No. 23STCV31143		
12	Plaintiff,	Assigned for All Purposes to: Hon. Daniel M. Crowley, Dept. 71		
13	V.	AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Date: June 24-25, 2025 Time: 9:00 a.m. Place: Greenberg Gross LLP 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017		
14 15 16 17 18	VIN DIESEL (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), an individual; SAMANTHA VINCENT, an individual; ONE RACE PRODUCTIONS, INC., a California corporation; ONE RACE FILMS, INC., a California corporation; and DOES 1 to 20, inclusive, Defendants.			
20		Action I Trial Da		December 21, 2023 August 18, 2025
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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on June 24-25, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034.415, the Deponent is directed to produce the documents and things set forth below no later than three business days before the deposition.

DEFINITIONS

Words in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS in these definitions, instructions, and Requests are defined as follows:

- 1. The term "DOCUMENT(S)" means all documents and electronically stored information—including but not limited to all emails, text messages, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, video and sound recordings, images, worksheets, and other data and data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation into a reasonably usable form, and includes COMMUNICATIONS.
- 2. The term "COMMUNICATION(S)" means and refers to all correspondence, discussions, conversations, interviews, telephone calls, emails, instant messages, voice mail messages, negotiations, notices, agreements, understandings, meetings, recordings, audiotapes, videotapes, transcripts, facsimiles, telegrams, charts, spreadsheets, visual images, presentations, and all other transmissions of information, thoughts, documents, electronically stored information, or ideas between two or more PERSONS.
 - 3. The terms "YOU" and "YOUR" means and refers to defendant Vin Diesel.
- 4. The terms "any" and "all" are interchangeable and shall be construed disjunctively, conjunctively, or both, as necessary to bring within the scope of this discovery request all matters

which might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

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5. The term "each" means "each and every."

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7. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

The term "including" means "including, but not limited to."

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INSTRUCTIONS

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- 1. The original of each responsive item (or a legible copy if the original is not within YOUR possession, custody, or control) shall be identified and produced at the above-stated date, time, and place unless complete and legible copies of each responsive item are received at the above-referenced address on or before the specified production date. Any such production of copies is without prejudice to Propounding Party's right to inspect and/or copy the original of each DOCUMENT or tangible thing at a future date.
- 2. These Requests seek the production of DOCUMENTS, and electronically stored information ("ESI"), in their native format, unless some other format is agreed to in writing by Propounding Party's counsel of record.
- 3. ESI must be produced with all "metadata" intact. ("Metadata" means the data embedded in electronic versions of a document that show how, when and by whom the document was created, accessed or modified.)
- 4. Any request for a DOCUMENT shall be construed to include any and all drafts, versions, or revisions of such DOCUMENT.
- 5. These Requests seek the production of all responsive DOCUMENTS within YOUR possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such DOCUMENTS are possessed directly by YOU.
- 6. In the event any DOCUMENTS responsive to these Requests are withheld from production based upon a claim of attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product doctrine, or any other privilege or protection from discovery, YOU are requested to provide a privilege log in which YOU explain the basis of the privilege or other protection you are claiming, and provide a description of the DOCUMENTS YOU are withholding sufficient to support the basis for withholding the DOCUMENTS.

All emails referring to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

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1 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:** 2 All emails sent between YOU and plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 3 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:** 4 All voicemail messages YOU received from plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 5 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:** 6 All text messages YOU received from or sent to plaintiff Asta Jonasson. **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:** 7 8 All audio recordings of plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 9 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:** 10 All video recordings of plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 11 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:** 12 All photographs of plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 13 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:** 14 All statements, declarations, and/or affidavits signed by YOU regarding the instant lawsuit. 15 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:** 16 All unsigned drafts of statements, declarations, and/or affidavits reflecting YOUR name, 17 regarding the instant lawsuit. 18 **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:** 19 All notes or records relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson. **REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:** 20 21 All text messages YOU received relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 ///

By:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

All text messages YOU sent relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

3 | 4 | DATED: May 13, 2025

GREENBERG GROSS LLP

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Brian L. Williams Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

PROOF OF SERVICE 1 Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. 2 **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On May 13, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on the 8 interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + 11 COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 14 Emails: bfreedman@lftcllp.com; smhardy@lftcllp.com; jsunshine@lftcllp.com; 15 Attorneys for Defendants Once Race Films, Inc., vbirtha@lftcllp.com; One Race Production, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Mark 16 cpuello@lftcllp.com; Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent 17 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the 18 e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 21 Executed on May 13, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 22 23 Hazelle T Nunez 24 25 26 27 28

EXHIBIT 10

OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR) AND REOUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

dase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's amended notice of the June 24 to June 25, 2025 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

I.

OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- 1. The Defendant is no longer available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel in the presence of a deposition officer. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310(a), that any deposition proceed via remote means, that the deposition officer not be physically present at the time of the deposition, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal. App. 4th 1107.
- 4. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed. The Notice improperly calls for Defendant's deposition on two consecutive dates. The burden on Defendant of an endless deposition outweighs the needs of the case.
- 5. Defendant objects to the notice of deposition in that it is reasonably calculated to result in the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets. Defendant objects into any inquiry into matters protected by Defendant's right to privacy, including without limitation Defendant's sexual history and financial condition. Defendant is entitled to a protective order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.420 and Civil Code Section 3295 to prevent inquiry into improper subject matter and topics.

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- 6. Defendant objects to the location of the deposition set forth in the Notice, as such location is inadequate to protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy. Defendant will meet and confer regarding the taking of a remote video deposition and potential alternative locations.
- 7. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, et seq.
- 8. Defendant objects that the deposition was noticed for a period in which a dispositive motion is pending. Good cause exists to stay any deposition until after a ruling on such motion. Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673; Terminals Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 234, 247.

II.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

The following responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Any document or thing supplied in response to any request is subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and admissibility, and to any and all other objections on any ground that would require the exclusion of any document or thing, or portion thereof, if such document or thing were offered in evidence, all of which objections and grounds are expressly reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial.

No incidental or implied admissions are intended by the responses herein. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agree to supply, a document or thing in response to any request should not be taken as an admission that the Defendant accepts or admits the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such request or in said document, or that such document or thing constitutes admissible evidence. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agrees to supply any document or thing in response to any request is not intended to be and shall not be construed to be a waiver of any part of any objection to any such request, or any part of any General Objection.

The responses herein only apply to those documents or things currently in Defendant's possession. Defendant has not completed investigation of the facts relating to this matter, completed discovery in this matter, or completed preparation for trial in this matter. Accordingly,

Defendant reserve all rights with respect to documents or things which may be subsequently located or discovered, including, without limitation, the right to use such documents at trial, and further reserves any and all rights and any and all objections to any responsive documents or things which may hereafter come into Defendant's possession, or which hereafter may be determined to be within the scope of any such request. Defendant disclaims any legal obligation

to supplement the responses herein.

III.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

- 1. Objection: Defendant objects to the production and inspection of documents at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel at their own expense. Defendant may be unable to locate all requested documents by the date specified for production and, therefore, a mutually convenient time and date can be ascertained by contacting the undersigned to make appropriate arrangement. Should Defendant in the future locate any relevant requested documents now in existence but not yet located, Defendant will so advise counsel for Plaintiff, subject to the objections and comments set forth in these responses.
- 2. Objection: Defendant objects to the instructions to the extent that they conflict with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq., or seek to impose additional obligations upon Defendant beyond those set forth under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. Defendant will respond within the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq.
- 3. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent that it requires the production of documents or things, which have previously been made available to the Plaintiff, are equally available to the Plaintiff, or are public records.
- 4. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks original documents, except where there is a legitimate dispute as to the legibility or authenticity of a copy.
- 5. Objection: to each and every request to the extent it seeks the production of documents or things not in the possession, custody or control of Defendant. Defendant would

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produce only those documents or things, if any, in the possession of Defendant, and would produce documents, if any, in the manner kept by Defendant the usual course of business.

- 6. Objection: Defendant objects to the definitions contained in the requests in that they are incomplete, vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, overbroad and oppressive, and seek to impose obligations on Defendant beyond those imposed by the California Code of Civil Procedure.
- 7. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. Nothing herein is intended to be, nor shall in any way be construed as, a waiver of any attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. To the extent any request may be construed as calling for disclosure of information protected by such privilege or doctrine, a continuing objection to such Request is hereby interposed. No such privileged information will be provided. In the event any privileged information is provided in connection with these responses, such disclosure is inadvertent and is not intended to be, and shall not be deemed, a waiver of such privilege.
- 8. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information that is confidential, proprietary, a trade secret or private, or otherwise calls for information protected by the right of privacy contained in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of California, in the United States Constitution or any other applicable privilege or protection recognized under statute or applicable case law.
- 9. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks information that may violate the financial privacy rights of Defendant, third parties and individuals who are protected under the California Constitution.
- 10. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information not relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and would subject Defendant to oppression, harassment, and undue burden

and expense not commensurate with any legitimate discovery need.

- 11. Objection: Defendant further objects to each request to the extent that it seeks a legal conclusion and/or an expert opinion.
- 12. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information already in the possession, custody, or control of Plaintiff.
- 13. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it is argumentative and without any foundation.
- 14. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information for periods of time other than periods relevant to the claims in the Complaint, or other than periods of time properly subject to discovery.
- 15. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets.
- 16. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information that are not limited in time or scope.
- 17. Objection: Defendant objects to each request on the grounds it requests

 Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is
 reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and
 produced the ESI.
- 18. Objection: Because Defendant have not concluded their discovery and investigation in this action, they specifically reserve the right to amend and/or supplement their responses to the requests.
- 19. Objection: Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents, and each of them. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the *California Code of Civil Procedure*, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. *See* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031,260; 1013(e).

- 20. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of "DOCUMENTS" to the extent that it conflicts with the provisions of *Evidence Code* section 250 and/or the *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.010. *et seq.*, or seek to impose additional obligation upon Defendant beyond those set forth under *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.010.
- 21. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "DOCUMENT(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 22. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "COMMUNICATION(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 23. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOU" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 25. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOUR" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.

Defendant incorporates by reference these general objections to each response below.

OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither

relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected

by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably

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accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States

Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

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Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court

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period.

(1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and

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communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031,030.

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(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully

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set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither

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relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected

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by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal, App. 3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably

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accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States

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Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

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Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court

(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

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Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and

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27 28 communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030.

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(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

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Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

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OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

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Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant

VIN DIÈSEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

¢	ase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 119 of 407				
1	PROOF OF SERVICE				
1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA]				
2	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES]				
3	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18				
4	and not a party to the within action; my business is EXPRESS NETWORK, LLC, 1605 W. Olympic Blvd, Suite 800, Los Angeles, CA 90015.				
5	On June 20, 2025, I served the foregoing document(s) described:				
6 7	OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN				
8	DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS				
9	on the interested parties in this action \(\sum \) by placing \(\sum \) the original \(\sum \) a true copy thereof enclosed in seal envelopes addressed as follows:				
10	Brian L. Williams				
11	Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale				
12	Greenberg Gross LLP 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30 th Floor				
13	Los Angeles, CA 90017 Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson				
14	By Personal Service. I personally delivered the above listed documents to the persons at the addresses listed above.				
15 16	State. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.				
17	Executed on June 20, 2025 at Los Angeles, California.				
18					
19	EXPRESS NETWORK				
20					
21	Print Name (Messenger) Signature of Declarant (Messenger)				
22					
23					
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C	ase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 120 of 407				
1	PROOF OF SERVICE				
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA]				
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES]ss.				
4	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18				
5	and not a party to the within action; my business is EXPRESS NETWORK, LLC, 1605 W. Olympic Blvd, Suite 800, Los Angeles, CA 90015.				
6	On June 20, 2025, I served the foregoing document(s) described:				
7	OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION				
8	OF DOCUMENTS				
9	on the interested parties in this action \(\sum \) by placing \(\sum \) the original \(\sum \) a true copy thereof enclosed in seal envelopes addressed as follows:				
10	Brian L. Williams				
11	Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale				
12 13	Greenberg Gross, LLP 650 Town Center Dr, Ste 1700				
14	Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7025 Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson				
15	By Personal Service. I personally delivered the above listed documents to the persons at				
16	the addresses listed above.				
17	State. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.				
18	Executed on June 20, 2025 at Los Angeles, California.				
19	EXPRESS NETWORK				
20					
21	Danie (have)				
22	Print Name (Messenger) Signature of Declarant (Messenger)				
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	30				

Pase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 121 of 407 OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR) AND REOUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 122 of 407

EXHIBIT 11

From: Matthew T. Hale

Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 5:12 PM

To: Bryan Freedman; Sean M. Hardy; Jason Sunshine

Cc: Brian Williams; Jemma E. Dunn; Hazelle T. Nunez; Vaneta Birtha

Subject: Jonasson v. Vin Diesel, et al

Counsel:

We are in receipt of defendant Vin Diesel's objections to Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Deposition and Requests for Production of Documents. For the first time since these dates (June 24 and 25) were provided by his counsel on May 9, 2025, and despite his agreement to appear in Los Angeles, Defendant Vin Diesel now suddenly asserts that he is not available to attend his duly noticed deposition. Please provide, by end of day this coming Monday June 23, 2025, multiple alternative dates for his deposition that fall on or before July 18th. Given the apparent gamesmanship and bad faith nature of this objection, if we do not receive these multiple dates by Monday, we will move forward with a Motion to Compel Vin Diesel's deposition and will take a notice of non-appearance on Tuesday. As to the remainder of Defendant's objections, please see the below:

- 2. Mr. Diesel's objection regarding in-person attendance misinterprets the CCP § 2025.310. The deponent cannot simply elect to be separate from the attorney taking the deposition. It is the attorney or party's election to physically present at the location of the deponent: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent."
- 3. Mr. Diesel again fails to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from our office in Downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Instead, Mr. Diesel again uses the qualifying language, "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection. Furthermore, Samantha Vincent already confirmed that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles.
- 4. There is no seven-hour limit applicable to employment cases, like this one. (CCP § 2025.290(b)(4)). Further, the notice does not assume any such time period.
- 5. Defendant asserts that he shouldn't have to attend his deposition because questions *may* be asked that implicate his privacy. Not only is this not a ground to forego attendance altogether, but also there is a protective order in this matter in place to protect truly confidential portions of the deposition.
- 6. There is absolutely no indication that Plaintiff's office, which has ample security staff and precautions, is inadequate to protect Mr. Diesel's personal safety and privacy.
- 7. The objection regarding a failure to comply with requirements of a deposition notice lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with. This objection should be disregarded due to its ambiguity.
- 8. The objection incorrectly asserts that there is a dispositive motion pending.

Matthew T. Hale

Counsel - Assistant Director of Litigation | Greenberg Gross LLP

One Summerlin | 1980 Festival Plaza Drive | Suite 730 | Las Vegas, NV 89135 Direct 702.777.0891 | Main 702.777.0888 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com



Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 125 of 407

EXHIBIT 12

From: Sean M. Hardy <smhardy@lftcllp.com>
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2025 8:09 AM

To: Matthew T. Hale

Cc: Brian Williams; Jemma E. Dunn; Hazelle T. Nunez; Vaneta Birtha; Bryan Freedman; Jason

Sunshine

Subject: [EXT] RE: Jonasson v. Vin Diesel, et al

Counsel,

We respectfully disagree with your position below, and will meet and confer with you on this issue in person today at your office. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Sean M. Hardy

Sean M. Hardy, Esq.
Partner
LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067

Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045

Web: www.ftllp.com

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EXHIBIT 13

PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2	Page(s)					
3	Cases					
4 5	(2010) 25 Col Arm 5th 210					
6	(1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673					
8	Terminal Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 234					
9	Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531					
11	Statutes					
12	California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(d)					
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14	California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a)					
15	Civ. Code, § 3295(a)(2)					
16	Code of Civ. Proc., § 340.16(e)					
17	Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010					
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19	Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(a)					
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23	Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq					
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from allegations that Defendant Vin Diesel sexually assaulted Plaintiff Asta Jonasson in September 2010 while she was working as his assistant during the production of the film "Fast Five," and then terminated her employment the following day in retaliation for resisting the assault incident. Plaintiff remained silent for years due to fear of industry ostracization, immigration concerns as a green card holder, and restrictive non-disclosure agreements imposed by Defendants. Empowered by recent legislative changes, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in December 2023 seeking redress for the sexual assault and wrongful termination.

Plaintiff now moves to compel Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition after a pattern of evasion and obstruction spanning over a year. Despite multiple notices, good faith efforts to accommodate his schedule, and his counsel's express confirmation of availability for June 24-25, 2025, Defendant served last-minute objections containing recycled, meritless arguments just four days before his scheduled deposition. When Plaintiff's counsel attempted to meet and confer, Defendant's counsel responded with shocking misconduct, including profanity, threats of malicious prosecution, and physical intimidation, while refusing to provide any legitimate explanation for Defendant's sudden unavailability. Defendant's objections lack merit as they misinterpret applicable statutes, seek to prevent discovery on topics central to Plaintiff's claims, and attempt to delay proceedings until after trial through frivolous procedural maneuvers.

Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court compel Defendant Vin Diesel to appear for deposition within ten days and impose monetary sanctions of \$7,455.07 against Defendant and his counsel for their willful abuse of the discovery process, pattern of evasion, and unmeritorious objections that have unnecessarily delayed essential discovery in this matter.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Α. Defendant Vin Diesel's Testimony is Essential to the Prosecution of Plaintiff's Matter.

In September 2010, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson was hired by Defendants as an assistant working directly for Defendant Vin Diesel during the production of "Fast Five." (Compl., p. 2, ¶ 1.) Shortly

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after beginning her employment, on or about September 10, 2010, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Diesel sexually assaulted her in his hotel suite at the St. Regis Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia. (Compl., p. 10, ¶¶ 29-30.) The following day, on or about September 11, 2010, Plaintiff was terminated from her position when Samantha Vincent, President of One Race and Defendant Diesel's sister, called Plaintiff and stated that One Race no longer needed "any extra help." (Compl., p. 11, ¶ 32.)

For years following the alleged incident, Plaintiff remained silent about the sexual assault. She was afraid to speak out against a high-profile actor due to concerns about being ostracized from the industry jeopardizing her potential future citizenship while she was a green card holder. (Compl., p. 3, ¶ 7.) Additionally, One Race required all employees to sign non-disclosure agreements, further limiting Plaintiff's ability to discuss matters related to her employment and Defendant Diesel. (Compl., p. 3, \P 7.)

Recently empowered by the #MeToo and Time's Up movements, and with the protection of the Speak Out Act and the revival of her claims under California Assembly Bill 2777 (AB 2777), Plaintiff is now seeking legal relief for the alleged sexual assault and subsequent termination of her employment. (Compl., p. 4, \P 7.)

This lawsuit was filed on December 21, 2023, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.16, as amended by Assembly Bill 2777.

В. Defendant Vin Diesel Has Repeatedly Evaded Deposition Despite Multiple Notices and Good Faith Efforts To Accommodate His Schedule.

Plaintiff Asta Jonasson first noticed Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition for May 7, 2024. (See Declaration of Matthew T. Hale ("Hale Decl."), ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) On May 1, 2024, Defendant served his objection to the notice of deposition, indicating in part that neither he nor his counsel were available on that date. (Hale Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. 2.)

On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff re-noticed Mr. Diesel's deposition for April 29, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 3.) and requested that Defendant's counsel provide alternative deposition dates if Mr. Diesel or his attorneys were not available on that date. (Hale Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Exhs. 3-4.) More than two weeks later, on April 24, 2025, Defendant's counsel belatedly responded by serving objections to the deposition notice via overnight mail without providing any alternative deposition dates. (Hale Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. 5.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. Diesel's counsel to meet and confer regarding the objections to Mr. Diesel's deposition notice. (Hale Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. 6.) This letter addressed Mr. Diesel's objections in detail, each of which was unmeritorious. Following discussion on this letter, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel confirmed that Mr. Diesel would appear for his deposition in person on June 24 and June 25, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. 7.) On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel emailed counsel for Defendant to confirm that the deposition would be held at Plaintiff's office in downtown Los Angeles and to request that they inform Plaintiff's counsel immediately if this location was an issue. (Hale Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. 8.) That same date, May 13, 2025, Plaintiff served the notice of deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel to be conducted at the Los Angeles office of Plaintiff's counsel on June 24 and June 25, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. 9.)

C. <u>Defendant Vin Diesel Served Nearly Identical Objections Just Four Days Before</u> <u>His Scheduled Deposition Despite Previously Confirming His Availability.</u>

On June 20, 2025—four days before the deposition date that Defendant's counsel had agreed upon more than one month earlier—counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel served objections to Plaintiff's deposition notice via personal service. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10.) This objection document closely resembled the prior objection document from April 2025, including five of the same eight objections. (See Hale Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 5.) The only three new objections related to Vin Diesel's purported unavailability on the date his counsel had selected, the scope of the deposition, and Defendant's claim that the deposition location at the Los Angeles office of Plaintiff's counsel could not "protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy" (*Ibid.*) Plaintiff's counsel had previously conducted in-person depositions in this matter at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office on May 28, 2025 and June 19, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 12.)

That same day, June 20, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel responded via email, meeting and conferring regarding each objection and requesting alternative dates before the fact discovery cutoff (July 18, 2025), given Vin Diesel's asserted unavailability. (Hale Decl., ¶ 13, Exh. 11.)

D. <u>Defendant's Counsel Engaged In Obstructionist Tactics, Including Physical</u> Threats And Profanity, While Refusing To Provide Any Legitimate Reason For

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Vin Diesel's Last-Minute Unavailability.

Plaintiff's counsel was scheduled to take the in-person deposition of third party witness Valentino Morales on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 14.) The morning of this deposition, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel asserted that they disagreed with Plaintiff counsel's position regarding Vin Diesel's objections to his duly noticed deposition and would meet and confer in person, later that day, on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 15, Exh. 12.)

Counsel for Defendants, Sean Hardy and Bryan Freedman, appeared with the third party deponent on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 16.) Prior to the deposition, Plaintiff's counsel Matthew Hale requested to meet and confer about the objections to the deposition of Vin Diesel in a separate room. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy began to discuss the assertion that Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable for his deposition. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale requested to know why Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable, and Mr. Hardy refused to provide a reason. (*Ibid.*)

During this back and forth, Mr. Freedman entered the room. (Hale Decl., ¶ 17.) Mr. Hale again requested to know why Mr. Diesel was unavailable to determine if this was a true emergency or a simple failure to appear for his deposition, for which availability had been cleared over a month prior, as it would be important for the purposes of any motion to compel that may need to be filed. (*Ibid.*) Counsel for Defendant continued to refuse to provide any explanation. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Freedman interjected and told Mr. Hale to just file his motion and called Mr. Hale, a "moron" and cursed while doing so. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale began to write down the language on note paper, specifically stating that he would be including these insults in his declaration to any Motion and requesting to have a professional and substantive meet and confer. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Freedman then threatened Mr. Hale with malicious prosecution and called him a "piece of shit." (Ibid.) At no time did Mr. Hale exchange any insult with Mr. Freedman, raise his voice, or provoke any physical contact. (*Ibid.*) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman got up from his chair, rushed to stand directly in front of Mr. Hale mere inches away from him, causing Mr. Freedman's face to be directly in front of that of Mr. Hale. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Freedman then called Mr. Hale a "pussy" and swung his fist at Mr. Hale's face, stopping directly in front of his face without making contact. (Ibid.) Shocked, Mr. Hale nonetheless remained composed and attempted to address Mr. Hardy behind Mr. Freedman, in hopes that counsel could

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get the meet and confer discussion back on track. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman left the room, and Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy conducted the meet and confer session, both then and after the deposition concluded later that day. (*Ibid.*)

Given Mr. Diesel's asserted objection regarding the lack of security and privacy at Plaintiff's counsel's office, Mr. Hale requested to know what was deficient about their security and/or privacy. (Hale Decl., ¶ 18.) Mr. Hardy indicated that Mr. Diesel had a medical condition and that he needed to be able to quickly leave the deposition for his security, including in relation to death threats, without having to go down thirty floors and obtain his vehicle from an underground parking lot. (Ibid.) Mr. Hardy also asserted that Mr. Diesel would need his personal security with him. (Ibid.)

Mr. Hale then offered to conduct the next day's deposition at defense counsel's office. (Hale Decl., ¶ 19.) Mr. Hardy again asserted that Mr. Diesel was not in the city. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale asked when Mr. Diesel left the city and where he was, but Mr. Hardy would not provide that information. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hardy then *for the first time* laid out several conditions for a rescheduled deposition of Vin Diesel: (1) that the deposition be conducted for no more than seven hours; (2) that a protective order be in place to protect Defendant's financial, medical, and sexual privacy; (3) that the deposition take place at defense counsel's office or remotely; and (4) that the deposition only occur following the hearing on Defendant's just-filed Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication, set for October 7, 2025, nearly two months after the current trial date of August 18, 2025. (*Ibid.*)

At no time did Mr. Hale agree to forego filing a Motion to Compel while the parties further met and conferred, at an Informal Discovery Conference, or in any other venue. (Hale Decl., ¶ 20.)

Ε. **Defendant's Filing of a Motion for Protective Order**

On the same date, June 23, 2025, Defendant Vin Diesel filed a Motion for Protective Order on the same subset of four (4) grounds listed immediately above. As will be argued below, these grounds are unmeritorious.

III. **LEGAL STANDARD**

Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(a) provides as follows:

If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an

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organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

IV. **ARGUMENT**

A. Defendant Vin Diesel's Objections to his Notice of Deposition are Invalid and Unmeritorious.

1. **Defendant Vin Diesel's Asserted Unavailability**

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel, for the first time since his counsel provided his availability for an in-person deposition on May 9, 2025, asserted that he was not available for his deposition. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1) Neither in writing nor verbally through his counsel did Defendant communicate any true emergency to explain his availability. In fact, Mr. Diesel's counsel indicated that he was not even "in the city." Mr. Diesel's counsel declined to provide any further detail. When Plaintiff's counsel offered to conduct the deposition at defense counsel's office, as requested by Mr. Diesel, defense counsel again asserted Mr. Diesel was not "in the city."

Furthermore, "unavailability" is not an adequate objection to a duly-served deposition notice. A deposition subpoena is valid if it complies with the timing and service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq.

2. **In-Person Attendance**

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that he cannot be required to attend his deposition in-person, pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.310(a). (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) However, as pointed out to counsel in previous meet and confer discussions regarding an identical objection to a prior notice of deposition of Mr. Diesel, this is a misreading of that code section.

CCP § 2025.310(a) states as follows: "At the election of the deponent or the deposing party,

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the deposition officer may attend the deposition at a different location than the deponent via remote means. A deponent is not required to be physically present with the deposition officer when being sworn in at the time of the deposition." Thus, the code section permits the deposition officer, i.e., the court reporter, to attend the deposition via remote means. No reference is made to the deponent's ability to elect a remote appearance.

CCP § 2025.310(b), which Mr. Diesel did not cite in his objection, states as follows: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent. If a party or attorney of record elects to be physically present at the location of the deponent, all physically present participants in the deposition shall comply with local health and safety ordinances, rules, and orders." This code section similarly does not permit Mr. Diesel to elect a remote appearance; it merely allows Mr. Diesel, or his attorney of record, to be physically present at the location of another deponent. Of course, this supports Plaintiff's position, as Plaintiff and her attorney of record may be physically present at the deposition of the deponent in this scenario: Vin Diesel.

3. **Location of Deposition**

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that he should not have to attend a deposition "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) Mr. Diesel failed to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from Plaintiff's counsel's office in downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection.

Furthermore, Samantha Vincent – Mr. Diesel's sister – and Valentino Morales – Mr. Diesel's security and close friend – already confirmed at their depositions that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles, California. (Hale Decl., ¶ 21.) Defendant's suggestion to hold the deposition at defense counsel's office in Century City also confirms the convenience of Los Angeles as a location for Mr. Diesel's deposition.

Finally, Plaintiff's counsel repeatedly requested confirmation on this topic from defense counsel but was not provided with any. As recently as May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel requested

to confirm that the in-person location of Vin Diesel's June 24 and 25 deposition was to be Los Angeles, specifically Plaintiff's counsel's Los Angeles office. (Hale Decl., ¶ 9, Exh 8.) Of course, this is Plaintiff's choice to begin with, but Plaintiff extended this question as a courtesy, which received no response from defense counsel.

4. Time Limit

Defendant Diesel also objected that his deposition should be limited to seven-hours under CCP § 2025.290. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) Pursuant to CCP § 2025.290(b)(4), depositions in employment matters are excepted from the default seven-hour limit. While Plaintiff's FEHA claims have indeed been dismissed, multiple employment claims still remain, including Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code, §§ 98.6, 1102.5 and Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

Further, the notice of deposition does not assume any particular total time to be on the record.

A full day of deposition rarely equates to seven hours on the record.

5. Questions Implicating Privacy

"[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (*Code Civ. Proc.*, § 2017.010.) "Relevant' evidence is evidence 'having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (*D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.* (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 229.) "The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious." (*Williams v. Sup. Ct.* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) If the court finds a privacy interest, the court must balance the privacy concerns against the need for the information. (*Id.* at p. 552.)

Defendant Vin Diesel asserts that he should not have to attend his deposition because questions *may* be asked that implicate his privacy, including his sexual history and financial condition. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.)

First, as to Defendant's financial condition, Plaintiff is already not permitted to seek pretrial discovery on this subject. (Civ. Code, § 3295(a)(2).) As such, a protective order is altogether unnecessary. On the contrary, Plaintiff must request an order permitting such discovery to obtain it pretrial. Plaintiff has not and does not plan on doing so. Defendant cannot be permitted to delay his deposition by simply listing subjects to which Plaintiff never had the intention or ability to inquire about.

Second, as to Mr. Diesel's "sexual history," it is unclear as to what Defendant is referring, given the ambiguity of the phrase. As asserted in Mr. Diesel's summary judgment motion, set to be heard after trial, Plaintiff relies on *Code of Civ. Proc.*, § 340.16 to revive her claims based on wrongful conduct in 2010. With regard to claims revived by *Code of Civ. Proc.*, § 340.16(e), Plaintiff must allege the following:

- (A) The plaintiff was sexually assaulted.
- (B) One or more entities are legally responsible for damages arising out of the sexual assault.
- (C) The entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.

As such, questions regarding previous instances of sexual assault by Mr. Diesel are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Now, Mr. Diesel seeks to prevent Plaintiff from even *seeking* essential discovery, while at the same time attempting to dismiss her claims for lack of that same sought-for evidence. That said, Plaintiff is not interested in Mr. Diesel's "sexual history" wholesale. An order preventing all investigation into anything sexual with regard to Vin Diesel would necessarily prevent Plaintiff from asking questions directed toward Mr. Diesel about accusations of sexual assault or abuse previously committed by him. A stipulated protective order ("SPO") in this matter has been in place since July 25, 2024. Any particular questions that Defendant or his counsel believe run afield are better addressed on a question-by-question basis, at which time counsel may simply instruct their client not to answer. All testimony

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will have the protection of the parties' protective order, so long as Defendant labels it as confidential, subject to the procedure in the parties' SPO to de-designate as confidential any testimony. In this scenario, a specialized protective order is a blunt tool that would prevent Plaintiff from seeking essential discovery.

In his recently filed Motion for Protective Order, Mr. Diesel adds multiple other types of privacy to the list, including medical and psychotherapeutic. Plaintiff has no interest in discovery on these topics, and Defendant has provided no examples of what it may be concerned about Plaintiff inquiring into. Again, Defendant cannot be permitted to delay his deposition by simply listing subjects to which Plaintiff never had the intention to inquire about and asking the Court to hear that Motion months after the parties' August 2025 trial date. Rather, the appropriate remedy is to appear for a properly noticed deposition (which was previously agreed to by defense counsel), and object on the record. This permits the Court to make specific findings as to specific questions rather than asking the Court to make premature blanket rulings on questions that have not yet been posed.

Finally, Defendant also adds "employment history" to the list of private topics that may not be inquired about. Defendant fails to define precisely what is meant by the ambiguous phrase. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and his entities, so to the extent "employment history" refers to Vin Diesel's employment with Defendants One Race Films, Inc. or One Race Productions, Inc., such topics are squarely discoverable. Other than this, Plaintiff has little interest in probing into Mr. Diesel's career path, which is already publicly known.

6. **Safety**

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that Plaintiff's office is "inadequate to protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy." (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) As is known by Defendants' counsel, Plaintiff's counsel's office is located in the PwC building on 7th and Figueroa, which is home to Seyfarth Shaw and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. (Hale Decl. ¶ 22.) Like many buildings downtown, it has multiple 24/7 dedicated security personnel. (*Ibid.*) Entrance is restricted per floor, and visitors may only access a particular floor if they have been added to a security list and been ushered to an appropriate elevator by security. (*Ibid.*) During a meet and confer session with Defense counsel, Sean Hardy explained that the concern was more about

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27 28 the quickness with which Mr. Diesel could descend from the 30th floor and retrieve his vehicle from the building's underground parking. (Hale Decl. ¶ 18.) This is not a reasonable or rational basis for failing to attend a deposition. Further, no explanation was provided with relation to the building's inability to protect Defendant's privacy, so this is still a mystery.

During the in-person meet and confer, Plaintiff's counsel offered as a compromise to conduct the deposition at the office of defense counsel. (Hale Decl. ¶ 19.) Defense counsel stated that nonetheless, Mr. Diesel was "not in the city" and so would not be attending. (*Ibid.*)

For purposes of security, Plaintiff also suggests the deposition be held at the courthouse where there is ample security to alleviate Mr. Diesel's concerns.

7. **Vague Procedural Deficiencies**

Mr. Diesel also objected "to the extent [the deposition notice] fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, et seq." (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) This objection lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with, and no additional detail has been provided by counsel. This objection should be disregarded due to its vagueness and ambiguity.

8. **Pending Dispositive Motion**

Defendant's final objection asserts good cause exists to stay the deposition pending Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication ("MSJ"), which is scheduled to be heard on October 7, 2025, nearly two months past the parties' August 18, 2025 trial date. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) The cases cited, Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673 and Terminal Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 234 do not stand for this proposition. Terminal and Silver are both cases where a plaintiff had yet to get past the pleadings stage, and each court stated that the plaintiff had to state at least one cause of action before discovery or depositions would be permitted. Of course, this matter is past the pleadings stage, is deep into fact discovery, and testimony sought at the deposition of Vin Diesel is squarely relevant to Plaintiff's preparation for Trial. Further, the MSJ should never be heard because it was filed late, and so should not be used as a sword to delay discovery and trial itself.

B. <u>Plaintiff's Counsel Adequately Met and Conferred Prior to Filing this Motion.</u>

Pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(b)(2), a motion to compel a deposition should be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under section 2016.040 or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. Plaintiff here does both. Plaintiff's counsel Matthew Hale attempted a reasonable and good faith resolution of each issued presented by this motion by meeting and conferring with opposing counsel on multiple occasions and contacted the deponent's counsel to inquire about the intended nonappearance. (Hale Decl. ¶ 13-20, Exh. 11-12.)

C. <u>Monetary Sanctions Are Appropriate Due to Defendant's Misuse of the Discovery Process.</u>

California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a) provides that "[t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process." California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(d) provides that "[f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery" constitutes misuse of the discovery process. California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(e) provides that "making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery" also constitutes misuse of the discovery process.

Here, sanctions against Mr. Diesel and his counsel, Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley, are warranted pursuant to the aforementioned code sections because Defendant has failed to appear for his properly noticed deposition. Further, Defendant's unmeritorious objections and counsel's improper conduct constitute a misuse of the discovery process and failure to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(g)(1) provides:

If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, *the court shall impose a monetary* sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction

acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Emphasis added.)

Defendants' conduct is a willful abuse of the discovery process for which Defendant and his counsel should be sanctioned. Defendant has failed to appear at his duly noticed deposition, at a date and location agreed to by the parties. Under the statutes enumerated above, plaintiff requests sanctions in the amount of \$7,455.07 for costs and attorneys' fees. (Hale Decl. ¶ 29.)¹

V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Accordingly, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson requests that this Court issue an order directing Defendant to appear for deposition within the next ten (10) days, directing Defendant and his counsel, Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley, to pay sanctions to plaintiff in the amount of \$7,455.07 for this willful discovery violation.

DATED: June 26, 2025 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

By: /s/Matthew T. Hale
Rrian I. Williams

Brian L. Williams
Jemma E. Dunn
Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

¹ To the extent it solves any of Defendant's concerns, it may be prudent to appoint a discovery referee at Mr. Freedman's expense to ensure (1) professional conduct at further in person depositions and meet and confers and (2) to make decisions regarding the appropriateness of the subject matter of the questions during the deposition in real time.

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE** 2 Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On June 26, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 8 **SUPPORT THEREOF** on the interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Attorneys for Defendants One Race Films, Inc., Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. One Race Productions, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Mark Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 Emails: bfreedman@ftllp.com 14 smhardy@ftllp.com jsunshine@ftllp.com 15 vbirtha@ftllp.com cpuello@ftllp.com 16 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any 18 electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 Executed on June 26, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 21 22 23

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Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25

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DECLARATION OF MATTHEW T. HALE

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- I, Matthew T. Hale, declare as follows:
- 1. I am an attorney at law, duly authorized to practice law in the State of California. I am an attorney with the law firm of Greenberg Gross LLP, counsel of record for plaintiff Asta Jonasson ("Plaintiff" or "Jonasson") in this case. The facts stated herein are within my personal knowledge and if called upon to testify, I can truthfully and competently do so as to all matters herein
- 2. Plaintiff Asta Jonasson first noticed Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition for May 7, 2024. A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.
- 3. On May 1, 2024, Defendant Vin Diesel served his objection to the notice of deposition, indicating in part that neither he nor his counsel were available on that date. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
- 4. On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff again noticed Mr. Diesel's deposition, this time for April 29, 2025. A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 3**.
- 5. Plaintiff accompanied the notice of deposition with a letter requesting alternative dates if April 29, 2025 did not work for Mr. Diesel or his attorneys. A true and correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
- 6. No response was received to that letter until Mr. Diesel's objections to the deposition notice were served via overnight mail on April 24, 2025. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
- 7. Thereafter, Plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. Diesel's counsel to meet and confer regarding the objections to Mr. Diesel's deposition notice. A true and correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
- 8. Following discussion on this letter, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel confirmed that he would appear for his deposition in person on June 24 and June 25. A true and correct copy of the confirming email from Jason Sunshine is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
- 9. On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel emailed counsel for Defendant confirming that the deposition would be held at Plaintiff's office downtown Los Angeles and to inform Plaintiff's

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- counsel immediately if this was an issue. A true and correct copy of the confirming email from Matthew Hale is attached hereto as Exhibit 8.
- 10. That same date, May 13, 2025, Plaintiff served the notice of deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel to be conducted at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office for June 24 and June 25., 2025 A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 9**.
- 11. On June 20, 2025, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel served via personal service its objections to Plaintiff's deposition notice, served on May 13, 2025. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as Exhibit 10.
- 12. Plaintiff's counsel had previously conducted in-person depositions in this matter at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office on May 28, 2025 and June 19, 2025.
- 13. That same day, June 20, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel responded via email, meeting and conferring regarding each objection and requesting alternative dates before the fact discovery cutoff (July 18, 2025), given Vin Diesel's asserted unavailability. A true and correct copy of that email is attached hereto as Exhibit 11.
- 14. Plaintiff's counsel was scheduled to take the in-person deposition of third party witness Valentino Morales on June 23, 2025.
- 15. The morning of this deposition, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel asserted that they disagreed with Plaintiff counsel's position regarding Vin Diesel's objections to his duly noticed deposition and would meet and confer in person later that day, on June 23, 2025. A true and correct copy of that email from Sean Hardy is attached hereto as Exhibit 12.
- 16. Counsel for Defendants, Sean Hardy and Bryan Freedman, appeared with the third party deponent on June 23, 2025. Prior to the deposition, Plaintiff's counsel Matthew Hale requested to meet and confer about the objections to the deposition of Vin Diesel in a separate room. Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy began to discuss the assertion that Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable for his deposition. Mr. Hale requested to know why Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable, and Mr. Hardy refused to provide a reason.
- 17. During this back and forth, Mr. Freedman entered the room. Mr. Hale again requested to know why Mr. Diesel was unavailable to determine if this was a true emergency or a simple

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failure to appear for his deposition, for which availability had been cleared over a month prior, as it would be important for the purposes of any Motion to compel that may need to be filed. Counsel for Defendant continued to refuse to provide any explanation. Mr. Freedman interjected and told Mr. Hale to just file his motion and called Mr. Hale, a "moron" and cursed while doing so. Mr. Hale began to write down the language on note paper, specifically stating that he would be including these insults in his declaration to any motion and requesting to have a professional and substantive meet and confer. Mr. Freedman then threatened Mr. Hale with malicious prosecution and called him a "piece of shit." At no time did Mr. Hale exchange any insult with Mr. Freedman, raise his voice, or provoke any physical contact. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman got up from his chair, rushed to stand directly in front of Mr. Hale, mere inches away from him, causing Mr. Freedman's face to be directly in front of that of Mr. Hale. Mr. Freedman then called Mr. Hale a "pussy" and swung his fist at Mr. Hale's face, stopping directly in front of his face, without making contact. Shocked, Mr. Hale nonetheless remained composed and attempted to address Mr. Hardy behind Mr. Freedman, in hopes that counsel could get the meet and confer discussion back on track. At some point shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman left the room, and Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy conducted the meet and confer session, both then and after the deposition concluded later that day.

- Given Mr. Diesel's asserted objection regarding the lack of security and privacy at 18. Plaintiff's counsel's office, Mr. Hale requested to know what was deficient about their security and/or privacy. Mr. Hardy indicated that Mr. Diesel had a medical condition and that he needed to be able to quickly leave the deposition for his security, including in relation to death threats, without having to go down thirty floors and obtain his vehicle from an underground parking lot. Mr. Hardy also asserted that Mr. Diesel would need his personal security with him.
- 19. Mr. Hale then offered to conduct the next day's deposition at defense counsel's office. Mr. Hardy again asserted that Mr. Diesel was not in the city. Mr. Hale asked when Mr. Diesel left the city and where he was, but Mr. Hardy would not provide that information. Mr. Hardy laid out several conditions for a rescheduled deposition of Vin Diesel: (1) that the deposition be conducted for no more than seven hours; (2) that a protective order be in place to protect Defendant's financial, medical, and sexual privacy; (3) that the deposition take place at defense counsel's office

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current trial date of August 18, 2025. 20. At no time did Mr. Hale agree to forego filing a Motion to Compel while the parties further met and conferred, at an Informal Discovery Conference, or in any other venue.

or remotely; and (4) that the deposition only occur following the hearing on Defendant's just-filed

Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication, set for October 7, 2025, nearly two months after the

- 21. Samantha Vincent – Mr. Diesel's sister – and Valentino Morales – Mr. Diesel's security and close friend – already confirmed at their depositions that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles, California.
- Plaintiff's counsel's office is located in the PwC building on 7th and Figueroa, which 22. is home to Seyfarth Shaw and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. Like many buildings downtown, it has multiple 24/7 dedicated security personnel. Entrance is restricted per floor, and visitors may only access a particular floor if they have been added to a security list and been ushered to an appropriate elevator by security.
- 23. I have been practicing law since 2015. I primarily litigate wrongful termination of employment and discrimination cases in both state and federal court on behalf of plaintiffs, including cases based upon violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act and the California Labor Code.
- 24. I am a graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law and of Harvard University.
- 25. In January of 2023, my colleagues and I tried Galvan v. United Parcel Service, et al. (LASC Case No. BC703891), which resulted in a \$5.4 million verdict.
- 26. I have been confirmed legal fees at an hourly rate of \$850.00 by Judge Lipner of Department 72.
- 27. Throughout my practice as an attorney on plaintiff's side, I have become familiar with customary billing rates for attorneys of my experience level and title. I understand that my hourly rate as an associate attorney of a plaintiff's law firm is at least comparable, if not below, the hourly rates of other attorneys in similar situations.
 - I am familiar with the proper procedure for calculating hourly bills. I understand 28.

which tasks are billable and which are not. All of the time that I spent on this motion was necessary to prepare it properly and diligently.

29. I have primarily handled the discovery issues in this action. I have spent approximately one hour meeting and conferring with Defendant's counsel regarding the motion, including drafting and revising correspondence and participating in conferences regarding the same. I also spent more than 5 hours preparing and revising all briefing in connection with the instant Motion to Compel, including in preparing this declaration and preparing and revising the brief, notice, and proposed order (6 hours X \$850.00 = \$5,100.00). I anticipate that it will take me an additional 2.5 hours to review Defendant's opposition, prepare a reply brief in support of the motion, and prepare for and attend oral argument on this motion (2.5 hours X \$850.00 = \$2,125.00). I was also required to cancel my hotel reservation due to the cancellation of Defendant's deposition, with a fee in the amount of \$230.07. As such, Plaintiff has incurred fees and costs in the amount of \$5,330.07 and is likely to incur costs in the amount of \$2,125.00, for a total of \$7,455.07.

I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: June 26, 2025.

Matthew T. Hale



Journal Technologies Court Portal

Make a Reservation

ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.

Case Number: 23STCV31143 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Wrongful Termination

Date Filed: 2023-12-21 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71

Reservation	
Case Name: ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.	Case Number: 23STCV31143
Type: Motion to Compel (Motion to Compel Party Deposition)	Status: RESERVED
Filing Party: Asta Jonasson (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71
Date/Time: 08/11/2025 8:30 AM	Number of Motions:
Reservation ID: 374377214511	Confirmation Code: CR-FWVPEPZZCBUZ2FMFB

Fees			
Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion to Compel (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment	
Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE
Account Number: n/a	Authorization: n/a
Payment Date: n/a	

 ♣ Print Receipt
 ♣ Reserve Another Hearing
 ♣ View My Reservations



Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 154 of 407

EXHIBIT 1

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

dase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 155 of 407

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on May 7, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

DATED: February 26, 2024 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

By:

Brian L. Williams Claire-Lise Y. Kutlay Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 157 of 407

EXHIBIT 2

¢	ase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL	Document 402-2	Filed 07/09/25	Page 158 of 407	
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	FREEDMAN TAITELMA Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. (S Sean M. Hardy, Esq. (SBN Jason Sunshine (SBN 3360 1801 Century Park East, 5t Los Angeles, CA 90067 Tel: (310) 201-0005 bfreedman@ftllp.com smhardy@ftllp.com jsunshine@ftllp.com Attorneys for Defendant VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MAF	BBN 151990) 266466) 162) h Floor	ENT)		
8	SUPERI	OR COURT OF TH	IE STATE OF CA	LIFORNIA	
9		FOR THE COUNTY	Y OF LOS ANGEI	LES	
10					
11	ASTA JONASSON, an ind	lividual,	Case No.: 23STC	V31143	
12	Plair	ntiff,	[Assigned for all Crowley, Dept. 7	purposes to Judge Daniel M.	
13	VS.		OBJECTIONS TO		
14 15	VIN DIESEL (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), an individual; SAMANTHA VINCENT, an individual; ONE RACE PRODUCTIONS, INC., a California corporation; ONE RACE FILMS, INC., a California corporation; and		DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)		
16			Date: May 7, 2024)24	
17	DOES 1 to 20, inclusive,	corporation, and	Time: 9:00 a.m. Place: Greenber	rg Gross LLP	
18	Defe	endants.	601 S. Fig Los Ange	gueroa Street, 30 th Floor les, CA 90017	
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	OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE		1 DEFENDANT VIN DIE CENT)	SEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR	

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's notice of the May 7, 2024 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

I.

OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- 1. The deposition was unilaterally set without any consideration for either the deponent or counsel's availability, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(1). Consideration has not been given in scheduling this deposition because Plaintiff did not clear the dates and time with counsel, and neither the deponent nor his counsel of record are available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310, that any deposition proceed via remote video, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally <u>Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court</u> (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.
- 4. Defendant objects to the notice of deposition in that it is reasonably calculated to result in the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets without the entry of a mutually-acceptable protective order.
- 5. The deposition was unilaterally set prior to the initially-noticed deposition of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson, without the agreement of counsel, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(3).
- 6. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed.

1	7. Defendant objects	to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the
2	requirements on Code of Civil Pr	rocedure section 2025.210, et seq.
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4	DATED: May 1, 2024	FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP
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6		B
7		Bryan J. Freedman, Esq.
8		Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR
9		VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)
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EXHIBIT 3

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on April 29, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034.415, the Deponent is directed to produce the documents and things set forth below no later than three business days before the deposition.

DEFINITIONS

Words in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS in these definitions, instructions, and Requests are defined as follows:

- 1. The term "DOCUMENT(S)" means all documents and electronically stored information—including but not limited to all emails, text messages, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, video and sound recordings, images, worksheets, and other data and data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation into a reasonably usable form, and includes COMMUNICATIONS.
- 2. The term "COMMUNICATION(S)" means and refers to all correspondence, discussions, conversations, interviews, telephone calls, emails, instant messages, voice mail messages, negotiations, notices, agreements, understandings, meetings, recordings, audiotapes, videotapes, transcripts, facsimiles, telegrams, charts, spreadsheets, visual images, presentations, and all other transmissions of information, thoughts, documents, electronically stored information, or ideas between two or more PERSONS.
 - 3. The terms "YOU" and "YOUR" means and refers to defendant Vin Diesel.
- 4. The terms "any" and "all" are interchangeable and shall be construed disjunctively, conjunctively, or both, as necessary to bring within the scope of this discovery request all matters

- 5. The term "each" means "each and every."
- 6. The term "including" means "including, but not limited to."
- 7. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

INSTRUCTIONS

- 1. The original of each responsive item (or a legible copy if the original is not within YOUR possession, custody, or control) shall be identified and produced at the above-stated date, time, and place unless complete and legible copies of each responsive item are received at the above-referenced address on or before the specified production date. Any such production of copies is without prejudice to Propounding Party's right to inspect and/or copy the original of each DOCUMENT or tangible thing at a future date.
- 2. These Requests seek the production of DOCUMENTS, and electronically stored information ("ESI"), in their native format, unless some other format is agreed to in writing by Propounding Party's counsel of record.
- 3. ESI must be produced with all "metadata" intact. ("Metadata" means the data embedded in electronic versions of a document that show how, when and by whom the document was created, accessed or modified.)
- 4. Any request for a DOCUMENT shall be construed to include any and all drafts, versions, or revisions of such DOCUMENT.
- 5. These Requests seek the production of all responsive DOCUMENTS within YOUR possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such DOCUMENTS are possessed directly by YOU.
- 6. In the event any DOCUMENTS responsive to these Requests are withheld from production based upon a claim of attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product doctrine, or any other privilege or protection from discovery, YOU are requested to provide a privilege log in which YOU explain the basis of the privilege or other protection you are claiming, and provide a description of the DOCUMENTS YOU are withholding sufficient to support the basis for withholding the DOCUMENTS.

All emails referring to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

All text messages YOU sent relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

DATED: April 7, 2025 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

Matthew T. Hale Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

Brian L. Williams Jemma E. Dunn

By:

-6-

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 169 of 407

EXHIBIT 4



Matthew T. Hale Direct Dial: (213) 334-7060 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com

April 7, 2025

VIA EMAIL ONLY

Bryan J. Freedman
Sean M. Hardy
Jason Sunshine
FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angles, CA 90067
bfreedman@ftllp.com
smhardy@ftllp.com
jsunshine@ftllp.com

Re: Asta Jonasson v. One Race Films, Inc., et al.

Counsel:

Enclosed please find notices of deposition for defendants Vin Diesel and Samantha Vincent and witnesses Valentino Morales and Thyrale Thai. If any of the noticed dates are not workable for the deponents' schedules, please let us know as soon as possible, and propose alternative dates that fall before the end of May 2025. Furthermore, counsel has previously objected that defendants Vin Diesel and Samantha Vincent *may* not reside within 150 miles of downtown Los Angeles. If these defendants do not reside within 150 miles of downtown Los Angeles, please notify our office of these defendants' city of residence, and we will coordinate a convenient location.

We are happy to accommodate reasonable scheduling conflicts, but considering the upcoming trial date, we will be completing these depositions by the end of May 2025.

Very truly yours,

Matthew T. Hale

Encls.

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 171 of 407

EXHIBIT 5

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's notice of the April 29, 2025 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

I.

OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- The deposition was unilaterally set without any consideration for either the deponent or counsel's availability, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(1). Consideration has not been given in scheduling this deposition because Plaintiff did not clear the dates and time with counsel, and neither the deponent nor his counsel of record are available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel in the presence of a deposition officer. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310(a), that any deposition proceed via remote means, that the deposition officer not be physically present at the time of the deposition, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.
- 4. The deposition was unilaterally set prior to the initially-noticed deposition of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson, without the agreement of counsel, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(3).
- 5. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025,290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed.
- 6. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, et seq.

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7. Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents in connection with the Notice. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the California Code of Civil Procedure, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.260; 1013(e).

Defendant objects that the deposition was noticed for a period in which a dispositive motion is pending. Good cause exists to stay any deposition until after a ruling on such motion. Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673; Terminals Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 234, 247.

II.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

The following responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Any document or thing supplied in response to any request is subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and admissibility, and to any and all other objections on any ground that would require the exclusion of any document or thing, or portion thereof, if such document or thing were offered in evidence, all of which objections and grounds are expressly reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial.

No incidental or implied admissions are intended by the responses herein. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agree to supply, a document or thing in response to any request should not be taken as an admission that the Defendant accepts or admits the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such request or in said document, or that such document or thing constitutes admissible evidence. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agrees to supply any document or thing in response to any request is not intended to be and shall not be construed to be a waiver of any part of any objection to any such request, or any part of any General Objection.

The responses herein only apply to those documents or things currently in Defendant's possession. Defendant has not completed investigation of the facts relating to this matter, completed discovery in this matter, or completed preparation for trial in this matter. Accordingly,

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GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

- 1. Objection: Defendant objects to the production and inspection of documents at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel at their own expense. Defendant may be unable to locate all requested documents by the date specified for production and, therefore, a mutually convenient time and date can be ascertained by contacting the undersigned to make appropriate arrangement. Should Defendant in the future locate any relevant requested documents now in existence but not yet located, Defendant will so advise counsel for Plaintiff, subject to the objections and comments set forth in these responses.
- 2. Objection: Defendant objects to the instructions to the extent that they conflict with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq., or seek to impose additional obligations upon Defendant beyond those set forth under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. Defendant will respond within the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq.
- 3. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent that it requires the production of documents or things, which have previously been made available to the Plaintiff, are equally available to the Plaintiff, or are public records.
- 4. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks original documents, except where there is a legitimate dispute as to the legibility or authenticity of a copy.
- 5. Objection: to each and every request to the extent it seeks the production of documents or things not in the possession, custody or control of Defendant. Defendant would

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produce only those documents or things, if any, in the possession of Defendant, and would produce documents, if any, in the manner kept by Defendant the usual course of business.

- Defendant objects to the definitions contained in the requests in that 6. Objection: they are incomplete, vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, overbroad and oppressive, and seek to impose obligations on Defendant beyond those imposed by the California Code of Civil Procedure.
- 7. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. Nothing herein is intended to be, nor shall in any way be construed as, a waiver of any attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. To the extent any request may be construed as calling for disclosure of information protected by such privilege or doctrine, a continuing objection to such Request is hereby interposed. No such privileged information will be provided. In the event any privileged information is provided in connection with these responses, such disclosure is inadvertent and is not intended to be, and shall not be deemed, a waiver of such privilege.
- 8. Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information Objection: that is confidential, proprietary, a trade secret or private, or otherwise calls for information protected by the right of privacy contained in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of California, in the United States Constitution or any other applicable privilege or protection recognized under statute or applicable case law.
- 9. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks information that may violate the financial privacy rights of Defendant, third parties and individuals who are protected under the California Constitution.
- 10. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information not relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and would subject Defendant to oppression, harassment, and undue burden

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11. Objection: Defendant further objects to each request to the extent that it seeks a legal conclusion and/or an expert opinion.

and expense not commensurate with any legitimate discovery need.

- 12. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information already in the possession, custody, or control of Plaintiff.
- 13. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it is argumentative and without any foundation.
- 14. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information for periods of time other than periods relevant to the claims in the Complaint, or other than periods of time properly subject to discovery.
- Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the 15. Objection: disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets.
- 16. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information that are not limited in time or scope.
- 17. Defendant objects to each request on the grounds it requests Objection: Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.
- 18. Objection: Because Defendant have not concluded their discovery and investigation in this action, they specifically reserve the right to amend and/or supplement their responses to the requests.
- 19. Objection: Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents, and each of them. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the California Code of Civil Procedure, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.260; 1013(e).

1	20.	Objection:	Defendant objects to the definition of "DOCUMENTS" to the extent
2	that it conflicts with the provisions of Evidence Code section 250 and/or the Code of Civil		
3	Procedure section 2031.010. et seq., or seek to impose additional obligation upon Defendant		
4	beyond those	set forth under	r Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010.
5	21.	Objection:	Defendant objects to the definition of the term "DOCUMENT(S)" to
6	the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.		
7	22.	Objection:	Defendant objects to the definition of the term
8	"COMMUNICATION(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.		
9	23.	Objection:	Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOU" to the extent
10	that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.		
11	25.	Objection:	Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOUR" to the
12	extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.		
13	Defendant incorporates by reference these general objections to each response below.		
14	IV.		
15	<u>OB</u>	JECTIONS T	O REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
16	OBJECTIO	N TO REQUE	ST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:
17	Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully		
18	set forth here	in.	
19	Defen	dant objects to	the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time
20	period.		
21	Defen	dant objects to	the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and
22	communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v.		
23	Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.		
24	Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain		
25	confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States		
26	Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.		
27	Defen	dant objects to	the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain

confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

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other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

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by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141. **OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:**

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search

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electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav—On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain

confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating

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to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be

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an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege. Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain

confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav—On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 141.

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OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain

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confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114

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Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law. Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain

confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also

Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030.

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(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

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Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

DATED: April 24, 2025

LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP

Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant

(IN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

PROOF OF SERVICE

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 201 of 407

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EXHIBIT 6



Matthew T. Hale Direct Dial: (213) 334-7060 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com

May 1, 2025

VIA EMAIL ONLY

Bryan J. Freedman
Sean M. Hardy
Jason Sunshine
FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angles, CA 90067
bfreedman@ftllp.com
smhardy@ftllp.com
jsunshine@ftllp.com

Re: Asta Jonasson v. One Race Films, Inc., et al.

Counsel:

I write to meet and confer regarding Vin Diesel's general objections to Plaintiff's deposition subpoena.

First, Mr. Diesel's objection based on scheduling is not well-taken. Plaintiff is not required to "clear dates" before noticing a deposition. A deposition subpoena is valid if it complies with the timing and service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.210 and 2020.220. Plaintiff already initiated a good faith effort to coordinate the deposition, and your office failed to respond in any way until making the instant objection.

Second, Mr. Diesel's objection regarding in-person attendance misinterprets the CCP § 2025.310. The deponent cannot simply elect to be separate from the attorney taking the deposition. It is the attorney or party's election to physically present at the location of the deponent: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent."

Third, Mr. Diesel again fails to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from our office in Downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Instead, Mr. Diesel again uses the qualifying language, "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection. My April 7, 2025 letter even inquired about this previously stated objection, but Mr. Diesel chose to reuse this equivocal objection nonetheless.

Greenberg Gross LLP

May 1, 2025 Page 2

Fourth, Ms. Jonasson's deposition has not been noticed for any future date, no less in the "reasonably near future," as required by the related LASC Local Rule. Defendant has chosen to not re-notice Plaintiff's deposition since early 2024.

Fifth, there is no seven hour limit applicable to employment cases, like this one. (CCP § 2025.290(b)(4)). Further, the notice does not assume any such time period.

Sixth, the objection regarding a failure to comply with requirements of a deposition notice lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with. This objection should be disregarded due to its ambiguity.

Seventh, this objection does not relate to Mr. Diesel sitting for his deposition but rather to the documents demanded in the notice. This dispute will be addressed elsewhere.

Eighth, the objection merely asserts good cause exists to stay the deposition pending the MJOP. The cases cited, *Silver v. City of Los Angeles* (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673 and *Terminal Equip. Co. v. City* (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 234 do not stand for this proposition. *Terminal* and *Silver* are both cases where a plaintiff has yet to get past the pleadings stage and the court stated that the plaintiff had to state at least one cause of action before discovery or deposition would be permitted. Of course, this matter is past the pleadings stage, and the MJOP does not even relate to each and every cause of action. Furthermore, the Defendants would need to file a Motion to Stay Discovery in order to stay fact discovery, and they have not done so.

Please let us know when you are available for a call on these topics tomorrow or early next week. Thereafter, we will need to seek relief from the Court.

Very truly yours,

Matthew T. Hale

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EXHIBIT 7

From: Jason Sunshine <jsunshine@lftcllp.com>

Sent: Friday, May 9, 2025 5:18 PM

To: Matthew T. Hale

Cc: Sean M. Hardy; Bryan Freedman; Joanna Rivera; Miles Cooley; Vaneta Birtha; Jemma E.

Dunn; Brian Williams

Subject: [EXT] RE: Jonasson v. Diesel, et al.

Matt:

Further to our meet and confer discussion on Monday, we can confirm that Samantha Vincent is available for deposition on May 29. Non-party Valentino Morales is available for deposition on June 3. Vin Diesel is available in-person on June 24 and June 25. Please confirm those dates, so we can lock them in. We are in the process of obtaining availability from non-party Thyrale Thai and should be in a position to offer the same to you next week. Additionally, per our prior request and discussion, please provide Ms. Jonasson's availability for deposition during this period. Finally, per our prior proposal and discussion on Monday, we reiterate that we have confirmed that Department 71 accepts stipulations and proposed orders to continue trial dates, and that we are amenable to doing so given your protestations regarding timing constraints.

Thanks, Jason

Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP 1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor Los Angeles, California 90067

Tel: (310) 201-0005 Direct: (310) 201-4285 Cell: (917) 841-8716 Fax: (310) 201-0045 Web: www.lftcllp.com

Please note that LFTC's domain name has changed from ftllp.com to lftcllp.com. Emails sent from this domain are not spam.

The information contained in this e-mail message is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. This message may be an attorney-client communication and/or work product and, as such, is privileged and confidential. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by e-mail and delete the original message.

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EXHIBIT 8

From: Matthew T. Hale

Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2025 10:12 AM

To: Jason Sunshine

Cc: Sean M. Hardy; Bryan Freedman; Joanna Rivera; Miles Cooley; Vaneta Birtha; Jemma E.

Dunn; Brian Williams

Subject: RE: Jonasson v. Diesel, et al.

Hi Jason,

Yes, I'll presume the in-person location is Los Angeles, but please let us know immediately if this is not correct. In the interim, we'll notice them for our LA office. I can confirm the dates for Valentino Morales (6/3) and Vin Diesel (6/24-25). We will notice these depositions shortly.

We will need additional dates for Samantha Vincent's deposition as 5/29 does not work for us. Please provide those and dates for Ms. Thai as soon as possible. Thank you.

We are not amenable to continuing the trial.

Matthew T. Hale

Counsel - Assistant Director of Litigation | Greenberg Gross LLP

One Summerlin | 1980 Festival Plaza Drive | Suite 730 | Las Vegas, NV 89135 Direct 702.777.0891 | Main 702.777.0888 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com



Los Angeles | Orange County | Las Vegas | New York

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EXHIBIT 9

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 et seq., Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on June 24-25, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034.415, the Deponent is directed to produce the documents and things set forth below no later than three business days before the deposition.

DEFINITIONS

Words in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS in these definitions, instructions, and Requests are defined as follows:

- 1. The term "DOCUMENT(S)" means all documents and electronically stored information—including but not limited to all emails, text messages, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, video and sound recordings, images, worksheets, and other data and data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation into a reasonably usable form, and includes COMMUNICATIONS.
- 2. The term "COMMUNICATION(S)" means and refers to all correspondence, discussions, conversations, interviews, telephone calls, emails, instant messages, voice mail messages, negotiations, notices, agreements, understandings, meetings, recordings, audiotapes, videotapes, transcripts, facsimiles, telegrams, charts, spreadsheets, visual images, presentations, and all other transmissions of information, thoughts, documents, electronically stored information, or ideas between two or more PERSONS.
 - 3. The terms "YOU" and "YOUR" means and refers to defendant Vin Diesel.
- The terms "any" and "all" are interchangeable and shall be construed disjunctively, 4. conjunctively, or both, as necessary to bring within the scope of this discovery request all matters

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which might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

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- 5. The term "each" means "each and every."
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- 7. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

The term "including" means "including, but not limited to."

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INSTRUCTIONS

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- 1. The original of each responsive item (or a legible copy if the original is not within YOUR possession, custody, or control) shall be identified and produced at the above-stated date, time, and place unless complete and legible copies of each responsive item are received at the above-referenced address on or before the specified production date. Any such production of copies is without prejudice to Propounding Party's right to inspect and/or copy the original of each DOCUMENT or tangible thing at a future date.
- 2. These Requests seek the production of DOCUMENTS, and electronically stored information ("ESI"), in their native format, unless some other format is agreed to in writing by Propounding Party's counsel of record.
- 3. ESI must be produced with all "metadata" intact. ("Metadata" means the data embedded in electronic versions of a document that show how, when and by whom the document was created, accessed or modified.)
- 4. Any request for a DOCUMENT shall be construed to include any and all drafts, versions, or revisions of such DOCUMENT.
- 5. These Requests seek the production of all responsive DOCUMENTS within YOUR possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such DOCUMENTS are possessed directly by YOU.
- 6. In the event any DOCUMENTS responsive to these Requests are withheld from production based upon a claim of attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product doctrine, or any other privilege or protection from discovery, YOU are requested to provide a privilege log in which YOU explain the basis of the privilege or other protection you are claiming, and provide a description of the DOCUMENTS YOU are withholding sufficient to support the basis for withholding the DOCUMENTS.

All emails referring to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

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By:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

All text messages YOU sent relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

4 DATED: May 13, 2025

GREENBERG GROSS LLP

Brian L. Williams Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

1 PROOF OF SERVICE Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. 2 **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On May 13, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on the 8 interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + 11 COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 14 Emails: bfreedman@lftcllp.com; smhardy@lftcllp.com; jsunshine@lftcllp.com; 15 Attorneys for Defendants Once Race Films, Inc., vbirtha@lftcllp.com; One Race Production, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Mark 16 cpuello@lftcllp.com; Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent 17 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the 18 e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 21 Executed on May 13, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 22 23 Hazelle T Nunez 24 25 26 27 28

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EXHIBIT 10

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 218 of 407

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's amended notice of the June 24 to June 25, 2025 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

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OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- 1. The Defendant is no longer available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel in the presence of a deposition officer. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310(a), that any deposition proceed via remote means, that the deposition officer not be physically present at the time of the deposition, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally <u>Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court</u> (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.
- 4. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed. The Notice improperly calls for Defendant's deposition on two consecutive dates. The burden on Defendant of an endless deposition outweighs the needs of the case.
- 5. Defendant objects to the notice of deposition in that it is reasonably calculated to result in the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets. Defendant objects into any inquiry into matters protected by Defendant's right to privacy, including without limitation Defendant's sexual history and financial condition. Defendant is entitled to a protective order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.420 and Civil Code Section 3295 to prevent inquiry into improper subject matter and topics.

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6. Defendant objects to the location of the deposition set forth in the Notice, as such location is inadequate to protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy. Defendant will meet and confer regarding the taking of a remote video deposition and potential alternative locations.

- 7. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, et seq.
- 8. Defendant objects that the deposition was noticed for a period in which a dispositive motion is pending. Good cause exists to stay any deposition until after a ruling on such motion. Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673; Terminals Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 234, 247.

II.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

The following responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Any document or thing supplied in response to any request is subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and admissibility, and to any and all other objections on any ground that would require the exclusion of any document or thing, or portion thereof, if such document or thing were offered in evidence, all of which objections and grounds are expressly reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial.

No incidental or implied admissions are intended by the responses herein. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agree to supply, a document or thing in response to any request should not be taken as an admission that the Defendant accepts or admits the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such request or in said document, or that such document or thing constitutes admissible evidence. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agrees to supply any document or thing in response to any request is not intended to be and shall not be construed to be a waiver of any part of any objection to any such request, or any part of any General Objection.

The responses herein only apply to those documents or things currently in Defendant's possession. Defendant has not completed investigation of the facts relating to this matter, completed discovery in this matter, or completed preparation for trial in this matter. Accordingly,

Defendant reserve all rights with respect to documents or things which may be subsequently located or discovered, including, without limitation, the right to use such documents at trial, and further reserves any and all rights and any and all objections to any responsive documents or things which may hereafter come into Defendant's possession, or which hereafter may be determined to be within the scope of any such request. Defendant disclaims any legal obligation to supplement the responses herein.

III.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

- 1. Objection: Defendant objects to the production and inspection of documents at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel at their own expense. Defendant may be unable to locate all requested documents by the date specified for production and, therefore, a mutually convenient time and date can be ascertained by contacting the undersigned to make appropriate arrangement. Should Defendant in the future locate any relevant requested documents now in existence but not yet located, Defendant will so advise counsel for Plaintiff, subject to the objections and comments set forth in these responses.
- 2. Objection: Defendant objects to the instructions to the extent that they conflict with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq., or seek to impose additional obligations upon Defendant beyond those set forth under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. Defendant will respond within the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq.
- 3. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent that it requires the production of documents or things, which have previously been made available to the Plaintiff, are equally available to the Plaintiff, or are public records.
- 4. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks original documents, except where there is a legitimate dispute as to the legibility or authenticity of a copy.
- 5. Objection: to each and every request to the extent it seeks the production of documents or things not in the possession, custody or control of Defendant. Defendant would

produce only those documents or things, if any, in the possession of Defendant, and would produce documents, if any, in the manner kept by Defendant the usual course of business.

- 6. Objection: Defendant objects to the definitions contained in the requests in that they are incomplete, vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, overbroad and oppressive, and seek to impose obligations on Defendant beyond those imposed by the California Code of Civil Procedure.
- 7. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. Nothing herein is intended to be, nor shall in any way be construed as, a waiver of any attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. To the extent any request may be construed as calling for disclosure of information protected by such privilege or doctrine, a continuing objection to such Request is hereby interposed. No such privileged information will be provided. In the event any privileged information is provided in connection with these responses, such disclosure is inadvertent and is not intended to be, and shall not be deemed, a waiver of such privilege.
- 8. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information that is confidential, proprietary, a trade secret or private, or otherwise calls for information protected by the right of privacy contained in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of California, in the United States Constitution or any other applicable privilege or protection recognized under statute or applicable case law.
- 9. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks information that may violate the financial privacy rights of Defendant, third parties and individuals who are protected under the California Constitution.
- 10. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information not relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and would subject Defendant to oppression, harassment, and undue burden

and expense not commensurate with any legitimate discovery need.

- 11. Objection: Defendant further objects to each request to the extent that it seeks a legal conclusion and/or an expert opinion.
- 12. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information already in the possession, custody, or control of Plaintiff.
- 13. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it is argumentative and without any foundation.
- 14. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information for periods of time other than periods relevant to the claims in the Complaint, or other than periods of time properly subject to discovery.
- 15. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets.
- 16. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information that are not limited in time or scope.
- 17. Objection: Defendant objects to each request on the grounds it requests

 Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is
 reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and
 produced the ESI.
- 18. Objection: Because Defendant have not concluded their discovery and investigation in this action, they specifically reserve the right to amend and/or supplement their responses to the requests.
- 19. Objection: Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents, and each of them. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the *California Code of Civil Procedure*, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. *See* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031,260; 1013(e).

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	20.	Objection:	Defendant objects to the definition of "DOCUMENTS" to the exten
that i	t conflic	cts with the pro	visions of Evidence Code section 250 and/or the Code of Civil
Proc	edure se	ection 2031.010). et seq., or seek to impose additional obligation upon Defendant
beyo	nd those	set forth unde	r Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010.

- 21. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "DOCUMENT(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 22. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "COMMUNICATION(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 23. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOU" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 25. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOUR" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.

Defendant incorporates by reference these general objections to each response below.

OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither

relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected

Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably

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accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States

Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

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Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav—On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court

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(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and

communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031,030.

(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully

set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected

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by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal, App. 3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably

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accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States

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Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

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Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court

(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030.

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(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

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OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

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VINCENT)

Attorneys for Defendant

VIN DIÈSEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR

¢	ase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 247 of 407
1	PROOF OF SERVICE
1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA]
2	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES]
3	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18
4	and not a party to the within action; my business is EXPRESS NETWORK, LLC, 1605 W. Olympic Blvd, Suite 800, Los Angeles, CA 90015.
5	On June 20, 2025, I served the foregoing document(s) described:
7	OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN
8	DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
9	on the interested parties in this action \(\sum \) by placing \(\sum \) the original \(\sum \) a true copy thereof enclosed in seal envelopes addressed as follows:
10	Brian L. Williams
11	Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale
12	Greenberg Gross LLP 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30 th Floor
13	Los Angeles, CA 90017 Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson
14	By Personal Service. I personally delivered the above listed documents to the persons at the addresses listed above.
15 16	State. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.
17	Executed on June 20, 2025 at Los Angeles, California.
18	
19	EXPRESS NETWORK
20	
21	Print Name (Messenger) Signature of Declarant (Messenger)
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•	ase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 248 of 407		
1	PROOF OF SERVICE		
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA]		
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES]		
4	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18		
5	and not a party to the within action; my business is EXPRESS NETWORK, LLC, 1605 W. Olympic Blvd, Suite 800, Los Angeles, CA 90015.		
6	On June 20, 2025, I served the foregoing document(s) described:		
7	OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION		
8	OF DOCUMENTS		
9	on the interested parties in this action \(\subseteq \) by placing \(\subseteq \) the original \(\subseteq \) a true copy thereof enclosed in seal envelopes addressed as follows:		
10	Brian L. Williams		
11	Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale		
12	Greenberg Gross, LLP 650 Town Center Dr, Ste 1700		
13 14	Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7025 Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson		
15	By Personal Service. I personally delivered the above listed documents to the persons at		
16	the addresses listed above.		
17	State. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.		
18	Executed on June 20, 2025 at Los Angeles, California.		
19	EXPRESS NETWORK		
20	EAPRESS NET WORK		
21	Daniel Charles		
22	Print Name (Messenger) Signature of Declarant (Messenger)		
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2728			
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Qase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 249 of 407 OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR) AND REOUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 250 of 407

EXHIBIT 11

From: Matthew T. Hale

Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 5:12 PM

To: Bryan Freedman; Sean M. Hardy; Jason Sunshine

Cc: Brian Williams; Jemma E. Dunn; Hazelle T. Nunez; Vaneta Birtha

Subject: Jonasson v. Vin Diesel, et al

Counsel:

We are in receipt of defendant Vin Diesel's objections to Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Deposition and Requests for Production of Documents. For the first time since these dates (June 24 and 25) were provided by his counsel on May 9, 2025, and despite his agreement to appear in Los Angeles, Defendant Vin Diesel now suddenly asserts that he is not available to attend his duly noticed deposition. Please provide, by end of day this coming Monday June 23, 2025, multiple alternative dates for his deposition that fall on or before July 18th. Given the apparent gamesmanship and bad faith nature of this objection, if we do not receive these multiple dates by Monday, we will move forward with a Motion to Compel Vin Diesel's deposition and will take a notice of non-appearance on Tuesday. As to the remainder of Defendant's objections, please see the below:

- 2. Mr. Diesel's objection regarding in-person attendance misinterprets the CCP § 2025.310. The deponent cannot simply elect to be separate from the attorney taking the deposition. It is the attorney or party's election to physically present at the location of the deponent: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent."
- 3. Mr. Diesel again fails to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from our office in Downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Instead, Mr. Diesel again uses the qualifying language, "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection. Furthermore, Samantha Vincent already confirmed that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles.
- 4. There is no seven-hour limit applicable to employment cases, like this one. (CCP § 2025.290(b)(4)). Further, the notice does not assume any such time period.
- 5. Defendant asserts that he shouldn't have to attend his deposition because questions *may* be asked that implicate his privacy. Not only is this not a ground to forego attendance altogether, but also there is a protective order in this matter in place to protect truly confidential portions of the deposition.
- 6. There is absolutely no indication that Plaintiff's office, which has ample security staff and precautions, is inadequate to protect Mr. Diesel's personal safety and privacy.
- 7. The objection regarding a failure to comply with requirements of a deposition notice lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with. This objection should be disregarded due to its ambiguity.
- 8. The objection incorrectly asserts that there is a dispositive motion pending.

Matthew T. Hale

Counsel - Assistant Director of Litigation | Greenberg Gross LLP

One Summerlin | 1980 Festival Plaza Drive | Suite 730 | Las Vegas, NV 89135 Direct 702.777.0891 | Main 702.777.0888 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com



Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 253 of 407

EXHIBIT 12

From: Sean M. Hardy <smhardy@lftcllp.com>
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2025 8:09 AM

To: Matthew T. Hale

Cc: Brian Williams; Jemma E. Dunn; Hazelle T. Nunez; Vaneta Birtha; Bryan Freedman; Jason

Sunshine

Subject: [EXT] RE: Jonasson v. Vin Diesel, et al

Counsel,

We respectfully disagree with your position below, and will meet and confer with you on this issue in person today at your office. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Sean M. Hardy

Sean M. Hardy, Esq.
Partner
LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067

Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045

Web: www.ftllp.com

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On June 26, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as DECLARATION OF MATTHEW T. HALE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL'S DEPOSITION & REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 8 on the interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Attorneys for Defendants One Race Films, Inc., Sean M. Hardy, Esq. One Race Productions, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Mark Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 Emails: bfreedman@ftllp.com 14 smhardy@ftllp.com jsunshine@ftllp.com vbirtha@ftllp.com 15 cpuello@ftllp.com 16 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any 18 electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 Executed on June 26, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 21 22 23 24 25 26

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[PROPOSED] ORDER

Filed 07/09/25

Page 256 of 407

Qase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2

1 [PROPOSED] ORDER 2 The motion of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson ("Plaintiff") for an order compelling Defendant Vin 3 Diesel ("Defendant") to appear for his deposition and granting sanctions, came on for hearing in 4 Department 71 of the above-entitled court on August 11, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. 5 Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court hereby **GRANTS** the Motion. 6 THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant shall, within ten (10) days of this order, appear for his deposition at Plaintiff's office at 601 S. Figueora Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, 7 8 California 90017... 9 THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that, pursuant to sections 2025.450(a), 2017.010, 2023.030(a), 2023.010(d), and 2023.010(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, Defendant and its 10 11 counsel shall, within thirty (30) days of this order, pay to Plaintiff monetary sanctions in the 12 amount of \$7,455.07, which is the amount reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this 13 motion. 14 15 Dated: Hon. Daniel M. Crowley 16 Judge of the Superior Court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28



Journal Technologies Court Portal

Make a Reservation

ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.

Case Number: 23STCV31143 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Wrongful Termination

Date Filed: 2023-12-21 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71

Reservation	
Case Name: ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.	Case Number: 23STCV31143
Type: Motion to Compel (Motion to Compel Party Deposition)	Status: RESERVED
Filing Party: Asta Jonasson (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71
Date/Time: 08/11/2025 8:30 AM	Number of Motions:
Reservation ID: 374377214511	Confirmation Code: CR-FWVPEPZZCBUZ2FMFB

Fees			
Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion to Compel (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment		
Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE	
Account Number: n/a	Authorization: n/a	
Payment Date: n/a		



TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 11, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 71 of Stanley Mosk Courthouse at 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, plaintiff Asta Jonasson will and hereby does move the Court for an order compelling Defendant Vin Diesel to appear for his deposition and for Defendant Vin Diesel and his counsel, Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley to pay sanctions in the amount of \$7,455.07, which is the amount reasonably incurred in connection with these proceedings.

Plaintiff moves to compel Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition after a pattern of evasion and obstruction spanning over a year. Despite multiple notices, good faith efforts to accommodate his schedule, and his counsel's express confirmation of availability for June 24-25, 2025, Defendant served last-minute objections just four days before his scheduled deposition containing recycled, meritless arguments. When Plaintiff's counsel attempted to meet and confer, Defendant's counsel engaged in shocking misconduct, including profanity, threats of malicious prosecution, and physical intimidation, while refusing to provide any legitimate explanation for Defendant's sudden unavailability. Defendant's objections lack merit as they misinterpret applicable statutes, seek to prevent discovery on topics central to Plaintiff's claims, and attempt to delay proceedings until after trial through frivolous procedural maneuvers.

This motion will be based on the Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.450(a), 2017.010, 2023.030(a), 2023.010(d), and 2023.010(e), the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declaration of Matthew T. Hale, and exhibits filed along with these papers, and other evidence to be presented at the hearing on this motion.

DATED: June 26, 2025 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

__

By: /s/ Matthew T. Hale

Brian L. Williams Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

-2-



Journal Technologies Court Portal

Make a Reservation

ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.

Case Number: 23STCV31143 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Wrongful Termination

Date Filed: 2023-12-21 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71

Reservation	
Case Name: ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.	Case Number: 23STCV31143
Type: Motion to Compel (Motion to Compel Party Deposition)	Status: RESERVED
Filing Party: Asta Jonasson (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71
Date/Time: 08/11/2025 8:30 AM	Number of Motions:
Reservation ID: 374377214511	Confirmation Code: CR-FWVPEPZZCBUZ2FMFB

Fees			
Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion to Compel (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment	
Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE
Account Number: n/a	Authorization: n/a
Payment Date: n/a	



1 **PROOF OF SERVICE** 2 Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On June 26, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S NOTICE OF MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS on the 8 interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Attorneys for Defendants One Race Films, Inc., One Race Productions, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Mark Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 Emails: bfreedman@ftllp.com 14 smhardy@ftllp.com jsunshine@ftllp.com vbirtha@ftllp.com 15 cpuello@ftllp.com 16 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any 18 electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 Executed on June 26, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 266 of 407

EXHIBIT 13

PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL

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Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 269 of 407 V. CONCLUSION17 PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2	Page(s)
3	Cases
4 5	D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210
6 7	Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673
8	Terminal Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 234
9 10	Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531
11	Statutes
12	California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(d)
13	California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(e)
14	California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a)
15	Civ. Code, § 3295(a)(2)
16	Code of Civ. Proc., § 340.16(e)
17	Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010
18	Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.310(a)
19	Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(a)
20	Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(b)(2)
21	Code of Civil Procedure § 340.16
22 23	Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq
24	Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(g)(1)
25	Labor Code, §§ 98.6, 1102.5
26	Speak Out Act
27	Other Authorities
28	Assembly Bill 27777

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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from allegations that Defendant Vin Diesel sexually assaulted Plaintiff Asta Jonasson in September 2010 while she was working as his assistant during the production of the film "Fast Five," and then terminated her employment the following day in retaliation for resisting the assault incident. Plaintiff remained silent for years due to fear of industry ostracization, immigration concerns as a green card holder, and restrictive non-disclosure agreements imposed by Defendants. Empowered by recent legislative changes, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in December 2023 seeking redress for the sexual assault and wrongful termination.

Plaintiff now moves to compel Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition after a pattern of evasion and obstruction spanning over a year. Despite multiple notices, good faith efforts to accommodate his schedule, and his counsel's express confirmation of availability for June 24-25, 2025, Defendant served last-minute objections containing recycled, meritless arguments just four days before his scheduled deposition. When Plaintiff's counsel attempted to meet and confer, Defendant's counsel responded with shocking misconduct, including profanity, threats of malicious prosecution, and physical intimidation, while refusing to provide any legitimate explanation for Defendant's sudden unavailability. Defendant's objections lack merit as they misinterpret applicable statutes, seek to prevent discovery on topics central to Plaintiff's claims, and attempt to delay proceedings until after trial through frivolous procedural maneuvers.

Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court compel Defendant Vin Diesel to appear for deposition within ten days and impose monetary sanctions of \$7,455.07 against Defendant and his counsel for their willful abuse of the discovery process, pattern of evasion, and unmeritorious objections that have unnecessarily delayed essential discovery in this matter.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Α. Defendant Vin Diesel's Testimony is Essential to the Prosecution of Plaintiff's Matter.

In September 2010, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson was hired by Defendants as an assistant working directly for Defendant Vin Diesel during the production of "Fast Five." (Compl., p. 2, ¶ 1.) Shortly

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27 28 after beginning her employment, on or about September 10, 2010, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Diesel sexually assaulted her in his hotel suite at the St. Regis Hotel in Atlanta, Georgia. (Compl., p. 10, ¶¶ 29-30.) The following day, on or about September 11, 2010, Plaintiff was terminated from her position when Samantha Vincent, President of One Race and Defendant Diesel's sister, called Plaintiff and stated that One Race no longer needed "any extra help." (Compl., p. 11, ¶ 32.)

For years following the alleged incident, Plaintiff remained silent about the sexual assault. She was afraid to speak out against a high-profile actor due to concerns about being ostracized from the industry jeopardizing her potential future citizenship while she was a green card holder. (Compl., p. 3, ¶ 7.) Additionally, One Race required all employees to sign non-disclosure agreements, further limiting Plaintiff's ability to discuss matters related to her employment and Defendant Diesel. (Compl., p. 3, \P 7.)

Recently empowered by the #MeToo and Time's Up movements, and with the protection of the Speak Out Act and the revival of her claims under California Assembly Bill 2777 (AB 2777), Plaintiff is now seeking legal relief for the alleged sexual assault and subsequent termination of her employment. (Compl., p. 4, \P 7.)

This lawsuit was filed on December 21, 2023, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.16, as amended by Assembly Bill 2777.

В. Defendant Vin Diesel Has Repeatedly Evaded Deposition Despite Multiple Notices and Good Faith Efforts To Accommodate His Schedule.

Plaintiff Asta Jonasson first noticed Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition for May 7, 2024. (See Declaration of Matthew T. Hale ("Hale Decl."), ¶ 2, Exh. 1.) On May 1, 2024, Defendant served his objection to the notice of deposition, indicating in part that neither he nor his counsel were available on that date. (Hale Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. 2.)

On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff re-noticed Mr. Diesel's deposition for April 29, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 4, Exh. 3.) and requested that Defendant's counsel provide alternative deposition dates if Mr. Diesel or his attorneys were not available on that date. (Hale Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, Exhs. 3-4.) More than two weeks later, on April 24, 2025, Defendant's counsel belatedly responded by serving objections to the deposition notice via overnight mail without providing any alternative deposition dates. (Hale Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. 5.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. Diesel's counsel to meet and confer regarding the objections to Mr. Diesel's deposition notice. (Hale Decl., ¶ 7, Exh. 6.) This letter addressed Mr. Diesel's objections in detail, each of which was unmeritorious. Following discussion on this letter, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel confirmed that Mr. Diesel would appear for his deposition in person on June 24 and June 25, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 8, Exh. 7.) On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel emailed counsel for Defendant to confirm that the deposition would be held at Plaintiff's office in downtown Los Angeles and to request that they inform Plaintiff's counsel immediately if this location was an issue. (Hale Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. 8.) That same date, May 13, 2025, Plaintiff served the notice of deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel to be conducted at the Los Angeles office of Plaintiff's counsel on June 24 and June 25, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. 9.)

C. <u>Defendant Vin Diesel Served Nearly Identical Objections Just Four Days Before</u> <u>His Scheduled Deposition Despite Previously Confirming His Availability.</u>

On June 20, 2025—four days before the deposition date that Defendant's counsel had agreed upon more than one month earlier—counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel served objections to Plaintiff's deposition notice via personal service. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10.) This objection document closely resembled the prior objection document from April 2025, including five of the same eight objections. (See Hale Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 5.) The only three new objections related to Vin Diesel's purported unavailability on the date his counsel had selected, the scope of the deposition, and Defendant's claim that the deposition location at the Los Angeles office of Plaintiff's counsel could not "protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy" (*Ibid.*) Plaintiff's counsel had previously conducted in-person depositions in this matter at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office on May 28, 2025 and June 19, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 12.)

That same day, June 20, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel responded via email, meeting and conferring regarding each objection and requesting alternative dates before the fact discovery cutoff (July 18, 2025), given Vin Diesel's asserted unavailability. (Hale Decl., ¶ 13, Exh. 11.)

D. <u>Defendant's Counsel Engaged In Obstructionist Tactics, Including Physical</u> Threats And Profanity, While Refusing To Provide Any Legitimate Reason For

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Vin Diesel's Last-Minute Unavailability.

Plaintiff's counsel was scheduled to take the in-person deposition of third party witness Valentino Morales on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 14.) The morning of this deposition, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel asserted that they disagreed with Plaintiff counsel's position regarding Vin Diesel's objections to his duly noticed deposition and would meet and confer in person, later that day, on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 15, Exh. 12.)

Counsel for Defendants, Sean Hardy and Bryan Freedman, appeared with the third party deponent on June 23, 2025. (Hale Decl., ¶ 16.) Prior to the deposition, Plaintiff's counsel Matthew Hale requested to meet and confer about the objections to the deposition of Vin Diesel in a separate room. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy began to discuss the assertion that Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable for his deposition. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale requested to know why Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable, and Mr. Hardy refused to provide a reason. (*Ibid.*)

During this back and forth, Mr. Freedman entered the room. (Hale Decl., ¶ 17.) Mr. Hale again requested to know why Mr. Diesel was unavailable to determine if this was a true emergency or a simple failure to appear for his deposition, for which availability had been cleared over a month prior, as it would be important for the purposes of any motion to compel that may need to be filed. (*Ibid.*) Counsel for Defendant continued to refuse to provide any explanation. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Freedman interjected and told Mr. Hale to just file his motion and called Mr. Hale, a "moron" and cursed while doing so. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale began to write down the language on note paper, specifically stating that he would be including these insults in his declaration to any Motion and requesting to have a professional and substantive meet and confer. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Freedman then threatened Mr. Hale with malicious prosecution and called him a "piece of shit." (Ibid.) At no time did Mr. Hale exchange any insult with Mr. Freedman, raise his voice, or provoke any physical contact. (*Ibid.*) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman got up from his chair, rushed to stand directly in front of Mr. Hale mere inches away from him, causing Mr. Freedman's face to be directly in front of that of Mr. Hale. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Freedman then called Mr. Hale a "pussy" and swung his fist at Mr. Hale's face, stopping directly in front of his face without making contact. (Ibid.) Shocked, Mr. Hale nonetheless remained composed and attempted to address Mr. Hardy behind Mr. Freedman, in hopes that counsel could

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III. **LEGAL STANDARD**

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deposition concluded later that day. (*Ibid.*) Given Mr. Diesel's asserted objection regarding the lack of security and privacy at Plaintiff's counsel's office, Mr. Hale requested to know what was deficient about their security and/or privacy.

get the meet and confer discussion back on track. (Ibid.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman left the

room, and Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy conducted the meet and confer session, both then and after the

(Hale Decl., ¶ 18.) Mr. Hardy indicated that Mr. Diesel had a medical condition and that he needed to be able to quickly leave the deposition for his security, including in relation to death threats,

without having to go down thirty floors and obtain his vehicle from an underground parking lot. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hardy also asserted that Mr. Diesel would need his personal security with him. (*Ibid.*)

Decl., ¶ 19.) Mr. Hardy again asserted that Mr. Diesel was not in the city. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hale asked when Mr. Diesel left the city and where he was, but Mr. Hardy would not provide that information. (*Ibid.*) Mr. Hardy then *for the first time* laid out several conditions for a rescheduled deposition of

Mr. Hale then offered to conduct the next day's deposition at defense counsel's office. (Hale

Vin Diesel: (1) that the deposition be conducted for no more than seven hours; (2) that a protective order be in place to protect Defendant's financial, medical, and sexual privacy; (3) that the

deposition take place at defense counsel's office or remotely; and (4) that the deposition only occur

following the hearing on Defendant's just-filed Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication, set

for October 7, 2025, nearly two months after the current trial date of August 18, 2025. (*Ibid.*)

At no time did Mr. Hale agree to forego filing a Motion to Compel while the parties further met and conferred, at an Informal Discovery Conference, or in any other venue. (Hale Decl., ¶ 20.)

E. **Defendant's Filing of a Motion for Protective Order**

On the same date, June 23, 2025, Defendant Vin Diesel filed a Motion for Protective Order on the same subset of four (4) grounds listed immediately above. As will be argued below, these grounds are unmeritorious.

Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(a) provides as follows:

If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action or an officer, director, managing agent, or employee of a party, or a person designated by an

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organization that is a party under Section 2025.230, without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent's attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document or tangible thing described in the deposition notice.

IV. **ARGUMENT**

A. Defendant Vin Diesel's Objections to his Notice of Deposition are Invalid and Unmeritorious.

1. **Defendant Vin Diesel's Asserted Unavailability**

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel, for the first time since his counsel provided his availability for an in-person deposition on May 9, 2025, asserted that he was not available for his deposition. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1) Neither in writing nor verbally through his counsel did Defendant communicate any true emergency to explain his availability. In fact, Mr. Diesel's counsel indicated that he was not even "in the city." Mr. Diesel's counsel declined to provide any further detail. When Plaintiff's counsel offered to conduct the deposition at defense counsel's office, as requested by Mr. Diesel, defense counsel again asserted Mr. Diesel was not "in the city."

Furthermore, "unavailability" is not an adequate objection to a duly-served deposition notice. A deposition subpoena is valid if it complies with the timing and service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210 et seq.

2. **In-Person Attendance**

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that he cannot be required to attend his deposition in-person, pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.310(a). (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) However, as pointed out to counsel in previous meet and confer discussions regarding an identical objection to a prior notice of deposition of Mr. Diesel, this is a misreading of that code section.

CCP § 2025.310(a) states as follows: "At the election of the deponent or the deposing party,

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the deposition officer may attend the deposition at a different location than the deponent via remote means. A deponent is not required to be physically present with the deposition officer when being sworn in at the time of the deposition." Thus, the code section permits the deposition officer, i.e., the court reporter, to attend the deposition via remote means. No reference is made to the deponent's ability to elect a remote appearance.

CCP § 2025.310(b), which Mr. Diesel did not cite in his objection, states as follows: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent. If a party or attorney of record elects to be physically present at the location of the deponent, all physically present participants in the deposition shall comply with local health and safety ordinances, rules, and orders." This code section similarly does not permit Mr. Diesel to elect a remote appearance; it merely allows Mr. Diesel, or his attorney of record, to be physically present at the location of another deponent. Of course, this supports Plaintiff's position, as Plaintiff and her attorney of record may be physically present at the deposition of the deponent in this scenario: Vin Diesel.

3. **Location of Deposition**

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that he should not have to attend a deposition "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) Mr. Diesel failed to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from Plaintiff's counsel's office in downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection.

Furthermore, Samantha Vincent – Mr. Diesel's sister – and Valentino Morales – Mr. Diesel's security and close friend – already confirmed at their depositions that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles, California. (Hale Decl., ¶ 21.) Defendant's suggestion to hold the deposition at defense counsel's office in Century City also confirms the convenience of Los Angeles as a location for Mr. Diesel's deposition.

Finally, Plaintiff's counsel repeatedly requested confirmation on this topic from defense counsel but was not provided with any. As recently as May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel requested

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to confirm that the in-person location of Vin Diesel's June 24 and 25 deposition was to be Los Angeles, specifically Plaintiff's counsel's Los Angeles office. (Hale Decl., ¶ 9, Exh 8.) Of course, this is Plaintiff's choice to begin with, but Plaintiff extended this question as a courtesy, which received no response from defense counsel.

4. **Time Limit**

Defendant Diesel also objected that his deposition should be limited to seven-hours under CCP § 2025.290. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.) Pursuant to CCP § 2025.290(b)(4), depositions in employment matters are excepted from the default seven-hour limit. While Plaintiff's FEHA claims have indeed been dismissed, multiple employment claims still remain, including Retaliation in Violation of Labor Code, §§ 98.6, 1102.5 and Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

Further, the notice of deposition does not assume any particular total time to be on the record. A full day of deposition rarely equates to seven hours on the record.

5. **Questions Implicating Privacy**

"[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) "Relevant' evidence is evidence 'having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 229.) "The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious." (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) If the court finds a privacy interest, the court must balance the privacy concerns against the need for the information. (*Id.* at p. 552.)

Defendant Vin Diesel asserts that he should not have to attend his deposition because questions may be asked that implicate his privacy, including his sexual history and financial condition. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 1.)

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First, as to Defendant's financial condition, Plaintiff is already not permitted to seek pretrial discovery on this subject. (Civ. Code, § 3295(a)(2).) As such, a protective order is altogether unnecessary. On the contrary, Plaintiff must request an order permitting such discovery to obtain it pretrial. Plaintiff has not and does not plan on doing so. Defendant cannot be permitted to delay his deposition by simply listing subjects to which Plaintiff never had the intention or ability to inquire about.

Second, as to Mr. Diesel's "sexual history," it is unclear as to what Defendant is referring, given the ambiguity of the phrase. As asserted in Mr. Diesel's summary judgment motion, set to be heard after trial, Plaintiff relies on Code of Civ. Proc., § 340.16 to revive her claims based on wrongful conduct in 2010. With regard to claims revived by Code of Civ. Proc., § 340.16(e), Plaintiff must allege the following:

- (A) The plaintiff was sexually assaulted.
- (B) One or more entities are legally responsible for damages arising out of the sexual assault.
- (C) The entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.

As such, questions regarding previous instances of sexual assault by Mr. Diesel are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Now, Mr. Diesel seeks to prevent Plaintiff from even *seeking* essential discovery, while at the same time attempting to dismiss her claims for lack of that same sought-for evidence. That said, Plaintiff is not interested in Mr. Diesel's "sexual history" wholesale. An order preventing all investigation into anything sexual with regard to Vin Diesel would necessarily prevent Plaintiff from asking questions directed toward Mr. Diesel about accusations of sexual assault or abuse previously committed by him. A stipulated protective order ("SPO") in this matter has been in place since July 25, 2024. Any particular questions that Defendant or his counsel believe run afield are better addressed on a question-byquestion basis, at which time counsel may simply instruct their client not to answer. All testimony

will have the protection of the parties' protective order, so long as Defendant labels it as confidential, subject to the procedure in the parties' SPO to de-designate as confidential any testimony. In this scenario, a specialized protective order is a blunt tool that would prevent Plaintiff from seeking essential discovery.

In his recently filed Motion for Protective Order, Mr. Diesel adds multiple other types of privacy to the list, including medical and psychotherapeutic. Plaintiff has no interest in discovery on these topics, and Defendant has provided no examples of what it may be concerned about Plaintiff inquiring into. Again, Defendant cannot be permitted to delay his deposition by simply listing subjects to which Plaintiff never had the intention to inquire about and asking the Court to hear that Motion months after the parties' August 2025 trial date. Rather, the appropriate remedy is to appear for a properly noticed deposition (which was previously agreed to by defense counsel), and object on the record. This permits the Court to make specific findings as to specific questions rather than asking the Court to make premature blanket rulings on questions that have not yet been posed.

Finally, Defendant also adds "employment history" to the list of private topics that may not be inquired about. Defendant fails to define precisely what is meant by the ambiguous phrase. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and his entities, so to the extent "employment history" refers to Vin Diesel's employment with Defendants One Race Films, Inc. or One Race Productions, Inc., such topics are squarely discoverable. Other than this, Plaintiff has little interest in probing into Mr. Diesel's career path, which is already publicly known.

6. Safety

In his objection to Plaintiff's Notice of Deposition, Mr. Diesel asserts that Plaintiff's office is "inadequate to protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy." (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) As is known by Defendants' counsel, Plaintiff's counsel's office is located in the PwC building on 7th and Figueroa, which is home to Seyfarth Shaw and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. (Hale Decl. ¶ 22.) Like many buildings downtown, it has multiple 24/7 dedicated security personnel. (*Ibid.*) Entrance is restricted per floor, and visitors may only access a particular floor if they have been added to a security list and been ushered to an appropriate elevator by security. (*Ibid.*) During a meet and confer session with Defense counsel, Sean Hardy explained that the concern was more about

the quickness with which Mr. Diesel could descend from the 30th floor and retrieve his vehicle from the building's underground parking. (Hale Decl. ¶ 18.) This is not a reasonable or rational basis for failing to attend a deposition. Further, no explanation was provided with relation to the building's inability to protect Defendant's privacy, so this is still a mystery.

During the in-person meet and confer, Plaintiff's counsel offered as a compromise to conduct the deposition at the office of defense counsel. (Hale Decl. ¶ 19.) Defense counsel stated that nonetheless, Mr. Diesel was "not in the city" and so would not be attending. (*Ibid.*)

For purposes of security, Plaintiff also suggests the deposition be held at the courthouse where there is ample security to alleviate Mr. Diesel's concerns.

7. Vague Procedural Deficiencies

Mr. Diesel also objected "to the extent [the deposition notice] fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, *et seq.*" (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) This objection lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with, and no additional detail has been provided by counsel. This objection should be disregarded due to its vagueness and ambiguity.

8. Pending Dispositive Motion

Defendant's final objection asserts good cause exists to stay the deposition pending Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication ("MSJ"), which is scheduled to be heard on October 7, 2025, nearly two months past the parties' August 18, 2025 trial date. (Hale Decl., ¶ 11, Exh. 10, p. 2.) The cases cited, *Silver v. City of Los Angeles* (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673 and *Terminal Equip. Co. v. City* (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 234 do not stand for this proposition. *Terminal* and *Silver* are both cases where a plaintiff had yet to get past the pleadings stage, and each court stated that the plaintiff had to state at least one cause of action before discovery or depositions would be permitted. Of course, this matter is past the pleadings stage, is deep into fact discovery, and testimony sought at the deposition of Vin Diesel is squarely relevant to Plaintiff's preparation for Trial. Further, the MSJ should never be heard because it was filed late, and so should not be used as a sword to delay discovery and trial itself.

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В. Plaintiff's Counsel Adequately Met and Conferred Prior to Filing this Motion.

Pursuant to Code of Civ. Proc., § 2025.450(b)(2), a motion to compel a deposition should be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under section 2016.040 or, when the deponent fails to attend the deposition and produce the documents, electronically stored information, or things described in the deposition notice, by a declaration stating that the petitioner has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. Plaintiff here does both. Plaintiff's counsel Matthew Hale attempted a reasonable and good faith resolution of each issued presented by this motion by meeting and conferring with opposing counsel on multiple occasions and contacted the deponent's counsel to inquire about the intended nonappearance. (Hale Decl. ¶ 13-20, Exh. 11-12.)

C. Monetary Sanctions Are Appropriate Due to Defendant's Misuse of the **Discovery Process.**

California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030(a) provides that "[t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process." California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(d) provides that "[f]ailing to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery" constitutes misuse of the discovery process. California Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010(e) provides that "making, without substantial justification, an unmeritorious objection to discovery" also constitutes misuse of the discovery process.

Here, sanctions against Mr. Diesel and his counsel, Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley, are warranted pursuant to the aforementioned code sections because Defendant has failed to appear for his properly noticed deposition. Further, Defendant's unmeritorious objections and counsel's improper conduct constitute a misuse of the discovery process and failure to respond or to submit to an authorized method of discovery.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450(g)(1) provides:

If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction

acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Emphasis added.)

Defendants' conduct is a willful abuse of the discovery process for which Defendant and his counsel should be sanctioned. Defendant has failed to appear at his duly noticed deposition, at a date and location agreed to by the parties. Under the statutes enumerated above, plaintiff requests sanctions in the amount of \$7,455.07 for costs and attorneys' fees. (Hale Decl. ¶ 29.)¹

V. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Accordingly, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson requests that this Court issue an order directing Defendant to appear for deposition within the next ten (10) days, directing Defendant and his counsel, Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley, to pay sanctions to plaintiff in the amount of \$7,455.07 for this willful discovery violation.

DATED: June 26, 2025 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

By: /s/ Matthew T. Hale
Brian L. Williams

Matthew T. Hale Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

Jemma E. Dunn

¹ To the extent it solves any of Defendant's concerns, it may be prudent to appoint a discovery referee at Mr. Freedman's expense to ensure (1) professional conduct at further in person depositions and meet and confers and (2) to make decisions regarding the appropriateness of the subject matter of the questions during the deposition in real time.

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE** 2 Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On June 26, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S MOTION TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 8 **SUPPORT THEREOF** on the interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Attorneys for Defendants One Race Films, Inc., Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. One Race Productions, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Mark Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 Emails: bfreedman@ftllp.com 14 smhardy@ftllp.com jsunshine@ftllp.com 15 vbirtha@ftllp.com cpuello@ftllp.com 16 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any 18 electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 Executed on June 26, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25

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DECLARATION OF MATTHEW T. HALE

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I, Matthew T. Hale, declare as follows:

- I am an attorney at law, duly authorized to practice law in the State of California. I am an attorney with the law firm of Greenberg Gross LLP, counsel of record for plaintiff Asta Jonasson ("Plaintiff" or "Jonasson") in this case. The facts stated herein are within my personal knowledge and if called upon to testify, I can truthfully and competently do so as to all matters herein
- 2. Plaintiff Asta Jonasson first noticed Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition for May 7, 2024. A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 1**.
- 3. On May 1, 2024, Defendant Vin Diesel served his objection to the notice of deposition, indicating in part that neither he nor his counsel were available on that date. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
- 4. On April 7, 2025, Plaintiff again noticed Mr. Diesel's deposition, this time for April 29, 2025. A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 3**.
- 5. Plaintiff accompanied the notice of deposition with a letter requesting alternative dates if April 29, 2025 did not work for Mr. Diesel or his attorneys. A true and correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.
- 6. No response was received to that letter until Mr. Diesel's objections to the deposition notice were served via overnight mail on April 24, 2025. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.
- 7. Thereafter, Plaintiff sent a letter to Mr. Diesel's counsel to meet and confer regarding the objections to Mr. Diesel's deposition notice. A true and correct copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.
- 8. Following discussion on this letter, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel confirmed that he would appear for his deposition in person on June 24 and June 25. A true and correct copy of the confirming email from Jason Sunshine is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
- 9. On May 13, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel emailed counsel for Defendant confirming that the deposition would be held at Plaintiff's office downtown Los Angeles and to inform Plaintiff's

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27 28 counsel immediately if this was an issue. A true and correct copy of the confirming email from Matthew Hale is attached hereto as Exhibit 8.

- 10. That same date, May 13, 2025, Plaintiff served the notice of deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel to be conducted at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office for June 24 and June 25., 2025 A true and correct copy of that deposition notice is attached hereto as **Exhibit 9**.
- 11. On June 20, 2025, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel served via personal service its objections to Plaintiff's deposition notice, served on May 13, 2025. A true and correct copy of that objection document is attached hereto as Exhibit 10.
- 12. Plaintiff's counsel had previously conducted in-person depositions in this matter at Plaintiff counsel's Los Angeles office on May 28, 2025 and June 19, 2025.
- 13. That same day, June 20, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel responded via email, meeting and conferring regarding each objection and requesting alternative dates before the fact discovery cutoff (July 18, 2025), given Vin Diesel's asserted unavailability. A true and correct copy of that email is attached hereto as Exhibit 11.
- 14. Plaintiff's counsel was scheduled to take the in-person deposition of third party witness Valentino Morales on June 23, 2025.
- 15. The morning of this deposition, counsel for Defendant Vin Diesel asserted that they disagreed with Plaintiff counsel's position regarding Vin Diesel's objections to his duly noticed deposition and would meet and confer in person later that day, on June 23, 2025. A true and correct copy of that email from Sean Hardy is attached hereto as Exhibit 12.
- 16. Counsel for Defendants, Sean Hardy and Bryan Freedman, appeared with the third party deponent on June 23, 2025. Prior to the deposition, Plaintiff's counsel Matthew Hale requested to meet and confer about the objections to the deposition of Vin Diesel in a separate room. Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy began to discuss the assertion that Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable for his deposition. Mr. Hale requested to know why Mr. Diesel was suddenly unavailable, and Mr. Hardy refused to provide a reason.
- 17. During this back and forth, Mr. Freedman entered the room. Mr. Hale again requested to know why Mr. Diesel was unavailable to determine if this was a true emergency or a simple

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failure to appear for his deposition, for which availability had been cleared over a month prior, as it would be important for the purposes of any Motion to compel that may need to be filed. Counsel for Defendant continued to refuse to provide any explanation. Mr. Freedman interjected and told Mr. Hale to just file his motion and called Mr. Hale, a "moron" and cursed while doing so. Mr. Hale began to write down the language on note paper, specifically stating that he would be including these insults in his declaration to any motion and requesting to have a professional and substantive meet and confer. Mr. Freedman then threatened Mr. Hale with malicious prosecution and called him a "piece of shit." At no time did Mr. Hale exchange any insult with Mr. Freedman, raise his voice, or provoke any physical contact. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman got up from his chair, rushed to stand directly in front of Mr. Hale, mere inches away from him, causing Mr. Freedman's face to be directly in front of that of Mr. Hale. Mr. Freedman then called Mr. Hale a "pussy" and swung his fist at Mr. Hale's face, stopping directly in front of his face, without making contact. Shocked, Mr. Hale nonetheless remained composed and attempted to address Mr. Hardy behind Mr. Freedman, in hopes that counsel could get the meet and confer discussion back on track. At some point shortly thereafter, Mr. Freedman left the room, and Mr. Hale and Mr. Hardy conducted the meet and confer session, both then and after the deposition concluded later that day.

- Given Mr. Diesel's asserted objection regarding the lack of security and privacy at 18. Plaintiff's counsel's office, Mr. Hale requested to know what was deficient about their security and/or privacy. Mr. Hardy indicated that Mr. Diesel had a medical condition and that he needed to be able to quickly leave the deposition for his security, including in relation to death threats, without having to go down thirty floors and obtain his vehicle from an underground parking lot. Mr. Hardy also asserted that Mr. Diesel would need his personal security with him.
- 19. Mr. Hale then offered to conduct the next day's deposition at defense counsel's office. Mr. Hardy again asserted that Mr. Diesel was not in the city. Mr. Hale asked when Mr. Diesel left the city and where he was, but Mr. Hardy would not provide that information. Mr. Hardy laid out several conditions for a rescheduled deposition of Vin Diesel: (1) that the deposition be conducted for no more than seven hours; (2) that a protective order be in place to protect Defendant's financial, medical, and sexual privacy; (3) that the deposition take place at defense counsel's office

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- or remotely; and (4) that the deposition only occur following the hearing on Defendant's just-filed Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication, set for October 7, 2025, nearly two months after the current trial date of August 18, 2025.
- 20. At no time did Mr. Hale agree to forego filing a Motion to Compel while the parties further met and conferred, at an Informal Discovery Conference, or in any other venue.
- 21. Samantha Vincent – Mr. Diesel's sister – and Valentino Morales – Mr. Diesel's security and close friend – already confirmed at their depositions that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles, California.
- Plaintiff's counsel's office is located in the PwC building on 7th and Figueroa, which 22. is home to Seyfarth Shaw and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. Like many buildings downtown, it has multiple 24/7 dedicated security personnel. Entrance is restricted per floor, and visitors may only access a particular floor if they have been added to a security list and been ushered to an appropriate elevator by security.
- 23. I have been practicing law since 2015. I primarily litigate wrongful termination of employment and discrimination cases in both state and federal court on behalf of plaintiffs, including cases based upon violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act and the California Labor Code.
- 24. I am a graduate of the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law and of Harvard University.
- 25. In January of 2023, my colleagues and I tried Galvan v. United Parcel Service, et al. (LASC Case No. BC703891), which resulted in a \$5.4 million verdict.
- 26. I have been confirmed legal fees at an hourly rate of \$850.00 by Judge Lipner of Department 72.
- 27. Throughout my practice as an attorney on plaintiff's side, I have become familiar with customary billing rates for attorneys of my experience level and title. I understand that my hourly rate as an associate attorney of a plaintiff's law firm is at least comparable, if not below, the hourly rates of other attorneys in similar situations.
 - I am familiar with the proper procedure for calculating hourly bills. I understand 28.

which tasks are billable and which are not. All of the time that I spent on this motion was necessary to prepare it properly and diligently.

29. I have primarily handled the discovery issues in this action. I have spent approximately one hour meeting and conferring with Defendant's counsel regarding the motion, including drafting and revising correspondence and participating in conferences regarding the same. I also spent more than 5 hours preparing and revising all briefing in connection with the instant Motion to Compel, including in preparing this declaration and preparing and revising the brief, notice, and proposed order (6 hours X \$850.00 = \$5,100.00). I anticipate that it will take me an additional 2.5 hours to review Defendant's opposition, prepare a reply brief in support of the motion, and prepare for and attend oral argument on this motion (2.5 hours X \$850.00 = \$2,125.00). I was also required to cancel my hotel reservation due to the cancellation of Defendant's deposition, with a fee in the amount of \$230.07. As such, Plaintiff has incurred fees and costs in the amount of \$5,330.07 and is likely to incur costs in the amount of \$2,125.00, for a total of \$7,455.07.

I declare, under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: June 26, 2025.

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL

Matthew T. Hale



Journal Technologies Court Portal

Make a Reservation

ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.

Case Number: 23STCV31143 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Wrongful Termination

Date Filed: 2023-12-21 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71

Reservation	
Case Name: ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.	Case Number: 23STCV31143
Type: Motion to Compel (Motion to Compel Party Deposition)	Status: RESERVED
Filing Party: Asta Jonasson (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71
Date/Time: 08/11/2025 8:30 AM	Number of Motions:
Reservation ID: 374377214511	Confirmation Code: CR-FWVPEPZZCBUZ2FMFB

Fees			
Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion to Compel (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment	
Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE
Account Number: n/a	Authorization: n/a
Payment Date: n/a	



Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 293 of 407

EXHIBIT 1

NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of Defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on May 7, 2024, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

By:

DATED: February 26, 2024 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

Brian L. Williams Claire-Lise Y. Kutlay Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 296 of 407

EXHIBIT 2

¢	ase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL	Document 402-2	Filed 07/09/25	Page 297 of 407
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	FREEDMAN TAITELMA Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. (S Sean M. Hardy, Esq. (SBN Jason Sunshine (SBN 3360 1801 Century Park East, 5t Los Angeles, CA 90067 Tel: (310) 201-0005 bfreedman@ftllp.com smhardy@ftllp.com jsunshine@ftllp.com Attorneys for Defendant VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MAR	SBN 151990) 266466) 162) h Floor	ENT)	
8	SUPER	IOR COURT OF TH	IE STATE OF CA	LIFORNIA
9		FOR THE COUNTY	Y OF LOS ANGEI	LES
10				
11	ASTA JONASSON, an inc	lividual,	Case No.: 23STC	V31143
12	Plair	ntiff,	[Assigned for all Crowley, Dept. 7	purposes to Judge Daniel M. 1]
13	VS.		OBJECTIONS T	
14 15	VIN DIESEL (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), an individual; SAMANTHA VINCENT, an individual; ONE RACE PRODUCTIONS,	DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)		
16	INC., a California corporat FILMS, INC., a California	ion; ONE RACE corporation; and	Date: May 7, 20	024
17	DOES 1 to 20, inclusive,		Time: 9:00 a.m. Place: Greenber	rg Gross LLP gueroa Street, 30 th Floor
18	Defe	endants.	Los Ange	eles, CA 90017
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	OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE		I DEFENDANT VIN DIE CENT)	SEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's notice of the May 7, 2024 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

I.

OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- 1. The deposition was unilaterally set without any consideration for either the deponent or counsel's availability, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(1). Consideration has not been given in scheduling this deposition because Plaintiff did not clear the dates and time with counsel, and neither the deponent nor his counsel of record are available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310, that any deposition proceed via remote video, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally <u>Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court</u> (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.
- 4. Defendant objects to the notice of deposition in that it is reasonably calculated to result in the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets without the entry of a mutually-acceptable protective order.
- 5. The deposition was unilaterally set prior to the initially-noticed deposition of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson, without the agreement of counsel, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(3).
- 6. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed.

7. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, et seq. DATED: May 1, 2024 FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant VIN DIÉSEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 301 of 407

EXHIBIT 3

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on April 29, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034.415, the Deponent is directed to produce the documents and things set forth below no later than three business days before the deposition.

DEFINITIONS

Words in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS in these definitions, instructions, and Requests are defined as follows:

- 1. The term "DOCUMENT(S)" means all documents and electronically stored information—including but not limited to all emails, text messages, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, video and sound recordings, images, worksheets, and other data and data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation into a reasonably usable form, and includes COMMUNICATIONS.
- 2. The term "COMMUNICATION(S)" means and refers to all correspondence, discussions, conversations, interviews, telephone calls, emails, instant messages, voice mail messages, negotiations, notices, agreements, understandings, meetings, recordings, audiotapes, videotapes, transcripts, facsimiles, telegrams, charts, spreadsheets, visual images, presentations, and all other transmissions of information, thoughts, documents, electronically stored information, or ideas between two or more PERSONS.
 - 3. The terms "YOU" and "YOUR" means and refers to defendant Vin Diesel.
- 4. The terms "any" and "all" are interchangeable and shall be construed disjunctively, conjunctively, or both, as necessary to bring within the scope of this discovery request all matters

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which might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

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- 5. The term "each" means "each and every."

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7. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

The term "including" means "including, but not limited to."

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INSTRUCTIONS

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- 1. The original of each responsive item (or a legible copy if the original is not within YOUR possession, custody, or control) shall be identified and produced at the above-stated date, time, and place unless complete and legible copies of each responsive item are received at the above-referenced address on or before the specified production date. Any such production of copies is without prejudice to Propounding Party's right to inspect and/or copy the original of each DOCUMENT or tangible thing at a future date.
- 2. These Requests seek the production of DOCUMENTS, and electronically stored information ("ESI"), in their native format, unless some other format is agreed to in writing by Propounding Party's counsel of record.
- 3. ESI must be produced with all "metadata" intact. ("Metadata" means the data embedded in electronic versions of a document that show how, when and by whom the document was created, accessed or modified.)
- 4. Any request for a DOCUMENT shall be construed to include any and all drafts, versions, or revisions of such DOCUMENT.
- 5. These Requests seek the production of all responsive DOCUMENTS within YOUR possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such DOCUMENTS are possessed directly by YOU.
- 6. In the event any DOCUMENTS responsive to these Requests are withheld from production based upon a claim of attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product doctrine, or any other privilege or protection from discovery, YOU are requested to provide a privilege log in which YOU explain the basis of the privilege or other protection you are claiming, and provide a description of the DOCUMENTS YOU are withholding sufficient to support the basis for withholding the DOCUMENTS.

All emails referring to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: All text messages YOU sent relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson. DATED: April 7, 2025 GREENBERG GROSS LLP By: Brian L. Williams Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 308 of 407

EXHIBIT 4



Matthew T. Hale Direct Dial: (213) 334-7060 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com

April 7, 2025

VIA EMAIL ONLY

Bryan J. Freedman
Sean M. Hardy
Jason Sunshine
FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angles, CA 90067
bfreedman@ftllp.com
smhardy@ftllp.com
jsunshine@ftllp.com

Re: Asta Jonasson v. One Race Films, Inc., et al.

Counsel:

Enclosed please find notices of deposition for defendants Vin Diesel and Samantha Vincent and witnesses Valentino Morales and Thyrale Thai. If any of the noticed dates are not workable for the deponents' schedules, please let us know as soon as possible, and propose alternative dates that fall before the end of May 2025. Furthermore, counsel has previously objected that defendants Vin Diesel and Samantha Vincent *may* not reside within 150 miles of downtown Los Angeles. If these defendants do not reside within 150 miles of downtown Los Angeles, please notify our office of these defendants' city of residence, and we will coordinate a convenient location.

We are happy to accommodate reasonable scheduling conflicts, but considering the upcoming trial date, we will be completing these depositions by the end of May 2025.

Very truly yours,

Matthew T. Hale

Encls.

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 310 of 407

EXHIBIT 5

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's notice of the April 29, 2025 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

I.

OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- The deposition was unilaterally set without any consideration for either the deponent or counsel's availability, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(1). Consideration has not been given in scheduling this deposition because Plaintiff did not clear the dates and time with counsel, and neither the deponent nor his counsel of record are available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel in the presence of a deposition officer. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310(a), that any deposition proceed via remote means, that the deposition officer not be physically present at the time of the deposition, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.
- 4. The deposition was unilaterally set prior to the initially-noticed deposition of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson, without the agreement of counsel, in violation of Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rule Appendix 3.A(e)(3).
- 5. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by Code of Civil Procedure section 2025,290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed.
- 6. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, et seq.

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- 7. Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents in connection with the Notice. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the California Code of Civil Procedure, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.260; 1013(e).
- Defendant objects that the deposition was noticed for a period in which a dispositive motion is pending. Good cause exists to stay any deposition until after a ruling on such motion. Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673; Terminals Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 234, 247.

II.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

The following responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Any document or thing supplied in response to any request is subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and admissibility, and to any and all other objections on any ground that would require the exclusion of any document or thing, or portion thereof, if such document or thing were offered in evidence, all of which objections and grounds are expressly reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial.

No incidental or implied admissions are intended by the responses herein. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agree to supply, a document or thing in response to any request should not be taken as an admission that the Defendant accepts or admits the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such request or in said document, or that such document or thing constitutes admissible evidence. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agrees to supply any document or thing in response to any request is not intended to be and shall not be construed to be a waiver of any part of any objection to any such request, or any part of any General Objection.

The responses herein only apply to those documents or things currently in Defendant's possession. Defendant has not completed investigation of the facts relating to this matter, completed discovery in this matter, or completed preparation for trial in this matter. Accordingly,

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GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

- 1. Objection: Defendant objects to the production and inspection of documents at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel at their own expense. Defendant may be unable to locate all requested documents by the date specified for production and, therefore, a mutually convenient time and date can be ascertained by contacting the undersigned to make appropriate arrangement. Should Defendant in the future locate any relevant requested documents now in existence but not yet located, Defendant will so advise counsel for Plaintiff, subject to the objections and comments set forth in these responses.
- 2. Objection: Defendant objects to the instructions to the extent that they conflict with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq., or seek to impose additional obligations upon Defendant beyond those set forth under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. Defendant will respond within the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq.
- 3. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent that it requires the production of documents or things, which have previously been made available to the Plaintiff, are equally available to the Plaintiff, or are public records.
- 4. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks original documents, except where there is a legitimate dispute as to the legibility or authenticity of a copy.
- 5. Objection: to each and every request to the extent it seeks the production of documents or things not in the possession, custody or control of Defendant. Defendant would

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27 28 produce only those documents or things, if any, in the possession of Defendant, and would produce documents, if any, in the manner kept by Defendant the usual course of business.

- Defendant objects to the definitions contained in the requests in that 6. Objection: they are incomplete, vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, overbroad and oppressive, and seek to impose obligations on Defendant beyond those imposed by the California Code of Civil Procedure.
- 7. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. Nothing herein is intended to be, nor shall in any way be construed as, a waiver of any attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. To the extent any request may be construed as calling for disclosure of information protected by such privilege or doctrine, a continuing objection to such Request is hereby interposed. No such privileged information will be provided. In the event any privileged information is provided in connection with these responses, such disclosure is inadvertent and is not intended to be, and shall not be deemed, a waiver of such privilege.
- 8. Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information Objection: that is confidential, proprietary, a trade secret or private, or otherwise calls for information protected by the right of privacy contained in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of California, in the United States Constitution or any other applicable privilege or protection recognized under statute or applicable case law.
- 9. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks information that may violate the financial privacy rights of Defendant, third parties and individuals who are protected under the California Constitution.
- 10. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information not relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and would subject Defendant to oppression, harassment, and undue burden

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- 11. Objection: Defendant further objects to each request to the extent that it seeks a legal conclusion and/or an expert opinion.
- 12. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information already in the possession, custody, or control of Plaintiff.
- 13. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it is argumentative and without any foundation.
- 14. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information for periods of time other than periods relevant to the claims in the Complaint, or other than periods of time properly subject to discovery.
- Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the 15. Objection: disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets.
- 16. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information that are not limited in time or scope.
- 17. Defendant objects to each request on the grounds it requests Objection: Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.
- 18. Objection: Because Defendant have not concluded their discovery and investigation in this action, they specifically reserve the right to amend and/or supplement their responses to the requests.
- 19. Objection: Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents, and each of them. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the California Code of Civil Procedure, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031.260; 1013(e).

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- 20. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of "DOCUMENTS" to the extent that it conflicts with the provisions of *Evidence Code* section 250 and/or the *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.010. *et seq.*, or seek to impose additional obligation upon Defendant beyond those set forth under *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.010.
- 21. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "DOCUMENT(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 22. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "COMMUNICATION(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 23. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOU" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 25. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOUR" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.

Defendant incorporates by reference these general objections to each response below.

IV.

OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

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Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search

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electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain

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confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating

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to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be

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an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of

other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation. Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating

to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably

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particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal. App. 4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal. App. 3d 141.

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OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

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Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav—On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain

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confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114

Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also

Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030.

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(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

DATED: April 24, 2025

LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP

Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Attorneys for Defendant

(IN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

PROOF OF SERVICE

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 340 of 407

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EXHIBIT 6



Matthew T. Hale Direct Dial: (213) 334-7060 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com

May 1, 2025

VIA EMAIL ONLY

Bryan J. Freedman
Sean M. Hardy
Jason Sunshine
FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angles, CA 90067
bfreedman@ftllp.com
smhardy@ftllp.com
jsunshine@ftllp.com

Re: Asta Jonasson v. One Race Films, Inc., et al.

Counsel:

I write to meet and confer regarding Vin Diesel's general objections to Plaintiff's deposition subpoena.

First, Mr. Diesel's objection based on scheduling is not well-taken. Plaintiff is not required to "clear dates" before noticing a deposition. A deposition subpoena is valid if it complies with the timing and service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.210 and 2020.220. Plaintiff already initiated a good faith effort to coordinate the deposition, and your office failed to respond in any way until making the instant objection.

Second, Mr. Diesel's objection regarding in-person attendance misinterprets the CCP § 2025.310. The deponent cannot simply elect to be separate from the attorney taking the deposition. It is the attorney or party's election to physically present at the location of the deponent: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent."

Third, Mr. Diesel again fails to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from our office in Downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Instead, Mr. Diesel again uses the qualifying language, "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection. My April 7, 2025 letter even inquired about this previously stated objection, but Mr. Diesel chose to reuse this equivocal objection nonetheless.

Greenberg Gross LLP

May 1, 2025 Page 2

Fourth, Ms. Jonasson's deposition has not been noticed for any future date, no less in the "reasonably near future," as required by the related LASC Local Rule. Defendant has chosen to not re-notice Plaintiff's deposition since early 2024.

Fifth, there is no seven hour limit applicable to employment cases, like this one. (CCP § 2025.290(b)(4)). Further, the notice does not assume any such time period.

Sixth, the objection regarding a failure to comply with requirements of a deposition notice lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with. This objection should be disregarded due to its ambiguity.

Seventh, this objection does not relate to Mr. Diesel sitting for his deposition but rather to the documents demanded in the notice. This dispute will be addressed elsewhere.

Eighth, the objection merely asserts good cause exists to stay the deposition pending the MJOP. The cases cited, *Silver v. City of Los Angeles* (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673 and *Terminal Equip. Co. v. City* (1990) 221 Cal. App. 3d 234 do not stand for this proposition. *Terminal* and *Silver* are both cases where a plaintiff has yet to get past the pleadings stage and the court stated that the plaintiff had to state at least one cause of action before discovery or deposition would be permitted. Of course, this matter is past the pleadings stage, and the MJOP does not even relate to each and every cause of action. Furthermore, the Defendants would need to file a Motion to Stay Discovery in order to stay fact discovery, and they have not done so.

Please let us know when you are available for a call on these topics tomorrow or early next week. Thereafter, we will need to seek relief from the Court.

Very truly yours,

Matthew T. Hale

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EXHIBIT 7

From: Jason Sunshine <jsunshine@lftcllp.com>

Sent: Friday, May 9, 2025 5:18 PM

To: Matthew T. Hale

Cc: Sean M. Hardy; Bryan Freedman; Joanna Rivera; Miles Cooley; Vaneta Birtha; Jemma E.

Dunn; Brian Williams

Subject: [EXT] RE: Jonasson v. Diesel, et al.

Matt:

Further to our meet and confer discussion on Monday, we can confirm that Samantha Vincent is available for deposition on May 29. Non-party Valentino Morales is available for deposition on June 3. Vin Diesel is available in-person on June 24 and June 25. Please confirm those dates, so we can lock them in. We are in the process of obtaining availability from non-party Thyrale Thai and should be in a position to offer the same to you next week. Additionally, per our prior request and discussion, please provide Ms. Jonasson's availability for deposition during this period. Finally, per our prior proposal and discussion on Monday, we reiterate that we have confirmed that Department 71 accepts stipulations and proposed orders to continue trial dates, and that we are amenable to doing so given your protestations regarding timing constraints.

Thanks, Jason

Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY LLP 1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor Los Angeles, California 90067

Direct: (310) 201-4285 Cell: (917) 841-8716 Fax: (310) 201-0045 Web: www.lftcllp.com

Tel: (310) 201-0005

Please note that LFTC's domain name has changed from ftllp.com to lftcllp.com. Emails sent from this domain are not spam.

The information contained in this e-mail message is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the recipient(s) named above. This message may be an attorney-client communication and/or work product and, as such, is privileged and confidential. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us immediately by e-mail and delete the original message.

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EXHIBIT 8

From: Matthew T. Hale

Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2025 10:12 AM

To: Jason Sunshine

Cc: Sean M. Hardy; Bryan Freedman; Joanna Rivera; Miles Cooley; Vaneta Birtha; Jemma E.

Dunn; Brian Williams

Subject: RE: Jonasson v. Diesel, et al.

Hi Jason,

Yes, I'll presume the in-person location is Los Angeles, but please let us know immediately if this is not correct. In the interim, we'll notice them for our LA office. I can confirm the dates for Valentino Morales (6/3) and Vin Diesel (6/24-25). We will notice these depositions shortly.

We will need additional dates for Samantha Vincent's deposition as 5/29 does not work for us. Please provide those and dates for Ms. Thai as soon as possible. Thank you.

We are not amenable to continuing the trial.

Matthew T. Hale

Counsel - Assistant Director of Litigation | Greenberg Gross LLP

One Summerlin | 1980 Festival Plaza Drive | Suite 730 | Las Vegas, NV 89135 Direct 702.777.0891 | Main 702.777.0888 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com



Los Angeles | Orange County | Las Vegas | New York

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EXHIBIT 9

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.010 *et seq.*, Plaintiff Asta Jonasson will take the deposition of defendant Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent). The deposition will take place at the office of Greenberg Gross LLP, 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90017. The deposition shall commence on June 24-25, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. and shall continue from day to day thereafter until completed. The deposition will be recorded using audio or video technology and will be conducted using the stenographic method.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE THAT, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2034.415, the Deponent is directed to produce the documents and things set forth below no later than three business days before the deposition.

DEFINITIONS

Words in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS in these definitions, instructions, and Requests are defined as follows:

- 1. The term "DOCUMENT(S)" means all documents and electronically stored information—including but not limited to all emails, text messages, writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, video and sound recordings, images, worksheets, and other data and data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation into a reasonably usable form, and includes COMMUNICATIONS.
- 2. The term "COMMUNICATION(S)" means and refers to all correspondence, discussions, conversations, interviews, telephone calls, emails, instant messages, voice mail messages, negotiations, notices, agreements, understandings, meetings, recordings, audiotapes, videotapes, transcripts, facsimiles, telegrams, charts, spreadsheets, visual images, presentations, and all other transmissions of information, thoughts, documents, electronically stored information, or ideas between two or more PERSONS.
 - 3. The terms "YOU" and "YOUR" means and refers to defendant Vin Diesel.
- 4. The terms "any" and "all" are interchangeable and shall be construed disjunctively, conjunctively, or both, as necessary to bring within the scope of this discovery request all matters

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which might otherwise be construed to be outside of its scope.

- 5. The term "each" means "each and every."
- 6. The term "including" means "including, but not limited to."
- 7. The use of the singular form of any word includes the plural and vice versa.

INSTRUCTIONS

- 1. The original of each responsive item (or a legible copy if the original is not within YOUR possession, custody, or control) shall be identified and produced at the above-stated date, time, and place unless complete and legible copies of each responsive item are received at the above-referenced address on or before the specified production date. Any such production of copies is without prejudice to Propounding Party's right to inspect and/or copy the original of each DOCUMENT or tangible thing at a future date.
- 2. These Requests seek the production of DOCUMENTS, and electronically stored information ("ESI"), in their native format, unless some other format is agreed to in writing by Propounding Party's counsel of record.
- 3. ESI must be produced with all "metadata" intact. ("Metadata" means the data embedded in electronic versions of a document that show how, when and by whom the document was created, accessed or modified.)
- 4. Any request for a DOCUMENT shall be construed to include any and all drafts, versions, or revisions of such DOCUMENT.
- 5. These Requests seek the production of all responsive DOCUMENTS within YOUR possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such DOCUMENTS are possessed directly by YOU.
- 6. In the event any DOCUMENTS responsive to these Requests are withheld from production based upon a claim of attorney-client privilege, attorney work-product doctrine, or any other privilege or protection from discovery, YOU are requested to provide a privilege log in which YOU explain the basis of the privilege or other protection you are claiming, and provide a description of the DOCUMENTS YOU are withholding sufficient to support the basis for withholding the DOCUMENTS.

All emails referring to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

All text messages YOU sent relating to plaintiff Asta Jonasson.

DATED: May 13, 2025 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

By: Brian L. Williams

Matthew T. Hale
Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson

Jemma E. Dunn

-6-

1 **PROOF OF SERVICE** Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. 2 **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On May 13, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS on the 8 interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + 11 COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 14 Emails: bfreedman@lftcllp.com; smhardy@lftcllp.com; jsunshine@lftcllp.com; 15 Attorneys for Defendants Once Race Films, Inc., vbirtha@lftcllp.com; One Race Production, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Mark 16 cpuello@lftcllp.com; Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent 17 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the 18 e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 21 Executed on May 13, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 22 23 Hazelle T Nunez 24 25 26 27 28

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 356 of 407

EXHIBIT 10

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 357 of 407

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Vin Diesel ("Defendant"), pursuant to *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.410, hereby objects to Plaintiff Asta Jonasson's amended notice of the June 24 to June 25, 2025 deposition of Defendant (the "Notice"), on the following grounds:

I.

OBJECTIONS TO NOTICE OF DEPOSITION

- 1. The Defendant is no longer available to attend on the date and time specified in the Notice.
- 2. The deposition was improperly noticed to require Defendant's in-person attendance at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel in the presence of a deposition officer. Defendant objects and elects pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.310(a), that any deposition proceed via remote means, that the deposition officer not be physically present at the time of the deposition, and that Defendant not be physically present at the time of the deposition.
- 3. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence, in violation of *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.250, subsection (a) and Code of Civil Procedure section 1989. See generally <u>Toyota Motor Corp. v. Superior Court</u> (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1107.
- 4. Defendant objects to the Notice in that it violates the seven-hour limitation on the length of a deposition mandated by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2025.290. The Notice improperly requires that the deposition to continue "day-to-day" until completed. The Notice improperly calls for Defendant's deposition on two consecutive dates. The burden on Defendant of an endless deposition outweighs the needs of the case.
- 5. Defendant objects to the notice of deposition in that it is reasonably calculated to result in the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets. Defendant objects into any inquiry into matters protected by Defendant's right to privacy, including without limitation Defendant's sexual history and financial condition. Defendant is entitled to a protective order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.420 and Civil Code Section 3295 to prevent inquiry into improper subject matter and topics.

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- 6. Defendant objects to the location of the deposition set forth in the Notice, as such location is inadequate to protect Defendant's personal safety and privacy. Defendant will meet and confer regarding the taking of a remote video deposition and potential alternative locations.
- 7. Defendant objects to the Notice to the extent it fails to comply with the requirements on Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.210, et seq.
- 8. Defendant objects that the deposition was noticed for a period in which a dispositive motion is pending. Good cause exists to stay any deposition until after a ruling on such motion. Silver v. City of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal. App. 2d 673; Terminals Equip. Co. v. City (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 234, 247.

II.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT REGARDING REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

The following responses are made solely for the purpose of this action. Any document or thing supplied in response to any request is subject to all objections as to competence, relevance, materiality, propriety, and admissibility, and to any and all other objections on any ground that would require the exclusion of any document or thing, or portion thereof, if such document or thing were offered in evidence, all of which objections and grounds are expressly reserved and may be interposed at the time of trial.

No incidental or implied admissions are intended by the responses herein. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agree to supply, a document or thing in response to any request should not be taken as an admission that the Defendant accepts or admits the existence of any facts set forth or assumed by such request or in said document, or that such document or thing constitutes admissible evidence. The fact that Defendant has supplied, or has agreed to supply, or hereafter agrees to supply any document or thing in response to any request is not intended to be and shall not be construed to be a waiver of any part of any objection to any such request, or any part of any General Objection.

The responses herein only apply to those documents or things currently in Defendant's possession. Defendant has not completed investigation of the facts relating to this matter, completed discovery in this matter, or completed preparation for trial in this matter. Accordingly,

Defendant reserve all rights with respect to documents or things which may be subsequently located or discovered, including, without limitation, the right to use such documents at trial, and further reserves any and all rights and any and all objections to any responsive documents or things which may hereafter come into Defendant's possession, or which hereafter may be determined to be within the scope of any such request. Defendant disclaims any legal obligation to supplement the responses herein.

III.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION

- 1. Objection: Defendant objects to the production and inspection of documents at the offices of Plaintiff's counsel at their own expense. Defendant may be unable to locate all requested documents by the date specified for production and, therefore, a mutually convenient time and date can be ascertained by contacting the undersigned to make appropriate arrangement. Should Defendant in the future locate any relevant requested documents now in existence but not yet located, Defendant will so advise counsel for Plaintiff, subject to the objections and comments set forth in these responses.
- 2. Objection: Defendant objects to the instructions to the extent that they conflict with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq., or seek to impose additional obligations upon Defendant beyond those set forth under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. Defendant will respond within the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.010. et seq.
- 3. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent that it requires the production of documents or things, which have previously been made available to the Plaintiff, are equally available to the Plaintiff, or are public records.
- 4. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks original documents, except where there is a legitimate dispute as to the legibility or authenticity of a copy.
- 5. Objection: to each and every request to the extent it seeks the production of documents or things not in the possession, custody or control of Defendant. Defendant would

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27 28 produce only those documents or things, if any, in the possession of Defendant, and would produce documents, if any, in the manner kept by Defendant the usual course of business.

- 6. Objection: Defendant objects to the definitions contained in the requests in that they are incomplete, vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, overbroad and oppressive, and seek to impose obligations on Defendant beyond those imposed by the California Code of Civil Procedure.
- 7. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. Nothing herein is intended to be, nor shall in any way be construed as, a waiver of any attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, the common interest privilege, the joint defense privilege or any other applicable privilege or doctrine. To the extent any request may be construed as calling for disclosure of information protected by such privilege or doctrine, a continuing objection to such Request is hereby interposed. No such privileged information will be provided. In the event any privileged information is provided in connection with these responses, such disclosure is inadvertent and is not intended to be, and shall not be deemed, a waiver of such privilege.
- 8. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information that is confidential, proprietary, a trade secret or private, or otherwise calls for information protected by the right of privacy contained in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of California, in the United States Constitution or any other applicable privilege or protection recognized under statute or applicable case law.
- 9. Objection: Defendant objects to each and every request to the extent it seeks information that may violate the financial privacy rights of Defendant, third parties and individuals who are protected under the California Constitution.
- 10. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks information not relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and would subject Defendant to oppression, harassment, and undue burden

and expense not commensurate with any legitimate discovery need.

- 11. Objection: Defendant further objects to each request to the extent that it seeks a legal conclusion and/or an expert opinion.
- 12. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks information already in the possession, custody, or control of Plaintiff.
- 13. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it is argumentative and without any foundation.
- 14. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information for periods of time other than periods relevant to the claims in the Complaint, or other than periods of time properly subject to discovery.
- 15. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent it seeks the disclosure of sensitive, proprietary, or confidential business information or trade secrets.
- 16. Objection: Defendant objects to each request to the extent that it seeks the production, identification, or disclosure of documents or information that are not limited in time or scope.
- 17. Objection: Defendant objects to each request on the grounds it requests

 Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is
 reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and
 produced the ESI.
- 18. Objection: Because Defendant have not concluded their discovery and investigation in this action, they specifically reserve the right to amend and/or supplement their responses to the requests.
- 19. Objection: Defendant objects to the 14 requests for production of documents, and each of them. Plaintiff served the requests for production of documents on April 7, 2025 by electronic service. Such a time frame is insufficient under the *California Code of Civil Procedure*, which contemplates 32 days when responding to document requests served by electronic service. *See* Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2031,260; 1013(e).

- 20. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of "DOCUMENTS" to the extent that it conflicts with the provisions of *Evidence Code* section 250 and/or the *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.010. *et seq.*, or seek to impose additional obligation upon Defendant beyond those set forth under *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.010.
- 21. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "DOCUMENT(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 22. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "COMMUNICATION(S)" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 23. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOU" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.
- 25. Objection: Defendant objects to the definition of the term "YOUR" to the extent that it is vague, ambiguous, and overbroad.

Defendant incorporates by reference these general objections to each response below.

OBJECTIONS TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither

relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected

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by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably

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accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States

Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

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Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav—On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court

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(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031,030.

(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully

set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (*See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and

burdensome.

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Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also

other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither

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relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected

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by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal, App. 3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably

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accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States

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Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

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Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. See Fortunato v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court

(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and

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communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

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Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. *See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior* Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; *see also Brown v. Superior Court* (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (*See, Coito v. Superior Ct.*, 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030.

(See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal.App.2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it seek information of Defendant and third parties that is protected by the right to privacy.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and unintelligible.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it is redundant with and duplicative of other discovery propounded by Plaintiff to Defendant in this litigation.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's financial condition in violation of California Civil Code § 3295.

Defendant objects to the request on the ground that it improperly seeks discovery relating to Defendant's confidential financial affairs. *See Fortunato v. Superior Court* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 475, 480-481.

Defendant objects to the request to the extent it seeks the production of records protected by the taxpayer privilege. See Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 1; see also Brown v. Superior Court (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 141.

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OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14:

Defendant incorporates the Preliminary Statement and General Objections as though fully set forth herein.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents from a remote time period.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents and communications protected by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine (See, Coito v. Superior Ct., 54 Cal.4th 480 (2012)), or other applicable privilege.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential information protected by the right to privacy under the California or United States Constitution or applicable statutory or common law.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that contain confidential business or proprietary information protected by trade secret.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant to this litigation nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that the request fails to designate the documents to be inspected either by specifically describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category of item as required by *Code of Civil Procedure* section 2031.030. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 216, 221-223; see also Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 786-787.)

Defendant objects to the request on the grounds that to comply with the request would be an undue burden and expense on the Defendant. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 225-226.) The request is calculated to annoy and harass the Defendant.

Defendant objects to this request on the grounds it requests Defendant to search electronically-stored information ("ESI") without regard to whether the ESI is reasonably accessible, or whether it would impose and undue burden or cost to search, review, and produced the ESI.

Attorneys for Defendant

VIN DIÈSEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT)

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Greenberg Gross LLP 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30 th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90017		
By Personal Service. I personally delivered the above listed documents to the persons at the addresses listed above.		
State. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.		
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F	ase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 387 of 407		
1	PROOF OF SERVICE		
2	STATE OF CALIFORNIA]		
3	COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES]		
4	I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18		
5	and not a party to the within action; my business is EXPRESS NETWORK, LLC, 1605 W. Olympic Blvd, Suite 800, Los Angeles, CA 90015.		
6	On June 20, 2025, I served the foregoing document(s) described:		
7	OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR VINCENT) AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION		
8	OF DOCUMENTS		
9	on the interested parties in this action \(\subseteq \) by placing \(\subseteq \) the original \(\subseteq \) a true copy thereof enclosed in seal envelopes addressed as follows:		
10	Brian L. Williams		
11	Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale		
12	Greenberg Gross, LLP 650 Town Center Dr, Ste 1700 Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7025 Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson		
13			
14			
15 16	By Personal Service. I personally delivered the above listed documents to the persons at the addresses listed above.		
17	State. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.		
18	Executed on June 20, 2025 at Los Angeles, California.		
19	EVDDESS NETWODV		
20	EXPRESS NETWORK		
21	Daniel (half)		
22	Print Name (Messenger) Signature of Declarant (Messenger)		
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Qase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 388 of 407 OBJECTIONS TO AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITION TO DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL (F/K/A MARK SINCLAIR) AND REOUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 389 of 407

EXHIBIT 11

From: Matthew T. Hale

Sent: Friday, June 20, 2025 5:12 PM

To: Bryan Freedman; Sean M. Hardy; Jason Sunshine

Cc: Brian Williams; Jemma E. Dunn; Hazelle T. Nunez; Vaneta Birtha

Subject: Jonasson v. Vin Diesel, et al

Counsel:

We are in receipt of defendant Vin Diesel's objections to Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Deposition and Requests for Production of Documents. For the first time since these dates (June 24 and 25) were provided by his counsel on May 9, 2025, and despite his agreement to appear in Los Angeles, Defendant Vin Diesel now suddenly asserts that he is not available to attend his duly noticed deposition. Please provide, by end of day this coming Monday June 23, 2025, multiple alternative dates for his deposition that fall on or before July 18th. Given the apparent gamesmanship and bad faith nature of this objection, if we do not receive these multiple dates by Monday, we will move forward with a Motion to Compel Vin Diesel's deposition and will take a notice of non-appearance on Tuesday. As to the remainder of Defendant's objections, please see the below:

- 2. Mr. Diesel's objection regarding in-person attendance misinterprets the CCP § 2025.310. The deponent cannot simply elect to be separate from the attorney taking the deposition. It is the attorney or party's election to physically present at the location of the deponent: "Subject to Section 2025.420, any party or attorney of record may, but is not required to, be physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent."
- 3. Mr. Diesel again fails to even straightforwardly assert that he in fact lives more than 150 miles from our office in Downtown Los Angeles, where the deposition is to take place. Instead, Mr. Diesel again uses the qualifying language, "to the extent the deposition is noticed for a location more than 150 miles from Defendant's residence." Mr. Diesel's objection is so vague and uncertain as to operate as a waiver of any such objection. Furthermore, Samantha Vincent already confirmed that Mr. Diesel currently lives in Los Angeles.
- 4. There is no seven-hour limit applicable to employment cases, like this one. (CCP § 2025.290(b)(4)). Further, the notice does not assume any such time period.
- 5. Defendant asserts that he shouldn't have to attend his deposition because questions *may* be asked that implicate his privacy. Not only is this not a ground to forego attendance altogether, but also there is a protective order in this matter in place to protect truly confidential portions of the deposition.
- 6. There is absolutely no indication that Plaintiff's office, which has ample security staff and precautions, is inadequate to protect Mr. Diesel's personal safety and privacy.
- 7. The objection regarding a failure to comply with requirements of a deposition notice lacks any specificity as to what requirements the notice fails to comply with. This objection should be disregarded due to its ambiguity.
- 8. The objection incorrectly asserts that there is a dispositive motion pending.

Matthew T. Hale

Counsel - Assistant Director of Litigation | Greenberg Gross LLP

One Summerlin | 1980 Festival Plaza Drive | Suite 730 | Las Vegas, NV 89135 Direct 702.777.0891 | Main 702.777.0888 MHale@GGTrialLaw.com



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EXHIBIT 12

From: Sean M. Hardy <smhardy@lftcllp.com>
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2025 8:09 AM

To: Matthew T. Hale

Cc: Brian Williams; Jemma E. Dunn; Hazelle T. Nunez; Vaneta Birtha; Bryan Freedman; Jason

Sunshine

Subject: [EXT] RE: Jonasson v. Vin Diesel, et al

Counsel,

We respectfully disagree with your position below, and will meet and confer with you on this issue in person today at your office. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Sean M. Hardy

Sean M. Hardy, Esq.
Partner
LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067

Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045

Web: www.ftllp.com

1 PROOF OF SERVICE 2 Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On June 26, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as DECLARATION OF MATTHEW T. HALE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL'S DEPOSITION & REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS 8 on the interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Attorneys for Defendants One Race Films, Inc., Sean M. Hardy, Esq. One Race Productions, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Mark Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 Emails: bfreedman@ftllp.com 14 smhardy@ftllp.com jsunshine@ftllp.com vbirtha@ftllp.com 15 cpuello@ftllp.com 16 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any 18 electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 Executed on June 26, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 21 22 23 24 25 26

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[PROPOSED] ORDER

Filed 07/09/25

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Qase 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2

1 [PROPOSED] ORDER 2 The motion of Plaintiff Asta Jonasson ("Plaintiff") for an order compelling Defendant Vin 3 Diesel ("Defendant") to appear for his deposition and granting sanctions, came on for hearing in 4 Department 71 of the above-entitled court on August 11, 2025 at 8:30 a.m. 5 Having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court hereby **GRANTS** the Motion. 6 THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that Defendant shall, within ten (10) days of this order, appear for his deposition at Plaintiff's office at 601 S. Figueora Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, 7 8 California 90017... 9 THE COURT FURTHER ORDERS that, pursuant to sections 2025.450(a), 2017.010, 2023.030(a), 2023.010(d), and 2023.010(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, Defendant and its 10 11 counsel shall, within thirty (30) days of this order, pay to Plaintiff monetary sanctions in the 12 amount of \$7,455.07, which is the amount reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in connection with this 13 motion. 14 15 Dated: Hon. Daniel M. Crowley 16 Judge of the Superior Court 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

[PROPOSED] ORDER



Journal Technologies Court Portal

Make a Reservation

ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.

Case Number: 23STCV31143 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Wrongful Termination

Date Filed: 2023-12-21 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71

Reservation	
Case Name: ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.	Case Number: 23STCV31143
Type: Motion to Compel (Motion to Compel Party Deposition)	Status: RESERVED
Filing Party: Asta Jonasson (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71
Date/Time: 08/11/2025 8:30 AM	Number of Motions: 1
Reservation ID: 374377214511	Confirmation Code: CR-FWVPEPZZCBUZ2FMFB

Fees			
Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion to Compel (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment	
Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE
Account Number: n/a	Authorization: n/a
Payment Date: n/a	



Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25

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TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on August 11, 2025, at 8:30 a.m., in Department 71 of Stanley Mosk Courthouse at 111 N. Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, plaintiff Asta Jonasson will and hereby does move the Court for an order compelling Defendant Vin Diesel to appear for his deposition and for Defendant Vin Diesel and his counsel, Liner Freedman Taitelman + Cooley to pay sanctions in the amount of \$7,455.07, which is the amount reasonably incurred in connection with these proceedings.

Plaintiff moves to compel Defendant Vin Diesel's deposition after a pattern of evasion and obstruction spanning over a year. Despite multiple notices, good faith efforts to accommodate his schedule, and his counsel's express confirmation of availability for June 24-25, 2025, Defendant served last-minute objections just four days before his scheduled deposition containing recycled, meritless arguments. When Plaintiff's counsel attempted to meet and confer, Defendant's counsel engaged in shocking misconduct, including profanity, threats of malicious prosecution, and physical intimidation, while refusing to provide any legitimate explanation for Defendant's sudden unavailability. Defendant's objections lack merit as they misinterpret applicable statutes, seek to prevent discovery on topics central to Plaintiff's claims, and attempt to delay proceedings until after trial through frivolous procedural maneuvers.

This motion will be based on the Code of Civil Procedure sections 2025.450(a), 2017.010, 2023.030(a), 2023.010(d), and 2023.010(e), the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Declaration of Matthew T. Hale, and exhibits filed along with these papers, and other evidence to be presented at the hearing on this motion.

DATED: June 26, 2025 GREENBERG GROSS LLP

By: /s/ Matthew T. Hale

Brian L. Williams Jemma E. Dunn Matthew T. Hale

Attorneys for Plaintiff Asta Jonasson



Journal Technologies Court Portal

Make a Reservation

ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.

Case Number: 23STCV31143 Case Type: Civil Unlimited Category: Wrongful Termination

Date Filed: 2023-12-21 Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71

Reservation	
Case Name: ASTA JONASSON, AN INDIVIDUAL vs VIN DIESEL, et al.	Case Number: 23STCV31143
Type: Motion to Compel (Motion to Compel Party Deposition)	Status: RESERVED
Filing Party: Asta Jonasson (Plaintiff)	Location: Stanley Mosk Courthouse - Department 71
Date/Time: 08/11/2025 8:30 AM	Number of Motions:
Reservation ID: 374377214511	Confirmation Code: CR-FWVPEPZZCBUZ2FMFB

Fees			
Description	Fee	Qty	Amount
Motion to Compel (name extension)	0.00	1	0.00
TOTAL			\$0.00

Payment		
Amount: \$0.00	Type: NOFEE	
Account Number: n/a	Authorization: n/a	
Payment Date: n/a		

 ♣ Print Receipt
 ♣ Reserve Another Hearing
 ♣ View My Reservations



1 **PROOF OF SERVICE** 2 Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel (f/k/a Mark Sinclair Vincent), et al. **Case No. 23STCV31143** 3 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. I am 5 employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. My business address is 601 S. Figueroa Street, 30th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90017. 6 On June 26, 2025, I served true copies of the following document(s) described as 7 PLAINTIFF ASTA JONASSON'S NOTICE OF MOTION TO COMPEL THE **DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT VIN DIESEL AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS on the** 8 interested parties in this action as follows: 9 Bryan J. Freedman, Esq. Attorneys for Defendants One Race Films, Inc., One Race Productions, Inc., Vin Diesel f/k/a Sean M. Hardy, Esq. Jason H. Sunshine, Esq. Mark Sinclair Vincent, and Samantha Vincent LINER FREEDMAN & TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP 1801 Century Park West, Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045 Emails: bfreedman@ftllp.com 14 smhardy@ftllp.com jsunshine@ftllp.com vbirtha@ftllp.com 15 cpuello@ftllp.com 16 BY E-MAIL OR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION: I caused a copy of the document(s) to be sent from e-mail address HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com to the persons at the e-mail addresses listed in the Service List. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the transmission, any 18 electronic message or other indication that the transmission was unsuccessful. 19 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 20 Executed on June 26, 2025, at Los Angeles, California. 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 405 of 407

EXHIBIT 14

Matthew T. Hale

From: Matthew T. Hale

Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2025 9:37 AM

To: Sean M. Hardy; Brian Williams; Jemma E. Dunn; Hazelle T. Nunez

Cc: Bryan Freedman; Miles Cooley; Jason Sunshine; Joanna Rivera; Vaneta Birtha

Subject: RE: Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel, et al., LASC Case No. 23STCV31143

Hi Sean,

Yes, we will be appearing and opposing the application. Please share the application documents as soon as possible.

Further, please be advised that pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1203(a), I am providing you with notice that Plaintiff will be presenting an *ex parte* application tomorrow morning. Plaintiff will also be presenting this *ex parte* application on Friday, June 27, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 71 of the Stanley Mosk Courthouse located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, California 90012. Plaintiff's *ex parte* application seeks an order compelling Defendant Vin Diesel to appear for his deposition, monetary sanctions against Defendant Vin Diesel and his counsel in the amount of \$5,330.07 for willful misuse of the discovery process, and alternatively, an Order Shortening Time regarding a noticed motion for the same relief. This application is necessitated by Defendant's failure to appear for his properly noticed deposition scheduled for June 24-25, 2025, despite previously confirming his availability. With fact discovery closing on July 18, 2025, and trial set for August 18, 2025, Defendant's continued evasion threatens irreparable prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to obtain essential testimony from Defendant Diesel.

Please confirm whether you intend to oppose this application and whether you will be appearing at the hearing.

Matthew T. Hale

Counsel - Assistant Director of Litigation | Greenberg Gross LLP

One Summerlin | 1980 Festival Plaza Drive | Suite 730 | Las Vegas, NV 89135 Direct 702.777.0891 | Main 702.777.0888

MHale@GGTrialLaw.com



Los Angeles | Orange County | Las Vegas | New York

From: Sean M. Hardy <smhardy@lftcllp.com>

Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2025 8:32 AM

To: Brian Williams <BWilliams@GGTrialLaw.com>; Jemma E. Dunn <JDunn@GGTrialLaw.com>; Matthew T. Hale

<MHale@GGTrialLaw.com>; Hazelle T. Nunez <HNunez@GGTrialLaw.com>

Cc: Bryan Freedman

Sfreedman@lftcllp.com>; Miles Cooley <mcooley@lftcllp.com>; Jason Sunshine <jsunshine@lftcllp.com>; Joanna Rivera <jrivera@lftcllp.com>; Vaneta Birtha <vbirtha@lftcllp.com>

Subject: [EXT] RE: Asta Jonasson v. Vin Diesel, et al., LASC Case No. 23STCV31143

Counsel,

Please allow this message to provide notice pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1204, that on June 27, 2025, at 8:30 A.M. in Department 71 of the Los Angeles Superior Court, located at 111 North Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012, Defendants One Race Productions, Inc., One Race Films, Inc., Vin Diesel, and Samantha

Case 1:24-cv-10049-LJL Document 402-2 Filed 07/09/25 Page 407 of 407

Vincent (collectively, "Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, will appear and apply *ex parte* to the Court for an Order: (1) that the current trial date of August 18, 2025, be vacated and continued to a date on or about November 17, 2025, or in accordance with the Court's calendar; (2) that the current Final Status Conference date of August 8, 2025, be vacated and continued to a date on or about November 10, 2025, or in accordance with the Court's calendar; and (3) that all related motion cut-off and pre-trial dates to comport with the new trial date and final status conference date.

Please advise if counsel for Plaintiff will be appearing and, if so, whether you will oppose the application. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Sean M. Hardy

Sean M. Hardy, Esq.
Partner
LINER FREEDMAN TAITELMAN + COOLEY, LLP
1801 Century Park West, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90067
Telephone: (310) 201-0005

Telephone: (310) 201-0005 Facsimile: (310) 201-0045

Web: www.ftllp.com